JOINT DISCUSSIONS

BETWEEN

GEN. THOMAS EWING, OF OHIO,

AND

GOV. STEWART L. WOODFORD, OF NEW YORK,

ON THE

FINANCE QUESTION.

Held at Circleville, Wilmington, Tiffin, and Columbus, Ohio, October 2, 4, 8, and 9, 1875.

COLUMBUS, OHIO.
1876.

JOINT DISCUSSIONS

BETWEEN

GEN. THOMAS EWING, OF OHIO,

AND

GOV. STEWART L. WOODFORD, OF NEW YORK,

ON THE

FINANCE QUESTION

Held at Circleville, Wilmington, Tiffin, and Columbus, Ohio,
October 2, 4, 8, and 9, 1875.

COLUMBUS, OHIO.
1876.

STEREOTYPED AT
FRANKLIN TYPE FOUNDRY
CINCINNATI, OHIO.

PREFACE.

TOWARD the close of the Ohio political campaign of 1875, the Republican and Democratic State Executive Committees arranged for a series of joint discussions upon the finance question, between Governor Stewart L. Woodford, of New York, and General Thomas Ewing, of Ohio; the former representing the Republicans, and the latter, the Democrats.

The undersigned was employed to make a stenographic report of the discussions, merely for convenience of reference. The debates commenced at Shawnee, September 30, and were continued on successive days at Lancaster, Circleville, Wilmington, Galion, Upper Sandusky, Tiffin, and Columbus. The importance of the subjects under discussion, and the ability and fame of the speakers, caused the debates to attract wide attention at the time. The public interest in the question canvassed having in no degree abated, the reporter determined to write out and publish several of the debates. Having been held before different audiences, and the same topics having been, to a large extent, discussed each day, there was necessarily a good deal of repetition. It was therefore deemed undesirable to publish all of them. For that reason only four of the eight debates are published.

The report has been submitted to and revised by Governor Woodford and General Ewing. In several instances, passages occurring in one speech have been omitted in succeeding ones made by the same gentle-

man. Some changes have been made in forms of expression, but *no new matter has been added.*

It is due to the speakers to say that the debate was brought on impromptu, and was continued from place to place each succeeding day, leaving them no time for special preparation.

J. V. LEE.

COLUMBUS, O., *February*, 1876.

DEBATE AT CIRCLEVILLE,

Saturday Afternoon, Oct. 2, 1875.

GOV. WOODFORD'S OPENING SPEECH.

Mr. President and Citizens of Circleville:—

This is the third meeting at which my friend General Ewing and myself have united in debate. In the first, at Shawnee, I endeavored to define the parties to the canvass.

The condition of our politics is somewhat singular. This is not a discussion between the old National Democratic party and the National Republican party. For while I stand where the National Republican party stood in the presidential canvass of 1872, my friend Gen. Ewing does not represent the National Democratic party of that year. At its convention in 1872, that National Democratic party resolved in favor of a return to specie payment at the earliest possible moment. My friend is not here to advocate that. Nor does my friend represent his old Liberal Republican allies, who stood with the National Democratic party in that presidential contest; for their platform was identical with the platform of the Democrats, in requiring a return to specie payment at the earliest practicable moment. My friend does not represent the Democrats of California, nor of Oregon, nor of Nevada, nor of Colorado, nor of Texas, nor of New Mexico, nor of Nebraska, nor of Illinois. He does not represent to-day a single Democratic convention held east of the Alleghany mountains nor the Democrats of a single eastern State, except Pennsylvania.

The family is small. Like the Siamese Twins, there are but two of them, Chang and Eng. [Laughter.] Like the Siamese twins, these Ohio and Pennsylvania inflationists must live and move and have their being together, and when one dies the other must die also. [Laughter.] If inflation Chang shall meet an untimely end in Ohio

this October, inflation Eng will have been a corpse in Pennsylvania long before the November election.

But my friend will tell you that while he does not represent the Democratic party of the past he represents the Democratic party of the future. He will tell you that his party is organized in opposition to what, in eloquent language, he will style "the money power" of the land. Should he speak here, as he has spoken elsewhere, he will tell you that this "money power" is centered in New York, and that in New York it has its main strength in Wall Street.

Unfortunately for him the only inflationists in New York are the gamblers of Wall Street, to whom it is an advantage to have gold bobbing up and bobbing down like the mercury in a thermometer. While every man in New York, who has an interest in the welfare of the country, has an interest in *your* welfare. To whom does New York sell? To Ohio and the West. If Ohio is not prosperous, how can New York be paid? Our interests are one with yours. When the farmer does well, the trader in the village does well. When the trader in the village does well, the merchant in the city does well. And when the merchant in the city does well, then the men who control the great springs of business at New York do well. The only men in New York who have an interest in inflation are, as I have said, the gamblers of Wall Street; and, without intending it, my friend represents them in his purpose to-day. [Laughter.]

I stated at Shawnee what I thought was the central issue of this canvass. I read the words which I used, so that no injustice may be done: "Shall the Government now, of its own sovereign pleasure, print, and hereafter continue to print, irredeemable paper, and stamp it with the alluring name of money and make it a legal tender in the payment of debt?" My distinguished opponent then claimed that I had not stated all the issues, but substantially admitted that I had correctly stated what he insists is after all only one of the issues of the debate.

Let me read his exact words, as taken by the stenographic reporter at Shawnee, and then I can not possibly do either him or myself injustice. Gen. Ewing said: "The gentleman (referring to me) states what he understands to be the issue that we are discussing to-night. His blanket doesn't cover the horse. So far as he states it I have no special reason to complain; but he states only a fragment of the issue. He says the question is whether this Government shall issue legal tender paper money, for that it is stripped of its gloss. I am willing," adds Gen. Ewing, "to accept that issue. The Government has the

right to issue it" (that is, the legal tender money), "and it ought to issue it." We have, then, one issue that is clearly and distinctly made on one side, and directly and in terms accepted on the other.

At Lancaster, in the second debate yesterday, my friend claimed that the central question of this discussion is the repeal of the resumption law. That law was passed on January 14th, 1875, to go into operation on the 1st of January, 1879. Now that there may be no quibbling on my part, and there certainly will not be on his, let me read the language of this issue from the Democratic platform. I think my friend was the chairman of the committee that reported it; were you not?

Gen. Ewing.—Yes.

Gov. Woodford.—Then I have the pleasure of discussing the color of the eye and the length of the hair of the baby right in the presence of its father. [Laughter.] Let me read the words of the 8th section of the Democratic Ohio platform. I am compelled to call it the *Democratic Ohio* platform, because it is not as yet Democratic anywhere except in Ohio and Pennsylvania.

Eighth.—"That the contraction of the currency hitherto made by the Republican party, and the further contraction proposed by it with a view to the forced resumption of specie payments, has already brought disaster to the business of the country, and threatens it with general bankruptcy and ruin. We demand that this policy be abandoned, and that the volume of the currency be made and kept equal to the wants of trade, leaving the restoration of legal tenders to a par with gold, to be brought about by promoting the industries of the people, and not by destroying them."

The first charge in this article is "the contraction of the currency hitherto made by the Republican party." When was the currency contracted, if at all? There are many who claim that there is more currency afloat to-day than there ever has been at any period since the beginning of the war. But that I am not going to discuss. I will spend no time quibbling on that. This charge is, that the Republican party contracted the currency.

When did the alleged contraction occur? Between 1865 and 1869 almost entirely. Not one-tenth of the alleged contraction occurred after the 4th of March, 1869. Who was president from 1865 to 1869? Andrew Johnson. Who elected him? The Republican party. With whom did he act? With the Democratic party. Who supported him? The Democratic party. Whose administration was it after he forgot the men who put him into power? The administration of the

Democratic party. Who in Ohio was one of the chief and most earnest supporters of that administration? The distinguished gentleman with whom I debate to-day. Who is responsible for the contraction of the currency? Andrew Johnson and Andrew Johnson's Secretary of the Treasury. And who is the man that most fearlessly supported that administration in the State of Ohio? The gentleman with whom I debate. Then it was not the Republican party that contracted the currency. [Applause.]

When was the first law passed with regard to the funding of the debt, which my friend calls the contraction of the currency? It was recommended by Mr. McCulloch, Secretary of the Treasury, in December, 1865. On the 18th of December, 1865, the following resolution was passed by the House of Representatives: "*Resolved,* That this House cordially concurs in the views of the Secretary of the Treasury in relation to the necessity of a contraction of the currency, with a view to as early a resumption of specie payments as the business interests of the country will permit, and we hereby pledge co-operative action to this end as speedily as practicable."

This resolution was adopted, without even a reference to a committee, by a vote of 144 in the affirmative, to 6 in the negative. Of those voting in its favor, 31 were Democrats, while only one Democrat voted against it. Among the Democrats who voted for the resolution, were Ross, Thornton, and Marshall, of Illinois; Niblack, Kerr, and Vorhees, of Indiana; Trimble, Ritter, and Shanklin, of Kentucky; Hogan, of Missouri; Finck, of Ohio; Randall, Boyer, Ancona, Strouse, Johnson, Denison, and Dawson, of Pennsylvania; and Eldridge, of Wisconsin.

On April 12th, 1866, during the administration of President Johnson, the only bill that ever directly provided for contraction of the currency was passed. On the passage of that bill, to carry out the recommendation of the resolution already quoted, only one Democrat voted *nay* in the House of Representatives. In the Senate the negative vote was cast entirely by Republicans. Both the Pennsylvania senators, Buckalew and Cowan, who were Democrats, voted for it. Then, if there was contraction, the Republican party was not, as a party, responsible for the contraction.

Gen. Ewing.—Cowan was a Republican.

Gov. Woodford.—That is so. Cowan was a Republican. I am in error in regard to that. Buckalew was a Democrat, and Cowan a Republican, in name, but in faith a Democrat of the President Johnson

type. In the height of my generosity I wanted to give your party all the credit I possibly could.

Gen. Ewing.—You give us too much. We are not greedy for such compliments.

Gov. Woodford.—You see the trouble is, I have been with Gen. Ewing for three days, and unfortunately am getting to be a little of an inflationist. I will have to come back to contraction. [Laughter.]

Gen. Ewing.—We will convert you altogether after a while.

Gov. Woodford.—Then the next charge in this Democratic platform is that a further contraction is now proposed by the Republican party with a view to the forced resumption of specie payments. In the resumption bill there is not a line or word that looks toward contraction. I am not here to specially defend the bill. I am not here to attack the bill. The bill is not legitimately the issue of the present canvass. Whether that bill will bring resumption or not, I do not know. It may not be possible to resume without contraction. But that bill does not compel a dollar of contraction.

On the contrary, it permits expansion of the national bank currency. It retires but $80 of greenback currency for every $100 of bank currency that may be put out. It provides that the greenbacks shall not be retired below $300,000,000.

It does not require a debtor in this land to resume payment in gold, it does not require a national bank in the land to resume payment in gold, until after the Federal Government shall have put its credit under the whole, and by making the greenbacks redeemable in gold, shall have lifted the entire credits and values of the country together. It proposes that the Government shall be absolutely honest first, and when the Government, if ever, is able to be honest, then and not till then, does this law ask that other payments shall be made in gold. They can even then still be paid in greenbacks. The greenbacks will simply command the gold.

But enough of that. This Democratic platform goes further. It demands the abandonment of this policy, and then, as lawyers would say, asks affirmative relief. It asks that the currency "be made and kept equal to the wants of trade." If the currency is to-day equal to the wants of trade, then it need not be made so. That which is, need not be created. If there is enough currency now, there is no need to *make* the volume any thing. Because the word "made" is used, everybody understands that this Democratic platform means that there is not to-day currency enough, and that the volume shall be made—something is to be created—something is to be done. The volume

shall be made equal to the wants of trade. Then there is to be inflation.

More than that: this platform demands that this volume "shall be made and *kept* equal to the wants of trade." If by the further issue of paper money its purchasing power diminishes; if we shall come to where we were during the war, when it may take $2.80 of legal tender to buy as much as $1 of gold will buy, then of course if there is not currency enough now, there will not be enough then. If there is not currency enough now, when a dollar in greenbacks will buy what eighty-five cents in gold will buy, there will not be enough currency when it shall take $2.80 in greenbacks to buy what $1 in gold will buy. And so the volume of currency must be kept equal to the demands of trade. As fast as the gas gets out from the hole in the top of the balloon, more must be made, and forever be pumped into the bottom, so that the scheme may float if possible. [Applause.]

Why is not the resumption law the main issue at this present moment? I will tell you. I will admit that the resumption law is the main issue whenever the gentleman will tell me that if the law is repealed he will not, under any circumstances, ask for the issue of another dollar in greenbacks. But if the law is simply in the way of inflation, like a horseback in a coal mine that has got to be dug through or tunneled under; if the resumption law is simply in the way of inflation, if it is simply the gate that keeps the cattle on one side of the fence, and out of the field on the other; if men only want the resumption law repealed, that they may issue more greenbacks, then the question is not the resumption law, but the question is inflation or no inflation. It is simply, shall we let the cattle out of the field, that are now behind the fence of the resumption law?

Every man clearly sees this. When you go through your community, who talks about the resumption law? I stood among those stalwart miners of Shawnee, and when with ringing cheer they welcomed their great champion, the cry that went up was "more greenbacks," "more greenbacks." I stood among his fellow-townsmen in the city of Lancaster, yesterday afternoon, and the cry that welcomed him as he came up the hall was "more greenbacks," "more greenbacks." The crowd and I were in thorough sympathy. [Laughter.] I wanted more greenbacks too. [Laughter.]

The common sense of the community has gone to the root of this matter, and the questions of this canvass in Ohio are, shall the volume of your currency be inflated? do you want more greenbacks? how

are you to get more greenbacks? how can we get more greenbacks even if the Government prints more?

These are the issues, and all other discussion is an effort to get fog and cloud and mist between the sun above and the people below. Be done with the fog. Be done with the mist. Come squarely up to the question. Do you want more greenbacks? Will you print more greenbacks? How are we to get more greenbacks when you have printed them? [Applause.]

Now I propose to discuss this question of more greenbacks. The eloquent gentleman who is running for Lieutenant-governor on the Democratic ticket, portrays before every audience the terrible condition of affairs under which we suffer, until, as I have been told, one stalwart farmer who had two crops already in his barns before he put in the third, wiped his eyes with his cuffs, and thought how terribly he was taxed and how fearfully he was off. Then Mr. Cary comes down to the question and says, "What we want is more money." Then he looks through the audience and adds, "If there is any gentleman here who does not want more money, let him stand up." Of course nobody stands up. [Laughter.]

If I should go down to New York and call a mass meeting there, and the only persons attending should be William B. Astor, and John Jacob Astor, and Cornelius Vanderbilt, and Alexander T. Stewart, and Horace B. Claflin, and then I should say to them, "Men and brethren, what do you want?" every one of them would say "more money," too. [Laughter.] The question is not, do you want more money? Of course you do, if you can get it honestly. The practical question is, How shall you and I get more money? That is the question.

Now, first, that we may get at a square understanding of this thing, let us see what money is. What is a greenback? It is a note. The law describes it as a United States note, a treasury note. What is a note? That which a man writes, promising to pay. The greenback is a part of the national debt. It is a part of the debt, whether the Government holds it in trust, or whether it is out and in circulation. Now the Government coins a ten dollar gold piece. The Government has the coin in its vault. The Government does not owe it except in payment of possible debt. After the Government has paid it out, the Government surely does not owe it. The Government paid a debt with it. The gold coin is payment of debt. The greenback is evidence of unpaid debt. Then a ten dollar gold piece in your pocket is not a debt of the Government, while the greenback is.

Am I mistaken about this? The greenback is a debt of the Government. Here is the last Treasury report or statement of the public debt of the United States for the month of August, 1875. It gives, first, "debt bearing interest in coin;" next, "debt bearing interest in lawful money;" next, "debt on which interest has ceased since maturity;" next, "debt bearing no interest," and under this head it embraces "old demand notes, *legal tender notes,* certificates of deposit, fractional currency, coin certificates, unclaimed interest;" and these all foot up $497,000,000. Then the greenback, which is described in this debt statement as a "legal tender note," is a note, and a note is a *debt.*

I will read the greenback itself, that there may be no mistake about it: "The United States will pay the bearer five dollars." It does not say "this is five dollars." What is the five dollars? Another piece of paper? No. Another note? No. You give me a note. When it comes due I go to you and say, "I want payment." "Certainly, Mr. Woodford, I will pay you." You sit down, get a pen and write a note a little handsomer than the one I had before, and hand it over to me. I look at its language and I reply, "That is a good deal like the Government greenback, I guess that must be payment," and I go off. In a month I come back and say, "I would like you to pay that note." "Certainly." So you write another one, that has more flourishes than the other, and you give me that. I go away and think that must be payment.

By and by I get tired. "The United States will pay the bearer five dollars." But my friend says the Government has made that greenback money. So it has. Now let us read the law which the Government has passed with regard to this, for I think it is stronger, possibly, in its language than even my friend anticipated. Section 3588 of the United States Revised Statutes: "United States notes shall be lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, within the United States, except for duties on imports and interest on the public debt."

The law has declared that the greenback or United States note is lawful money. Why did the law so declare? You and I recollect the circumstances of the Rebellion. You and I recollect that the Government credit was weak. You and I recollect that we could not fight the Rebellion without money any more than we could without men. You and I recollect that on the table of the Treasurer of the United States there lay requisitions for the payment of the army and the navy, for military supplies, and other war obligations, amounting in

all to more than $50,000,000. This debt had been created. There was no coin with which to pay. What did the Government do? It printed these notes and gave them to the soldiers. What did it further do? These notes might have been useless in the soldier's hands. With them he could not pay his debts or surely buy food and clothing for his children. What did the Government do? It said if our soldiers, in the absence of money, must take these notes, we will clothe these notes with legal tender quality. We will clothe them with the power to pay your debt, so that you may send them home, and wife and children shall be cared for. So the legal tender came into existence, and so the legal tender is to-day circulating in the community. But it is still a promise to pay.

I am not here to attack the greenback. It was the price of my country's liberty. It comes to me with memories tender and sacred clustering round it. So deeply do I love it, the price that bought the salvation of my land, that I would keep its promise in pure virgin gold, so that it should be forever the nation's truth and never become the nation's lie. [Applause.]

This greenback is a note, although it is clothed with legal tender quality. My friend will tell you that this legal tender quality is what gives it currency; that this is what gives it value. It does give the greenback currency or circulation. If you owe me a hundred dollars to-day, and you have a hundred dollars in greenbacks, you can pay your debt to me; but the Government debt, which those greenbacks represent, is still unpaid. Remember, however, that the greenback does not regulate price and value. If you have got a bushel of corn to sell, you can ask as many greenbacks for it as you please, and the law can not make you sell your corn for less. But if you do sell the corn, the number of dollars for which you sell it is paid in greenbacks. Then what is the result? Just in proportion as the people lose faith in the greenback, just in that proportion prices go up.

There was an hour during the war when all looked dark, when the cloud of despair hung over the land. Our armies seemed paralyzed. There they stood, helpless, almost hopeless. Women were praying at home; men were dying in the hospital and on the field; and a great nation stood irresolute, too proud to retire, yet powerless to advance. And where then did the greenback go? As faith weakened, down, down, down dropped the greenback, until it took two dollars and eighty cents in greenbacks to buy what one dollar in gold would buy. Victory came, and up, up, up went the greenback. It was the thermometer that marked the faith of the people in the future of the na-

tion. When the Rebellion was crushed, still up, up went the green-back. It stood this last August where it only took one dollar and fourteen cents in greenbacks to buy a dollar in gold.

Here is a five dollar gold piece [holding one up]. Take a good look at it. You may not have seen one for a long, long time, and if my friend succeeds you won't see one for a much longer time to come. There is the promise to pay [exhibiting a five dollar greenback]. Here is the five dollars that the greenback promises to pay. But some of you may ask: "What, does not that" [the greenback] "buy as much as this" [the gold]? It does not. I can go to a bank, right here in Circleville, and to-day sell this gold piece at a premium of seventeen cents on the dollar. I can get a five dollar bill just like that and eighty-five cents in currency besides. Five dollars and eighty-five cents in paper will buy more than five dollars in paper. Last August I could only have got a premium of fourteen cents on the dollar for the gold. This gold piece is worth fifteen cents more than it was last August. That paper is worth fifteen cents less.

The first shock came from the Ohio platform. But then the people said there will be nobody mad enough to follow this will-o'-the-wisp into the bogs, and be left there in the mud. Alas! the needs of politics were greater than the demands of trade. And so Ohio begged for Pennsylvania, and Pennsylvania turned her back on her hard money record of the past. I fancy that the bones of Andrew Jackson gave one long and melancholy rattle in the coffin at the Hermitage when Democracy turned back upon every thing that Democracy had ever meant in the story of the past. But it has been done and Pennsylvania is beside Ohio, and what is the result? Up went gold from fourteen to seventeen. Down dropped the paper greenback from eighty-eight to eighty-five. Pennsylvania stood by Ohio, and the man who had the gold made three cents on the dollar, while the man who had the paper lost three cents on the dollar. Now let the volume of the greenback currency be increased, and who will make the money? The men who have substantial property, that does not have to be sold, will mark it up in value, while the man who has only his labor to sell, the man who has only between himself and starvation a very little property that he can sell, must sell that labor and part with that little property at the best price he can get. Andrew Jackson said, years and years ago, that the only effect of a depreciated paper currency is to make the rich forever richer and the poor forever poorer. [Applause.]

What gives that paper greenback value? The promise of the Gov-

ernment. Take from that paper its promise, and where is its value? Break the promise, and where is its value? Here [showing another paper bill] is a bill just as pretty as that other one. That other says five dollars, and this twenty dollars. This ought to be worth four times as much as the other. Let me read them and see how you would like to trade: "The United States will pay the bearer five dollars." "The Confederate States of America will pay the bearer twenty dollars." Who wishes to trade? Little Phil Sheridan broke that bank down at Five Forks, and its issue hasn't been good since. [Applause.]

Then what makes the difference? You believe that the Government will pay that five dollar bill, and therefore it has value. You have not the slightest dream that the Confederacy will ever pay this twenty dollar bill, therefore it has no value. My friend will say that the promise of a dead republic is worth nothing. But if it had been real money it would be worth to-day as much as it ever was. Suppose this had been a twenty dollar gold piece coined by the Confederate States, would not it buy twenty dollars worth to-day just as surely as does the twenty dollars of the United States? Think of this a moment.

Across the ocean there was once a nation called the Dutch Republic. It grew so strong that it dictated law to Europe. Its armies swept the continent, and its fleets swept the sea. It is dead to-day. Its name lives only in song and in story. Here is a three guilden piece that it issued in its day of power. There is a $20 note, that the Confederacy issued during its brief life. The Confederacy is dead. That paper is worth nothing. The Dutch Republic is dead. This silver will buy to-day $1.35 in American silver; $1.35 in American silver will buy $1.48 in American fractional currency; and $1.48 will buy right here in Circleville whatever $1.48 in paper money will buy. This is the real money of a dead republic; and there is what my friend calls the money of a dead republic. That (the Confederate note) is a rag, and this (the silver piece) is a truth, hard substantial money—the real money of a dead republic. It is better to-day than the promise of our living republic, for it will buy more. [Applause.]

But my friend says there is no danger that we can repudiate; our promise is good. I believe it. I have faith in Ohio. I have faith in my land. I have faith in the men who stood and struggled in the field. I have faith in the men who are here at home. I believe that we will make our greenbacks good; and the first step is this: not

another dollar of them until we have made good what we have already issued.

You are in debt and owe $100. You can not pay the debt by simply giving your note. Some day that note must be paid. You must work it out of your farm. You must save it out of your toil. Payment is hard. It is easy to run in debt. It is easy to gamble with paper. It is hard to pay debts. If it is hard to pay $400,000,000 of greenbacks now, will it be easier when the amount is $800,000,000? If it will be hard to pay $800,000,000, will it be easier to pay $1,600,000,000?

In order to print those new greenbacks you must break an existing law. Right in the midst of the war, when we wanted to give this currency a value, we passed a law, which is on the statute book to-day, that this Government would never print more than $400,000,000 of these greenbacks. We have got to break that law. Talk about your resumption law! The original law that stands in the way is the pledge that we would never print but $400,000,000; and if my friend wants to discuss laws that are in the way, let him go back to the law that was passed during the Rebellion, which stands there now and which gave value to the greenback. Let him ask its repeal, for you can not print one additional dollar until you have repealed that law.

Now supposing that we decide to print them, what will be the effect? Every additional dollar that you put out, will buy less and less. That is inevitable. Even the Cincinnati *Enquirer* said the other day that the purchasing power of the greenback is to-day too great, that it ought to be reduced. Print more greenbacks, and their purchasing power will be reduced. Values will go up apparently. You will have castles in the air. And yet right in the midst of the war a farm that you called worth $2,800 in paper, I could have bought with a thousand dollars in gold. The gold didn't change; the paper did. The power of the paper to buy was diminished. The apparent value of property went up. But there never was an hour during the war that you could not buy with gold almost all that you could have bought with gold before the war. What it took $2.80 in paper to buy, a dollar in gold would have bought at the darkest hour during all the war. The gold did not change. The gold remained about the same in value all the while. Then the purchasing power of the greenback will be diminished by its repeated issue.

What will be the effect of inflation on business? It introduces an element of gambling. Look at it. What is money? It is a measure of value. You want to trade a little corn for a little cloth that I have

in New York. We can not very well make the exchange of the articles. That was the way they used to trade in barter. They swapped one thing for another. By and by men said, Isn't there something that shall represent value? Men found that gold did this. It is no new dream. As far back as when Abraham bought the field where his dear ones were buried, he paid for it—how? In shekels of silver. Your burying-grounds are so bought and paid for to-day. Do what you will—for the law of trade, the inevitable law of cause and effect is stronger than your politics—back to specie payments this country must go. France tried paper money, and she went back to specie payment.

Gen. Ewing.—She is not back to specie payment.

Gov. Woodford.—I said France tried paper. She printed the *assignat* and the *mandat* during the first French Revolution. She gave circulation to it until more than two thousand millions of *assignat* and *mandat* money were afloat. And then when the Empire was established in 1803, the First Napoleon went back by force to specie payment. He organized the Bank of France, and put France on a specie basis.

My friend has referred to France. I will go one step farther. You will pardon me for breaking right off in my argument, for I want to state this French question while we are at it. France became involved in a war with Prussia. The French Government used up all its coin. The Bank of France had a great deal of coin. The Bank of France, which is a private corporation, is owned by stockholders simply. It has a director-general, as he is called, with three receivers-general and three censors, and these seven officers are appointed by the Government; and the other twelve directors are elected by the stockholders precisely as the directors of a national bank are here. The French Government said to the Bank of France, "If you will lend us the gold that you have—for we shall have to use gold in fighting on Prussian soil—you may print Bank of France notes." The French Government did not print a dollar of Government legal tender during the war with Prussia. The French Government authorized the Bank of France to print a certain amount of its notes and practically made them legal tender. It excused the Bank of France from paying those notes in gold until the Government should have paid its debt to the Bank of France in gold. Then it took the gold, and the Bank of France put out its notes. And the Bank of France has since been gathering up specie. The nation of France did what? It put out a loan. It got gold on the loan, and paid off part of its debt to the Bank of France. It owes the Bank of France to-day but $96,000,000. The Bank of France has notified its bill-holders, that on and after the first day of

January, 1878, every note of the Bank of France presented at its counter shall be paid in gold. It redeems one year ahead of the United States. Consequently, the paper of the Bank of France is worth only one per cent. less than the gold money of the Government of France. [Applause.]

Another step, and then we shall have finished with France. The Emperor Napoleon I. created a gold debt for France. When he was deposed and Charles the Tenth came back and represented the Bourbons on the French throne, the Bourbons recognized the debt of the Empire in gold and did not try to repudiate it. When the Bourbons were driven off and the Emperor came back for the hundred days, Napoleon recognized both the debt of the First Empire and that of the Bourbons. Such is the record of three successive governments. When Louis Philippe came, as the king of the people, he recognized the debts of all the preceding governments in gold. When Louis Philippe was driven out by the Republic of 1848, that Republic recognized all the preceding debts in gold. When that went down under the Second Empire, the third Napoleon recognized all the preceding debts in gold. When he was driven out by the Commune, the very French Commune never suggested to print legal tender, but accepted every preceding debt. And Gambetta himself, the leader of the Reds, recognized and stood by all the old debts of the Government. When he went down and the Republic of Thiers came in, that recognized every debt that had been made since 1803. And where is the credit of France? No Frenchman has ever talked of paper legal-tender issued by the Government. No Frenchman has ever talked of inflation. Every French Government has recognized the gold debt of the Governments that went before it. The result has been that French credit, founded on a rock, stands firm and sure. People will take French paper, because they know that French paper ultimately and surely means gold.

When the Democrats of Ohio shall have treated the national debt of this country as the French Republicans treated the debt of the French Empire, then will American credit stand where French credit stands, with a difference between paper and gold of only one per cent. Then specie payment will have been restored by faith, honesty, and pluck—the best things to establish credit in the world. [Applause.] I trust my friend is satisfied with France. [Applause.]

Gen. Ewing.—The Bank of France paper is not redeemable.

Gov. Woodford.—The Bank of France paper is to-day a legal tender in payment of debt and is redeemable after the 1st of January, 1878.

Gen. Ewing.—The 1st of July, 1878, in case they have the money. [Applause.]

Gov. Woodford.—The man who says he will pay his debt and faithfully tries to do it, will be far more likely to pay when pay-day comes around than the man who, instead of trying to pay, says I am not able to pay, I am not going to pay, and I will issue more promises that I don't know that I ever will pay. [Applause.] Now if a debt is never to be paid, then the debt will become valueless. The only value of the greenback is that some day you expect it paid. If you come to understand that it never is to be paid, then people will not want it. Is not that so?

Here is some legal tender money [showing another piece of paper], and it reads, "The United States"—we know the name of the Nation—"eight dollars. This bill entitles the bearer to receive eight Spanish milled dollars, or the value thereof in gold and silver, according to a resolution passed by Congress at Philadelphia, September 26, 1778." This is a Continental note. This is the money in which they paid our forefathers who fought the battles of the Revolution. This bill was paid for the birth agony of this Government just as much as that greenback was paid for its preservation. That (the greenback) simply says, "Will pay five dollars." This Continental note says, "Eight Spanish milled dollars, or the value thereof in gold and silver." We gave this to the soldiers of the Revolution. We gave that to the soldiers of the Rebellion. That (the greenback) is worth something, because the men of Ohio, standing by the men of New York, intend to pay that greenback just as soon as the Government can do it without serious injury to the industry and the business of the country. This (the Continental note) is worth nothing, because the Government has never tried to pay. It has been repudiated. Here is your repudiated Continental paper, worth nothing. There is your greenback paper promise not yet kept, and worth in gold only eighty-five cents on the dollar.

That greenback says, "Will pay five dollars." Here is the gold [showing a five dollar gold piece.] The only words upon its face are, "The United States of America," "Liberty," and the figures "1791." There are not even the words "five dollars," yet every body knows that it is a five dollar coin. It is a promise kept. When we shall resolutely try to keep the promise of the greenback it will be good, like the gold it represents.

But I will go farther. Suppose that you secure the law authorizing more greenbacks; how are you going to get the money out into circu-

lation? The Government has printed the greenbacks. How shall it get them out?

I will read my friend a few questions, which I should like him to answer, and I shall be happy to answer in return any questions he may ask.

1st. Do you intend, by force of the authority of the United States, to pay off the bonds at their face value in greenbacks, against the will and protest of the bond-holders?

2d. If not, do you intend, by like force, to fix an arbitrary price on these bonds; that is, to fix a certain greenback premium on the gold bond, and then pay them off by compulsion, giving the bond-holder the face of his bond, together with this fixed premium, in your new greenbacks?

3d. If, however, the bond-holder decides to keep his bonds and will not take your new greenbacks, do you intend with those new greenbacks to buy the gold and pay him off therewith?

4th. Or do you intend to buy the bonds in open market, just as every body else buys them now, and pay in your new greenbacks such price as the bonds may then command?

5th. If you thus buy bonds in open market, what do you think will be the effect on the premium on gold, and how much will the volume of greenbacks be probably increased?

6th. Do you ever intend to redeem in coin the new greenbacks so issued?

Gentlemen, I thank you right heartily for your patient attention, and know that you will be more than repaid when you come to hear the eloquence of the gentleman who follows me.

[*Time expired.*]

GENERAL EWING'S REPLY.

Mr. Chairman and Fellow-Citizens:—

I congratulate you on the fact that we have here to-day the opportunity of discussing face to face the only issue in this campaign—the money question. Instead of having it debated by a Republican orator to one set of hearers, and a Democratic orator to another—Democrats and Republicans have assembled at this meeting to hear and compare

the arguments of the two opposing sides, and therefore will be better prepared to determine the merits of the issue now before the people.

My friend starts out with the statement that I do n't represent the Democrats of New York, or of Oregon, or Nebraska, or of a number of other Northern States settled largely from New York and New England, and specially under Eastern influence. It is quite true. It is enough that I appear here to represent the views of the Democrats of the State of Ohio. They have taken a position upon this finance question which they believe to be in the interests of the whole people of the State. They have not carefully followed party precedent. They have not looked back and determined the living issue of this campaign by dead platforms. They have met this money question which has been forced into signal prominence by the terrific panic of 1873, and the utter prostration of business which has followed it, as a new question, and declared for what they believe to be the present rights and interests of the American people of all parties upon it. That is what a party is for—to represent the living issues as they rise; and if the Democratic party were so lifeless, or so subjugated to precedents or to the influence of the powerful section which the gentleman warns me we differ from, as to shun this issue, it would be an unfit exponent of the American people. I wish to say, however, by way of vindication of my personal consistency, that although an early return to specie payments was in the platforms of both political parties of 1872, I never made a speech in that canvass in which I did not declare that I spat upon that plank of the platform.

The gentleman says I appear here reflecting the views of the gamblers of Wall Street. Indeed! The gamblers of Wall Street handle many millions of dollars every day. They have powerful political organs to represent them. They have newspapers in New York, in Cincinnati, in Saint Louis, and in all the great money centers of the country. Would one judge from those papers that the Democrats of Ohio were instigated to adopt the platform they have adopted by the wishes of the gamblers of Wall Street? What say the organs of the gamblers? What says the New York *World*, the New York *Herald*, the New York *Times*—the facile tools of that vast money power? They cry out, as the gentleman from New York cries out, in favor of a swift return to specie payment at all hazards. Every one of them sings the same song. Every one of them will applaud the speech he made here, and the speeches he may make throughout Ohio in this campaign. Yes—they will pat him on the back—"You are the man; you are doing it! you are right! go ahead!" Fortunately in this

campaign, so far as I have been noticed at all, I have received nothing from the organs of Wall Street but denunciation and ridicule. [Applause.] The New York *Herald*, in a money article a week ago, said in substance: "Let the Democrats carry Ohio and Pennsylvania if they can on their greenback platform. The money power has ruled and will ever rule the politics of this country, no matter what the Democrats of those two States may say." That is their feeling—the arrogance which grows out of the belief that the vast accumulation of wealth, in the eastern section of this country, can wheedle the public men of both political parties, and make both parties the mere instruments for executing the will of the money power.

I will follow the course of the gentleman's argument. He takes up the Ohio platform and discusses it section by section. "The contraction of the currency heretofore made by the Republican party." He says the Republican party did n't make it; if his argument means any thing, it means that it was done by the Democrats. Is that so? Read the very resolution which he quotes, under which McCulloch initiated the contraction of the currency—the legislation under which \$1,200,000,000 of Treasury notes bearing currency interest, and comprising the great bulk of the interest-bearing debt—a debt held by the mass of the people, and so distributed over the country that it was easy to be borne because the interest on it was received by the people who paid it back to the Government as taxes—that vast public debt of \$1,200,000,000 of interest-bearing Treasury notes was converted into gold bonds and sold in Europe under a resolution passed by a Congress overwhelmingly Republican, and passed, too, before Andrew Johnson had the slightest quarrel with the Republican party. He was then not only a sound Republican, but supposed to be one of the most violent, and if any thing, too violent, by the mass of the party. Then it was that this contraction was initiated under the auspices of John Sherman, who was then as now the dictator of the finance measures of the Republican party, and of Hugh McCulloch, who has ever been one of the staunchest supporters of that party.

Fellow-citizens, it is true the Republican party subsequently fell out with Andrew Johnson on the reconstruction question. It is true that in 1868 they made violent war upon him for obeying that Constitution which he had sworn to support, and which they knew the grand old man would rather have been burned at the stake than have failed to support. They seized him as a criminal and dragged him to the bar of the Senate for daring to appoint a Secretary of War in place of the demigod of the Republican party, who then usurped the office—for doing only that

which every President had always done, and which every intelligent man knew he had a right to do. Yes, you fell out with him then—fell out with him because he was not a suppliant tool of the party, and willing to violate the Constitution of his country for the purpose of accomplishing the subjugation and republicanization of the Southern States. [Cheers.] But while he was engaged in contracting the currency, or rather, while the Republican party was contracting it under their laws and resolutions, Andrew Johnson was in perfect accord with that party, and was lauded and supported by it.

What was this contraction? It was not only the sweeping out of this $1,200,000,000 of notes bearing currency interest held among the people, and the conversion of them into gold bonds to be sold abroad, and to make this country, as a borrower, the servant to England and Germany as the lenders; but it was also an actual contraction of the greenback, and the national bank currency amounting, when you consider population and growth, to about forty per cent. between the circulation of 1865 and the circulation at the time of the panic. The wiping out of that $1,200,000,000 of interest-bearing Treasury notes, and the relative contraction of 40 per cent. of the currency, bearing no interest, brought on the panic which prostrated the industries of the country, and before they had fully risen to their feet again, the passage of the resumption law utterly and hopelessly prostrated them.

The gentleman says he did n't come here to defend the resumption law. He says it is not the principal issue in this canvass. I say it is the issue over all others. I do n't wonder he is afraid to defend it. [Cheers.] If he had the temerity to defend that law before the people, he would have a blinder courage than any Republican orator in this land has yet shown. [Applause.] The principal framers of the law dare not mention its name when they come before the people. It is a law under the operation of which $30,000,000 of the currency has been destroyed in the past six months, and under the operation of which one-half the currency of this country has gone out of circulation,—gone into the vaults of the banks and the gamblers in Wall Street, who are holding it for the seventeen per cent. premium that they are to get when the day of resumption arrives,—holding it until the industries of the country perish for want of money,—holding it while all property and labor falls, while all business languishes, while every thing goes down, down, down, except the almighty dollar and bond, which go up, up, up. He does n't defend the law. Why not? Is n't it a Republican measure? Who passed it? Every Republican senator voted for it; every Democratic senator

against it. In the House, every Republican representative, with the exception of two or three, voted for it; every Democratic representative, without exception, against it. The President approved it; the Ohio Republican State Convention indorsed the finance policy of the Administration, and this is a section of that policy. Why does n't the gentleman defend it? Why does he say it is no issue in this canvass? Is it a small matter to fix a day, only a little over three years hence, when this nation must be prepared for resumption of specie payment on the vast sum of currency we now have afloat, or in the alternative, if we can not resume specie payment with this vast sum, must submit to have the currency cut down to probably one-fourth of its present volume? Is this so trifling an affair, this law on the statute-book binding on the Secretary of the Treasury, and which he is now carrying out? This is not an issue, he says, in this canvass; but *his* interpretation of the Ohio Democratic platform respecting the volume of the currency is the great issue before the people. As he has put some questions to me, I will have, before I close, some questions to put to him in regard to this resumption law. [Applause.]

Governor Woodford.—I will answer them, General, as best I can.

General Ewing.—Yes, sir, I have no doubt of it. He says this resumption law is an inflation measure; it is not contraction at all. Why is it inflation? Because, he says, that banking is made free under this law, and for every $100 of new bank notes issued only $80 of greenbacks are taken up and destroyed, leaving the people with twenty per cent. more currency. I beg to suggest to him that that provision for the retirement of only eighty per cent. of the greenbacks is made because the bank reserves make up the balance, the banks being compelled to hold reserves of between fifteen and twenty-five per cent. at different points, and it was thought twenty per cent. would be about an average reserve, and therefore we would keep the volume of the currency the same when new bank notes were issued, if twenty per cent. less of greenbacks were destroyed. So there is no inflation in that provision. Now let us see how much more inflation there is in the resumption law. It commands the Secretary of the Treasury as speedily as practicable to buy silver, coin it, and take up all the fractional currency and destroy it. The law does n't say destroy, but I say that is what it means—destroy it. There are about $44,000,000 of fractional currency, at least there were when this law was passed. The Secretary of the Treasury, it appears by statements that he has made, has already retired $2,600,000 of it—retired by redemption with new silver coin. Has the silver taken its place in your pocket? [A voice, "Not much."]

Speak out. [Voices, "No," "no," "no."] Is there nobody in this crowd that has part of that $2,600,000 of silver? There is nobody here; there is nobody in Ohio, nor in the Scioto Valley, nor outside of New York City, nor outside of Wall Street, nor outside of two or three pet brokers' houses in Wall Street. [Cheers.] Not a dime of it has ever been seen outside of the hands of those brokers who have had the privilege of sending in fractional currency and getting silver in its place—new silver, to be sold at from five to eight per cent. premium, and to be shipped to California, or Oregon, or Nevada, or China, or Japan, where it is money. It will not be money to you, my friends. The work is going on. The Secretary of the Treasury has already added $12,000,000 to the bonded debt by the purchase of silver—bought it with new five per cent. bonds in Europe—bought the old silver that Germany had cast out, demonetized, and gave five per cent. gold bonds of the people of the United States to the amount of $11,000,000 for the purpose of coining the silver and destroying the fractional currency—for the purpose of putting five to eight per cent. on the volume into the hands of some treasury pets. That is all there is of it. [Applause.]

A voice.—How many millions?

General Ewing.—He got $12,000,000 of silver. He issued about $11,000,000 of five per cent. gold bonds and bought the silver. Under the provisions of this law, the Secretary of the Treasury is bound as speedily as practicable to wipe out the whole of our fractional currency, and add about $44,000,000 to the bonded debt of the United States—and for what purpose? To coin this $44,000,000 of silver to be shipped off—because silver has been at a premium of never less than five, and at times as high as eight, per cent. every hour since that law was passed; and every man knows that if the silver were at a premium of *one* per cent., it would n't remain in circulation, but would go into the brokers' shops to be shipped away. I made this point in my speech at Findlay some weeks ago, which was reviewed in an editorial in the Chicago *Times;* and the *Times,* although a violent specie resumption paper, said: "That point is well taken; the silver can not remain in circulation; it will be shipped off." But then it said, after all, the people would not be very greatly inconvenienced, because, although they would lose the United States fractional money, the merchants and grocers would issue fractional shin-plasters to take its place. [Laughter.] That is, they add $44,000,000 to our bonded debt for the sake of getting merchants' and grocers' shin-plasters in place of our fractional currency. Now,

there is not much inflation in that, my friend—not much. There is some inflation of the debt, but no inflation of the currency. [Applause.]

This law further provides that the Secretary of the Treasury may sell five per cent. gold bonds, for the purpose of accumulating gold enough by the first day of January, 1879, to redeem and pay all the greenbacks that may be presented. There are $375,000,000 of greenbacks besides the fractional currency. He must provide $375,000,000 of gold. How is he to get it? The law says he may provide it out of the surplus revenues. But the revenues last year fell short of the expenditures. Congress added $35,000,000 of additional taxes last winter. But my friend now claims that the revenues this year are between thirteen and fourteen millions more than the expenses. Well, the thirteen or fourteen millions will not provide $375,000,000 of gold by the first of January, 1879, in addition to the $44,000,000 of silver to redeem and destroy the fractional currency. And so, in effect, this law provides that the Secretary of the Treasury must add somewhere between four hundred and four hundred and nineteen millions to the five per cent. gold bonded debt of the United States for the purpose of destroying the only free money that the American people now have—leaving us after the day of resumption dependent only on national bank money, that costs the Republic five per cent. on every dollar of it. I say leaving us, after the day of the resumption—because, in view of the fact that we haven't now by a hundred millions as much gold as we had before the war, that we are now shipping to Europe $30,000,000 of gold a year more than the present production of our mines added to all that comes to us by emigrants; in view of the last drain of gold abroad, the immense demand for it for customs, and to pay the interest on our bonded debt abroad, no man can doubt that the holders of the greenbacks, when the first day of January, 1879, comes round, will present them for redemption and get the gold—gold that we have added four hundred to four hundred and nineteen millions to our bonded debt to acquire.

When the greenbacks are presented and redeemed, that law in effect provides that they shall never again go into circulation. I asked my friend to discuss the law, yesterday, at Lancaster, and he did. But he claimed that after the greenbacks were redeemed once, they might be re-issued by the Secretary of the Treasury and be redeemed again. That is, after we had provided $375,000,000 of gold to redeem them once, he might re-issue them, and, if he did, would be compelled to go on, buying gold, redeeming greenbacks, buying gold and redeeming greenbacks, sending the greenbacks out whenever they came back, to flow out again as gold. Why, where would be the end of our public

debt under that arrangement? But that will not do. We know the purpose of the law. The purpose is to destroy the costless money of the people—to make the American people dependent solely on the national banks for their money, and give the banks five per cent. for the privilege of controlling the currency of the country. [Applause.]

He says the word "redeem" does not carry the idea of destruction; that a national bank would redeem a note and might re-issue it. Yes, but that word "redeem" is used here twice in the same section of this resumption law. Section 3 provides that when a new national bank is formed, the Secretary of the Treasury shall redeem an amount of greenbacks equal to eighty per cent. of the new national bank notes issued; provided the aggregate of redemptions by reason of increase of the national bank issues sha'n't cut the greenbacks down below $300,000,000. That is a guarantee only that the volume of greenbacks shall remain as high as $300,000,000 until the first of January, 1879. But on and after the first of January, 1879, the Secretary of the Treasury shall redeem in gold all the United States legal tender notes then outstanding—the whole of them. Now, some new national banks have been formed and new bank notes issued, and the Secretary of the Treasury has taken in eighty per cent. of the amount of such new issues in greenbacks. He has "redeemed" them. What has he done with them? The columns of the Cincinnati *Commercial*, of day before yesterday, will show you. A bulletin from the Treasury Department says that the Secretary of the Treasury *burned* the greenbacks so "redeemed." That is what *he* understands by the word "redemption." And that is the word that is applicable both to the legal tenders that are turned in by reason of the new bank note issues and to the legal tenders which, after the first of January, 1879, shall be redeemed in coin.

Well, now, fellow-citizens, so much for this law. What is the genius and spirit of it? It is to force all debtors throughout the United States, who have made debts payable in currency, to pay them in coin. And in order to establish coin redemption they destroy the greenbacks and throw the whole volume of the currency into the hands and under the discretion of that money power which has created and controlled the vast system of national banks. It means the death of both the fractional currency and the greenback on and after the first of January, 1879. We are to have no more. We are to pay $419,000,000 for the purpose of destroying this costless currency. That is the issue. It is big enough to be an issue in this canvass. It seems to me that its proportions are sufficiently vast, and the position of the

Republican party upon it sufficiently well defined to call on gentlemen who come here to represent that party to stand by this great resumption law which is the climax and consummation of its finance measures. [Applause.]

The gentleman shows you a gold five dollar piece and a greenback five dollar bill. He is giving you, gentlemen, "object lessons" like those given in the children's schools [laughter], evidently upon the theory that you could not understand the question at all unless he actually held up the veritable glittering five dollar piece. Now let us see about his lessons. "Here is the five dollar greenback, and there is the five dollar gold piece," he said to the miners at Shawnee; "now which would you rather have?" Rather doggedly one of the miners exclaimed, "I would rather have the greenback." [Laughter.] But that wasn't a fair answer to the question. The gold piece is worth five dollars and eighty-five cents, my friend says, and the greenback is worth five dollars. That is true. Other things being equal, I admit I would rather have the gold. I would rather have eighty-five cents more than five dollars than just five dollars. Somebody or other commenting on this finance question recently, said: "Money is close, but not close enough to reach." [Laughter.] Well, it is a good deal so with his specie payment. It is not close enough to reach. What condition are we in to reach it? We intend to be as honest as the gentleman from New York. The Democracy have no more interest for dishonest money than the Republicans. I think we can compare pretty favorably either party or personal records on the mere question of personal or public morality. So that as far as good faith and honor are concerned, I guess we are about as sensitive on the subject as the Republicans or any of their representatives. Now let us see what is the honorable thing; the thing that good faith and good conscience demand.

When the war broke out the Government was forced to issue this legal tender paper money. I notice that my friend does not repeat here what he said at Shawnee and Lancaster, that the power to issue paper money was got outside of the Constitution. [A voice, "Oh!"] [Laughter.] He said at Shawnee, in effect that the Republican party had violated the Constitution in issuing the greenback, but did it by reason of the national peril and the right of self-preservation. But at Lancaster he modified his position somewhat, and rather complained of me, for my construction of his remarks at Shawnee, saying that that was n't what he meant at all; that what he meant was that the power was not given in the Constitution to issue the legal tenders, but the Government got the power outside. Well, now, I had supposed that

the General Government was a Government of only delegated power. I had supposed that all its powers are derived from grants in the Constitution. That is according to my notion and the way I was brought up. It may be all wrong. But if there is a grant outside of the Constitution, where is the evidence of it? And if the Government has any power outside of the Constitution, why hasn't it one power outside as well as another? And if it has not only all powers that are granted in the Constitution but also all powers that are outside of the Constitution, we might as well drop the Constitution altogether. [Laughter and applause.]

The Republican party is pretty hard driven when it says it had to violate the Constitution to make the legal tenders. I was a member of the Republican party in those days. I didn't understand it to be violating the Constitution. I was a Republican believing that the Constitution which was the bond of Union was in peril, and that this Government should vindicate the Constitution and the Union by all the powers that were delegated to it, and none other. [Cheers.] And while I assented generally to the leading measures of the Republican party during the war—not all of them, it is true, for any party in power under such intense emergencies would have committed errors—while I assented to the general course and management of the war, and most cordially to the issuing of this legal tender money—this money that almost more than our arms themselves gave us the victory and saved the Republic,—I never understood, and I believe it is a wrong to the Republican party of the war to say that it violated the Constitution in issuing this money. [Applause.] The Supreme Court says that the issue was legal, that it was "an appropriate means in the execution of a granted power"—naming among the granted powers of which it was "an appropriate means," the power to provide revenues—a power existing in peace as well as in war. But the modern Republican party, the instrument of that money power which has gathered to itself the vast national, State, corporate, and private debts, until they rise now like a mountain to a sum of ten or twelve billions of dollars—that party which made the greenback in which these vast debts were created, and in which they are payable, comes now and says that the issue was unconstitutional, and the money bogus! [Applause.] He talks about the paternity of the "Rag Baby." Ah! the "Rag Baby" is thirteen years old. [Applause and laughter.] It is no baby any longer. You thought it was very bright and promising as a baby, but you spurn and reject it now.

To go back a little to this argument, which is at the bottom of the logic of my friend—this question of public morals. He says that the

greenback dollar was taken by the American people because of the promise on its face to pay one dollar, which, he says, means gold. Well, it is admitted that it means gold. Now every man understood why the Government issued that money. It was because it had n't and could n't get the gold and silver to pay the cost of the war. When it was issued every man knew that that promise did n't mean to pay to-morrow or next day. When it was issued every man knew there were two kinds of public debt being created by the United States. One was a bonded debt, bearing interest payable at fixed dates, so that the man who bought knew when he was to get his interest and when his principal. The certainty of getting the interest and the principal at the dates prescribed, was the inducement to invest in that form of the public debt. Here was another kind of debt—the legal tender note. A man did n't *invest* in that with the idea of getting gold for it. He did n't look on the face of it for his reason for taking it; he looked on the back. It said, "This note is a legal tender for all debts, public and private, except duties on imports and interest on the public debt." That is why he took it. He took it because, if he owed his neighbor, his neighbor must take it from him in payment. He took it because, if a judgment were rendered against him for money, that note was money within the meaning of the law and the judgment of the courts. He took it because it would pay all his taxes, all his internal revenue dues, every thing that he owed in any form to the public, every thing that he owed in any form to individuals. In short, he took it because it was *money*, within the understanding of the people of the country; because the law made it money; because the law declared it should perform every office for which money is used. What is money used for but to pay debts, dues to Government, and to exchange for values? Nothing else. Does the gentleman mean to say that, but for the promise to pay gold for that note, nobody would take it when every body owes taxes, when every body owes debts, and when that note would pay them all? And, gentlemen, that indorsement upon that note gave it all the use that the people have for money. It was n't taken on the faith of the promise to pay gold at all. It was taken with the full understanding that the Government could n't pay gold then and did n't know when it could; that it depended on the general chances of the war and on the future interests of the people. That promise upon the face of the bill, indefinite as to time, meant simply this: "This note shall be paid whenever it is for the general interest that specie payment shall be resumed." Now there is no use of talking about public faith any further. That

is the true interpretation of this promise, and there is not a man in this audience but that knows it. Yet you come here talking about "public faith," as if we were violating public faith in not resuming on the instant that the holders of these vast securities, created and payable in that paper money, demand specie payment.

The gentleman, the other day at Lancaster, ridiculing this money, talked about Captain Cook and the Sandwich Islanders and cowry shells—of Cook's making cowry shells legal tender until he got all the gold of the savages.

A Voice.—Jay Cooke?

Gen. Ewing.—No; it wasn't Jay Cooke, but his ancestor, perhaps. He said after this cowry shell business had gone on for a while, it turned out that Captain Cook and his party had all the gold and the Sandwich Islanders all the cowry shells. Then cowry shells became not so much legal tender as they had been. Well, his illustration was not so bad after all. Pretty good. When this greenback money was put afloat to a large amount, and the prices all adapted to it, the Government issued their five-twenty bonds. They said to every man that had these cowry shells—these greenbacks—let the Government have a thousand dollars of cowry shells, and we will give you a bond for a thousand dollars, with interest at six per cent., payable in gold, and the principal payable in the cowry shells that we get from you for the bonds. [Laughter.] Well, that seemed to be fair; and these gentlemen who had the cowry shells turned them over to the Government and got the bonds, to the amount of about $1,600,000,000 of the public debt. They gave the greenbacks for the bonds. The Government said, "We will pay you six per cent., in gold, interest on the face of the bonds for five years, and then we will pay you back in these same greenbacks that we got from you." Well, after these bond-holders (Captain Cook and his party) had got bonds for $1,600,000,000 of their cowry shells, and had drawn gold interest for five years, and the time had come for the Government to redeem the bonds with cowries, they just passed this little act of 1869, saying that these bonds are not to be redeemed in cowries but in gold. [Applause.]

The gentleman says—and as I am on that topic now I will advert to that part of his argument—"You can't issue any more greenbacks." Why not? Because the Act of 1864 declares that the whole issue of greenbacks shall never exceed $400,000,000. That is so. That was the act that provided that the five-twenty bonds should be issued. There had been former acts authorizing the issue, but that act provided that a new issue of five-twenty bonds should be sold for greenbacks at

par; the act providing and the greenback declaring, in effect upon its face, that after the Government had paid six per cent. gold interest on the bond for five years, then the Government might take up the bond for the same greenbacks that it got for them. That is the law. That is the law as interpreted by John Sherman, who declared that "any bond-holder who asked any thing else but greenbacks for his bond was a repudiator and an extortioner." That is the position taken by the Republican party in 1868. It came before the people of Ohio asking them to put it again in power. And the people of Ohio, supposing that the Republican party would deal fairly by them respecting this vast body of public debt, and leave to them the right to pay those five-twenty bonds in the same greenbacks that they got for them, joined with the people of Indiana, to whom the party through their State Convention made the same pledge, and elected General Grant; and yet in the first fourteen days after his inauguration that party passed an act robbing the people of the right to pay those bonds in the money that they got for them, and compelling them to pay every dollar of that $1,600,000,000 in gold—in a currency worth then thirty per cent. more than the currency that they got for them, and which they agreed to pay them in. It was an infamous act of robbery. It was a robbery greater than any ever committed by any Government upon a foreign nation. No Government ever robbed a nation with which it was at war of a sum equal to that $500,000,000 or $600,000,000 which were stripped from the American people by the infamous Act of 1869, called "An act to preserve the public credit." [Applause.]

The gentleman asks me whether we would pay those bonds in gold. Well, fellow-citizens, I will give him an answer that may surprise you and him. I can hardly refer to that act without an insuppressible feeling of indignation. And yet that act is a law, passed by unworthy and dishonest agents of the American people, but still by their agents. The people trusted the Republican party. The people trusted the honor of that party as declared by its Ohio State Convention in 1868, when it said: "The Republican party pledges itself to the faithful payment of the public debt: and according to the laws under which the five-twenty bonds were issued, they should be paid in the currency of the country which may be a legal tender when the Government is prepared to redeem said bonds." They trusted in the honor of the Republicans of Indiana, who declared in 1868 that "the bonds of the United States should be paid in legal tender except where, by their express terms, they provide otherwise." You believed them. John

Sherman came before you in that canvass saying that any man who demanded gold for those bonds was "a repudiator and an extortioner." How could you believe that he would go back to Washington, and within six months himself introduce that act of repudiation and extortion which robbed you of the right to pay the bonds according to the contract as interpreted by himself? You were fooled and swindled—not to put too fine a point on it. [Laughter.] But they were your agents. There is that law which the subsequent purchaser of the bond had a right to look to when he made the purchase; and that law says that the bond shall be paid in gold. And I say now to the gentleman, that so far as those bonds have changed hands on the faith of that law, utterly as I detest it as an act of wanton violation of faith by the Republican party, I would abide by it. [Applause.]

A Voice.—Repudiate the men that passed it.

Gen. Ewing.—Yes. Repudiate the men that passed it. [Applause.] Thank you, my friend, that is worth any five minutes of my speech. [Laughter.]

Now I will go to the other questions: "Do you intend by force of the authority of the United States to pay off the bonds at their face value, against the will and protest of the bond-holder?" I think the question answered already.

Gov. Woodford.—You mean no?

Gen. Ewing.—I think I have sufficiently answered it. But if men who held the bonds before the Act of 1869 shall hold them when the people get control of this Government through agents who will execute the original contract, I would make them take the money that they gave for them. [Applause.] That is what I mean. [*Voices*—"That's it," "That's it."] Now the question is answered, is n't it?

Gov. Woodford.—Very squarely, very squarely, as I knew it would be.

Gen. Ewing.—"If not, do you intend by law to fix an arbitrary price on these bonds—that is, to fix a certain greenback premium on the gold bond—then pay them off by compulsion, giving the bond-holder the face of his bond, together with this fixed premium in your new greenbacks?" I, for one, do n't intend that at all. As far as we have a right to pay off any of those bonds in greenbacks—that is as far as they are held by men who held them before the act of repudiation and extortion of 1869 was passed—they are payable in greenbacks. Those who took them afterwards on the faith of that act have a right to hold them as long as they please, until the Government pays them par in gold.

"If, however, the bond-holder decides to keep his bonds and not take your new greenbacks, do you intend with your greenbacks to buy this gold and pay them off therewith?" Well, I am not Secretary of the Treasury. [Laughter.] That is a mere matter of detail that I presume it is not worth while for me to go into.

"Or do you intend to buy the bonds in open market just as every body buys them now, and pay in your new greenbacks such price as the bonds may then command?" As to this matter of "new greenbacks," we do propose to issue $350,000,000 of greenbacks to take in and destroy $350,000,000 of bank money. [Cheers.] I want you to understand that now distinctly. We are for open war on this usurpation by private corporations of the sovereign function of making the money of the people. [Cries of "Good," "Good," and applause.] And we are not hired by Wall Street to make the fight. [Applause.] I mean to cast no reflection on my antagonist in this debate. I know that he is a gentleman who is here from conviction of what is his duty as an American citizen. But *we* do n't represent the views of Wall Street brokers, nor of Tammany, nor of the Manhattan Club, nor of the New York *World*, thank God. [Applause.]

"If you thus buy bonds in open market, what do you think will be the effect on the premium on gold, and how much will the greenback debt be probably increased?" As to premium on gold I will give the gentleman a suggestion—that we propose that there sha'n't be quite such an overwhelming demand for gold. We propose to help redeem this promise of the Government to make the greenback good by making it receivable for all that part of the customs which is not necessary for the payment of the interest on the public debt. As it is now, the Government, repudiating the greenback to a large extent, denying it the power of money to pay any part of the customs, receives all the customs in gold, which is a sum of gold larger than the Government needs to pay interest on the debt; and hence it is a mere broker of the balance. We want the Government to go out of the gold brokerage business. We want it to have just as little to do with the gold room and the gold brokers as practicable; and to collect at the customs only the gold that it needs for interest on the public debt, and let the balance of the customs be paid in that money which the people use. I think this policy will reduce the premium on gold, which arises, to a large extent, from this exorbitant and unnecessary demand for over $200,000,000 of gold every year to pay customs when the Government do n't need more than half the sum to pay the interest on its debt.

"Do you ever intend to redeem in coin the new greenbacks so is-

sued?" My friend, read the Ohio Democratic platform. [Laughter.] Read it. It is not very cleverly written, but it seems to contain a good deal of sentiment that the people think mighty good.

The Ohio Democracy say, Stop this contraction of the currency; do n't add this $419,000,000 to the bonded debt for the sake of redeeming and destroying this costless money of the people; reduce the public debt over $300,000,000 by issuing greenbacks in place of the national bank notes, and with the greenbacks buy in the open market, if you please, the bonds, except so far as national banks or others may hold them who held them before the act of 1869 was passed; those bonds the Government would have the right to pay off in greenbacks. But the banks are too smart to be still holding the five-twenty bonds. They got that act of 1869 passed in order that they might settle this question about the payment of those bonds in greenbacks; and as soon as it was passed they sold their five-twenties at a big premium—a premium that arose from that act of repudiation and extortion—and bought five per cent. forty years' bonds and put them in the Treasury. They are all right. [Laughter.] I think that an administration representing the interests of the people—such an administration as the people of Ohio and Pennsylvania will in effect secure by the October and November elections this year—such an administration will issue greenbacks in place of the national bank notes, pay off at par such of the five-twenty bonds as can justly be paid in greenbacks, and buy such as can not be so paid in the open market with the new greenbacks, cancel the bonds, and thus reduce the interest-bearing public debt over $300,000,000. [Cheers.] The difference between the policies of the two parties being, that the Republicans propose to add to the interest-bearing bonded debt $419,000,000, and we propose to reduce it a little over $300,000,000, without wronging any body.

To go back to that limitation to $400,000,000. He says you can't without national dishonor issue more than $400,000,000 of greenbacks, because this act of 1864 declares that the volume shall never exceed that aggregate. That was an act providing also for the issue of five-twenty bonds. It said to the people, "Here, now, take these six per cent. gold bonds, and give us greenbacks at par. We will pay you six per cent. annually in gold, and at the end of five years we have the right to pay you back in greenbacks. To assure you that we will pay in greenbacks just as good as you give us, we promise not to increase the present volume of $400,000,000." There was the promise. And when they violated the people's part of that contract, and said that the people should n't pay these bonds in the greenbacks that they got

for them, they still maintained that somebody—God knows who, certainly not the bond-holders—had a right to hold the people to the proposition that they never will issue more than $400,000,000. For the Republican party, after having repudiated that contract, to come before the people of Ohio, and claim that, although the right of the people to pay the bonds in greenbacks has been robbed from them, still the people are bound not to issue any more than $400,000,000; to do that—well—it requires the cheek of a Government mule. [Laughter.]

"More greenbacks," the gentleman said, was the cry which greeted me at Shawnee. I guess that was so. That was a town of about 2,000 people before the panic, before this screw had been turned, and turned, and turned, until it screwed the very life-blood out of the business of the country. About 2,000 people—men who had bought little homes there, or bought lots and built houses. I see a friend before me who knows something of business down there.

A voice.—You bet, I do.

Gen. Ewing.—And the records of Perry County will show that over half the men that bought their homes there have lost them in two years past, and those who still have them are suffering foreclosures and sales for the third or two-thirds balance of purchase money.

From those mining and manufacturing communities were sent out the men whom Republican orators and newspapers denounce and scoff at as tramps. Some loafers among them, probably, but many, many more, fellow-citizens, who left their families in those mining and manufacturing towns, breadless, shoeless, clotheless, in the terribly inclement winter of last year—left them to wander out in a hopeless search for work. In my own town of Lancaster our little jail was filled many nights with stalwart, sober young men—filled so that in some of those inclement nights they had not room to lie down; seeking the jail at night to keep from freezing, and walking by day from town to town—

> "Begging their brothers of the earth
> To give them leave to toil."

Ah! if my friend knew it, that cry of "more greenbacks" was a cry that came from the wrung hearts of those poor men. [Applause.] More greenbacks meant: "Let industry revive!" More greenbacks meant: "Take off this terrible dread of the reduction of the currency which paralyzes the industries in which our labor is employed." It meant: "Tell the business men of this country that $419,000,000 of their money out of $750,000,000 shall not be destroyed by the first of January, 1879." It meant: "Tell the usurers of this country they

need not hoard up money for the sake of the sixteen or seventeen per cent. premium." It meant: "Tell the hoarders of money, You may trust your money out again in the ordinary business of the country, because this turning of the contraction screw shall stop." Why should men trust money now in the ordinary business of the country? They should not, if they are prudent. There isn't one business man in ten that can live through the next three years of contraction involved in the execution of the resumption law. Look at the failures every-where. Look at the foreclosures of mortgages, the sweeping off of property at prices a half of what they were before the resumption law was passed, or before the panic, which was brought on by the contraction of the currency by the Republican party. "More greenbacks" means simply that the business of this country shall live and not perish. It means that the money furnished by the General Government shall be just as much as the legitimate, healthy business of the country requires—no more, no less. It doesn't mean wild inflation. But it means that as we have been doing business on $750,000,000 of currency, or more, for thirteen years past, we won't submit to a sudden and enormous contraction, and thus be forced into the yawning chasm of bankruptcy, which the resumption law prepares for us. [Applause.]

[*Time expired.*]

GOVERNOR WOODFORD'S REJOINDER.

Think it no idle compliment, when I say that the speech to which we have just listened, is, in its evident sincerity, one of the grandest utterances I ever heard. [Applause.] At last every thing is cleared away, and down to the naked question have we come. I am glad that here we stand.

The question is to-day, what shall we do for the labor of the land? Why is industry paralyzed? Why are poor men vagrant on the road? Why are there hungry men? Why are there suffering children? Mainly because the madness of speculation, which an irredeemable paper currency caused all over this land, has closed the furnace and put out the forge fire and stolen the bread from the little ones. [Applause.]

Why are there men hungry at Shawnee? Because speculations opened mines for whose products there was no use; because men were called from industries where they could earn their bread, and are now left stranded when the tide goes down. Out on the farms men are wanted. In the corn-fields men have been wanted all the summer long. Wherever there is any thing to be done for which there is demand, labor is wanted. Let me speak plainly. We have had a paper money drunk and we are getting over it. [Applause.] It is hard, it is very hard. In God's name, do n't play with the labor of this country as you have played with it.

Gen. Ewing.—I have n't played with it.

Gov. Woodford.—I do n't mean you individually. [Laughter.]

Gen. Ewing.—I thought you did.

Gov. Woodford.—That is where the wrung conscience leaped into words that I did not dream of. [Laughter and applause.]

Gen. Ewing.—When you look at me and point your finger at me, I suppose you mean me. If you were talking to the audience I suppose you would look at them.

Gov. Woodford.—The fact is I do like you so much that I want to convert you. You would be worth a regiment of ordinary men, because you are dead in earnest in the thing, and that makes your error so terrible. [Applause.]

The Government started the printing presses, and made what? They made promises to pay, and they called them money. Promises to pay were easy and every body got in debt. Promises were circulating every-where. Men forgot how easy it is to get in debt, and how terribly hard it is to work out of it. Men went into speculation. They did well. They bought corn; they bought every thing, trusting that to-morrow would take the balloon up higher than it was to-day. The madness became general. We had an enormous railroad speculation all over the land. Here in Ohio, because the Boesel law was declared unconstitutional, you may be very grateful that you did not have it. Men started to build railroads from nowhere to nowhere. They buttressed them on faith, and they built them into the air. Towns bonded themselves. Counties bonded themselves. The nation was rushing into debt with railroad velocity. And so every body piled up debt until its volume rose nine billions high. In what was that debt mainly payable? Those who lent the money required the pledge that it should be repaid in gold. And the bonds, the private bonds, the county bonds, the State bonds, the railroad bonds, were all made payable in gold. It was indeed the cowry shell.

Gen. Ewing.—Oh, no.

Gov. Woodford.—I said *all;* let me explain this. The General, in his Ironton speech, says we pay $150,000,000 gold interest abroad. Of that interest, about $60,000,000 is on federal bonds, and the balance of $90,000,000 is on State, municipal, and county bonds, and the bonds of corporations of different kinds. If the interest be at six per cent., $90,000,000 is the interest on $1,500,000,000. If the entire debt is nine billions, at least one and a half billions—a very large proportion—is payable in gold. The proportion must be greater if we include the debt held at home. That is what cowry shells did.

Let me tell you something more. If we keep on operating in cowry shells, what will be the result? Outside of this country you can't pay any debt in greenbacks. You must sell greenbacks and buy gold. Every thing that you buy outside of this land you buy in gold and you pay for in gold. The cowry shells pass here and the gold goes there. Your law does not float your greenbacks outside this Continent. We have built a great wall of greenbacks around us, just as the Chinese built their wall, and we think that we can make a mere promise money. Promises are money when they are kept. Print your greenbacks to-day. Are they ever to be paid? If they are never to be paid, then they will be valueless. The Continental note is valueless because it has not been paid. Nobody expects that it ever will be paid. The greenback, if you never pay it, will have no value. If you intend to pay it, then why print more?

Take the gentleman's position. He says those bonds should have been paid in the lawful currency of the country. That would not have extinguished the debt. The bonded debt would have gone out of existence; the non-interest-bearing debt would have been increased and would have remained. Some day it must be paid. Printing the greenback does not pay the debt.

You print the bond. That is a note bearing interest. I give you another note, in place of it, that bears no interest, and you say you are paid. But you may want money on that note, and then if there is no redemption there is no payment. Some day the debt has got to be paid.

The debt that is not paid has no value. The debt that has no value, though it may be legal tender in payment of a past debt, will buy nothing for the future. Men will hold their corn, they will hold their cloth, they will hold their land. You may keep your greenback, and they will keep their property. Inflation surely destroys purchasing power. So that at the last the man who, when you began your inflation, had his greenbacks in his pocket to bring home his dinner in

his basket, will take his greenbacks in his basket that he may bring home his dinner in his pocket. [Laughter.]

Admit that you have got your law and that new greenbacks are printed. I asked my friend what he would do with them? I asked whether he would go into the market and buy up bonds at ruling market rates. He says,—if I crystallize his answers into two propositions,—first, that all the bonds that are now held by the parties who held them before the passage of the law of 1869, he would pay in greenbacks; second, that all the rest he would pay in gold.

Now, I am not going to discuss the right or the wrong of the law. I want simply to tell you what the law is. The law, as it stands to-day, allows any man to fund any bond that he now holds into a five, four and a half, and four per cent. gold bond, with the word gold on its face—a bond declaring that principal and interest shall be payable in gold. Now, gentlemen, let us see how the thing stands. We are practical men. We are concerned with things as they are. Before you can get your law to allow inflation and print new greenbacks, every present bond-holder will have turned in all the bonds that you think are payable in greenbacks, and will have gotten back bonds which under the existing law are payable, principal and interest, in gold. Therefore you can't practically pay a dollar of the bonded debt except in gold. That is the hard alternative, as my friend would say, which the law, as it now stands, gives us. Then you can get no bond except by buying it in open market.

Now mark the logical result. You want more greenbacks. You say they are good. You talk about these "bloated bond-holders." You print your new greenbacks. How do you get them into circulation? You pay them to the "bloated bond-holders" for their bonds, and the men who now have the bonds will then have every dollar of the new greenbacks; and what become of "the wants of trade"? [Applause.]

There is no getting away from this. There it stands. You print the greenback. You have got to pay it out after you have printed it. Now, how will you get it out? If you pay it for the bond, the bond-holder gets it. If you stop taxing, then you run your Government for a year or two without taxes, and it will be pretty hard to get the people to pay taxes the third year. If you never are to tax, but always to pay in paper, by and by you will get so much paper out that the paper will not be worth any thing. So that will not work. Then what will you do? Will you give your new greenbacks away in order to supply "the demands and wants of trade"?

I am a lawyer. I am so poor a one, possibly, that nobody will hire me to try a case. What is the result? Saturday night, because my wife and children are not cared for, I go to the postmaster and say, "The wants and demands of my trade require some more greenbacks. Won't you please give me some?" [Applause.]

I am working at a trade. I work hard all the week and earn my living. My neighbor by my side is an idler. He goes on the street and earns nothing. When Saturday night comes, is he to go and say, "The wants and demands of trade require that I should have some greenbacks; Mr. Postmaster, give me my share?"

Do you not see you can not give them away? That would make us a nation of beggars. You can not pay them out by stopping taxes, because your officials would be held to no accountability. The Government might squander millions of dollars; it might start the printing presses and pay by the issue of paper money; and you would have a government so reckless that it would fall by reason of its own corruption. So that will not work.

How, then, are you to get these new greenbacks out? My friend has been driven to a hole. To buy the bonds in the open market is the only resort, and so the "bloated bond-holders" get all the good, new greenbacks. I hardly think that will work so as to help trade much. There is the inevitable logic of it.

If you have no money, how are you to get it? Printing greenbacks will not put them into your pocket or into mine. Suppose they were all printed and all piled on this table, right under a glass, and carefully guarded. There they are, radiant in their greenness and glittering in their gold—$1,800,000,000 of them. At once our fingers begin to itch, and our loving hearts incline toward those greenbacks, and you and I want more.

How can we get them? If we have any thing to sell that somebody else wants to buy, we can sell it and get them. There are greenbacks enough to do that now. If we know how to do any special kind of work, and any body wants that work, he hires and we labor, and so we earn the greenbacks and get more money. If your credit is good, you can borrow the greenbacks. But then you must give your private greenback—your note—promising to pay, and some day you will have to pay. Thus you get your greenbacks. Or, if sad and oppressed, you beg, and another with generous heart gives, then you have got more greenbacks. You can sell and get them; you can work and get them; you can borrow and get them; you can beg and get them. Is there any other way?

A voice.—Steal.

Gov. Woodford.—My friend says steal them. [Laughter.] Now, he has hit the inflation platform in just two words. [Laughter and applause.]

Gen. Ewing.—You brought him along to say that. He said it at Shawnee.

Gov. Woodford.—He said it with much better effect here. When the menagerie travels, there is always some one to stir the animals up. [Applause and laughter.]

Gen. Ewing.—I did n't know you had so many retainers.

Gov. Woodford.—Now, my friends, I do n't know of any way to get money except to work for it, to sell for it, to borrow for it, to beg for it, or to steal it. There are greenbacks enough now for all these purposes.

This is what I want to impress on your minds, and it is the bottom bed rock of the whole matter. The greenback is a promise to pay. Some day it either is to be paid or it is to be repudiated. If it is ever to be paid, it is more honest, it is more resolute, to set our faces, like the wise men, toward the star of the East, and follow until we reach the performance of our promise. [Cheers.] It is easier to do it to-day than it ever will be in the future.

That law of 1869, which my friend, with such eloquence and sarcasm of phrase, has thus stigmatized, has only one fault, and that is, that it paid; that is all—it paid. Some day the greenback must be paid, or else it has no value. The last section of that law of 1869 declares as follows: "And the United States pledge themselves"—I give the meaning, not the exact words—"that at the earliest practicable moment they will redeem the greenbacks in gold."

Who holds the greenbacks? You have them in your pockets. Whenever you work you get them. Who is to be paid the gold? You who hold them. The bond sells to-day for 120 in greenbacks. The greenback dollar sells for eighty-five cents in gold. When the greenback dollar is made good, the bond will only sell for a dollar, while the greenback will sell for the same dollar.

It is not for the bond-holder, it is for the bill-holder; it is not for the money power, it is for the laboring poor, that I plead to-day. I speak for the laborer, for the man who toils, who has nothing but his work to sell. The rich man can live on the savings of the years that are gone. And you put this burden of inflation where? On the back and muscle of every man who toils. You leave the bond-holder with his bond payable in gold. You leave the bond-holder in his

riches, and all the burden you cast where? Now I don't use this word of personal address to yourself, sir, with other than the sincerest respect, but the party that you represent leaves this burden where the false teaching of demagogues always leaves it. The party of inflation leaves this burden to be borne by the laboring and suffering, crushing labor and poor men alike, while the bond-holder gets the benefit. In God's name, men of Ohio, take care of the bill-holder. Make the bill gold, so that there shall be no margin and no difference between the bond on one side and the bill on the other. [Cheers.]

My friend tells you that I taunt and sneer at the greenback. Oh, no. None can love it more than I. When the mad waves of rebellion swept over the land, that greenback was all that my friend paints it. It was the ark that bore the hope of the nation, and that saved us. So the olden ark saved Noah, but Noah didn't live in the ark forever. [Laughter and applause.] When he had a chance he got out on hard ground [applause and laughter]; on solid rock; and Mt. Ararat stands for honest money, specie resumption at the earliest practicable moment. [Cheers.]

Let us set our faces toward the payment of our debt. Let us march toward specie resumption. We may not get there as soon as we dream. But toward specie resumption, with our faces toward the sunlight, toward honesty, toward the absolute fulfillment of the nation's pledge, let us steadily keep our way and at last we shall get there. It may not be in 1879, but we will at least keep our faces toward the right. We shall not reach specie resumption by turning our backs on it and marching the other way.

My friends, I have but three minutes before I leave you. I make no apology for speaking of honor and for speaking of good faith, for that is the bed rock of a promise. You can not give your note unless it is based on your good faith. What is credit? You ask it at the store. You go there to buy goods. When the week comes round you have to pay or else your credit is gone. The trader here buys at New York. When the time comes round he must pay or his credit is gone. So with the Government. The bed rock of a promise is honesty.

I hold up the greenback, the price of my country's liberty, with its pledge to pay one dollar. I ask that at the earliest practicable moment that promise shall be kept, so that the bill-holder may stand where the bond-holder stands. Down through all the ages from Sinai, robed with cloud and sceptered with lightning, are sounding the words of the old Hebrew law, "Thou shalt not lie." That law is binding upon nations as it is upon men. [Cheers.]

I make no apology for talking to the men and women of Ohio and putting my argument on the ground of simple and absolute good faith. Inflation to-day inevitably means repudiation to-morrow. Bad faith to-day inevitably means repudiation to-morrow. We stand within the shadows of the centennial day. We are going next year to Philadelphia and there, beneath old Independence Hall, where the bell rang out, "Liberty to all the land and to the inhabitants thereof," we shall gather reverently and thank the God that hath saved the nation and brought us to this strength. But let us deserve our prosperity, and then we shall have it. Let us not in the centennial time do in our strength what our fathers did in their infancy. Let us not inflate our greenback as they inflated their Continental note. Let us not be forced to repudiate our greenback as they repudiated their Continental note. Let us pay our debts, and He who gave us victory over rebellion will give the honest land prosperity in peace. [Cheers.]

[*Time expired.*]

DEBATE AT WILMINGTON,

Monday Afternoon, Oct. 4, 1875.

GENERAL EWING'S OPENING SPEECH.

Mr. Chairman and Fellow-citizens:—

The attempt being made by Governor Morton in this canvass in Ohio to call up the ghost of the rebellion, and the attempts of other Republican speakers to arouse the apprehension of the people lest their common school system be injured, seem to me cowardly subterfuges resorted to out of fear of an honest discussion of the question of the campaign—the finance question. I am happy that we are to have it here discussed by an able gentleman who can speak for the Republican party; for the State Executive Committee have put him on the stand before the people to do that. He is well qualified to present the Republican view of the question, and will throughout the debate, I hope and have no doubt, give us a candid discussion of these issues. I have several questions to propound to him, and I read them now in order that he may have full time to consider them and adjust his speech so as to reply at the time that will be most convenient.

1. Is the Republican party of the United States in favor of the execution of the specie resumption law?

2. Was not every vote in favor of it cast by Republicans?

3. Is the Republican party in favor of continuing in the national banks the power to issue paper currency?

4. Was the power of the General Government to issue legal tender paper money derived from the Constitution? If not, whence was it derived? If it was derived from the Constitution, what provision of that instrument limits the exercise of the power to time of war?

5. If the Government had the constitutional right to issue legal tender paper money, when did the right begin and when did it end?

The gentleman propounded questions to me yesterday at Circleville. I was happy to receive them. I answered them, I believe, fully. I certainly intended to, and was not at all disconcerted by the fact that they were put to me just as I took the stand. But I am perhaps a little more phlegmatic than the gentleman. He is of a nervous temperament, and I want to give him the questions in time for him to consider them calmly and answer them fully. I approach him with the questions as a skillful horseman would approach a colt with a buffalo robe—not jump at him with it, or shake it at him. I want to lead him up to them carefully and kindly, and I hope he will see that there is no danger to his party in answering with that candor which I am sure belongs to his character.

I will ask your attention to-day, fellow-citizens, specially to the eighth and ninth resolutions of the Ohio Democratic platform: "That the contraction of the currency heretofore made by the Republican party, and the further contraction proposed by it with a view to the forced resumption of specie payment, have already brought disaster to the business of the country and threaten it with general bankruptcy and ruin. We demand that this policy be abandoned, and that the volume of currency be made and kept equal to the wants of trade, leaving the restoration of legal tenders to par with gold to be brought about by promoting the industries of the people, not by destroying them."

"9. That the policy already initiated by the Republican party, of abolishing legal tenders and giving national banks the power to furnish all the currency, will increase the power of an already dangerous monopoly, and the enormous burdens now oppressing the people, without any compensating advantage; and that we oppose to this policy the demand that all the national bank circulation be promptly and permanently retired, and legal tenders issued in their place."

I read these two resolutions, not that they embody all the issues on the finance question, but that they either embody all or suggest all, involving necessarily, as they do, a consideration of the specie resumption law.

It is denied by Republican speakers and papers that there has been any contraction of the currency since the war. Let us see how that is. When the war ended in 1865 there was $1,200,000,000 of public debt in the form of Treasury notes intended to circulate as money, although bearing interest. Why do I say they were intended to circu-

late as money? Because they were made legal tenders for their face, and the making of them legal tenders was for the purpose of giving them use as currency. They had the character also of investments, for they bore a moderate rate of interest, payable in currency, some three per cent., some four, some five, and some seven-thirty per cent. per annum. They were used alternately as investments and as currency. A man who had no special use for his money immediately would take one of those notes, lay it by, and it would draw him a fair interest. If he found it necessary to pay a debt, or to use any considerable sum, he would take one of those notes, and it was always worth its face in greenbacks with interest to date, so that any man, in a blacksmith's shop or on the road, on horseback or on foot, could in a minute calculate what that note was worth in the money market on that day. These notes were used largely as currency among the people. They were held almost exclusively by the people. None of them had been sold abroad.

During those times we decreased immensely the general public debt by paying off the floating debt of the United States—paid it off to the extent of $500,000,000 or $600,000,000 a year, without feeling the drain. The Republican party, determining to return to a bank currency, decided, at the earliest possible day, to take away from the Government all control over the money of the people. They determined that these interest-bearing Treasury notes, this easily borne debt, should be put into the form of a debt bearing a six per cent. gold interest, running from five to twenty years, called five-twenty bonds. Accordingly these notes were all taken up and funded in bonds. The principal of these five-twenty bonds was, by the terms of the law authorizing their issue, payable at the end of five years in greenbacks. The Government received greenbacks for them. They agreed to pay greenbacks for them at the end of five years, and in the meantime pay the person who furnished greenbacks for the bonds six per cent. gold interest. But the managers of the Republican party saw that as long as those five-twenty bonds were outstanding, there would be reason for keeping up this greenback currency. They, therefore, determined that they would make those bonds payable in gold, as a step toward wiping out the greenback currency. So they passed the Act of March 18, 1869, falsely called "An Act to maintain the public credit," by which, without any justice or equivalent, they made the sixteen hundred millions of five-twenty bonds, that up to that time were payable in greenbacks, payable only in gold. Greenbacks were then worth about seventy cents on the dollar in gold. That act added

to the public burdens about 30 per cent. of sixteen hundred million dollars.

Did the Republicans tell you that they were going to do that? No; they came before the people of Ohio and told them they would never do it. In the campaign of 1868 their State Convention passed a resolution declaring that those bonds should be paid in legal tenders. Here it is: "That the Republican party pledges itself to the faithful payment of the public debt. According to the laws under which the five-twenty bonds were issued, said bonds should be paid in the currency of the country, which may be a legal tender, when the Government shall be prepared to redeem such bonds." The Indiana Republican Convention declared "the bonds of the United States should be paid in legal tender, except where, by their express terms, they provide otherwise." John Sherman, in that year, 1868, declared "if the bond-holder refuses to take the same kind of money with which he bought the bonds, he is an extortioner and repudiator." Mr. Morton said practically the same thing. So did Thaddeus Stevens. And on these declarations in 1868 the Republican party went before the people of Ohio, Indiana, and the West, and succeeded in inducing them to elect General Grant President, thus solemnly pledging their faith to the people that that vast body of the national debt should be paid in the money that the people got for the bonds—in legal tenders.

They elected Grant. A few days after he was inaugurated the Senate Finance Committee prepared this act to maintain the public credit, providing that the bonds should be paid in gold; and in fourteen days after Grant took his seat he signed that bill, violating the contract on which the bonds were issued, and robbing the people of the right to pay them in the money they got for them. Why was it done? As another step toward the boon of specie payment, that the gentleman will tell you is the great thing to be longed for and sought for by the American people—in order to put the public debt in such form that it could not be paid in legal tenders, and obviate the necessity for continuing the legal tender money in existence;—for the same object that induced them to wipe out the $1,200,000,000 of interest bearing Treasury notes that were payable in legal tenders.

Those were two steps toward specie payment. The third was a large contraction of the non-interest-bearing currency, composed of greenbacks and national bank notes—amounting to $910,000,000 in 1865, when the war ended. By 1873 they amounted to but $742,000,000—a reduction of $168,000,000. Now there are $741,000,000—a reduction of $169,000,000. That reduction was on the express decla-

rations of Mr. McCulloch and John Sherman, the finance leaders of the Republican party, that there was only one road to specie payment, and that was the road of contraction.

Now, when you compare the currency of 1865—the greenback and national bank currency of $910,000,000—with the greenback and national bank currency of to-day, $741,000,000, you find a reduction of about eighteen per cent.; and when you compare the population of the country in 1865, which was about 35,000,000, with the population of to-day, which is about 43,000,000, you find an increase of population of about twenty-two per cent. Assuming that the population represents ratably the proper volume of currency, we have to-day practically a reduction of the currency of forty per cent. since 1865, not counting in at all the $1,200,000,000 of interest-bearing legal tender notes, counting only the greenbacks that bore no interest and the national bank notes—a contraction of forty per cent. That is the contraction that the Democratic platform speaks of.

We say it brought disaster to the business of the country. Let me show you that it did. Here is a table of mercantile failures in the United States, taken from Hunt's Merchants' Magazine and Year Book for the years up to 1870, and from R. G. Dun & Co.'s tables for the years following. See how, during the period of a full currency, business is shown by these tables to have been prosperous, and how with each year of contraction—contraction by reduction of the currency and growth of business, both going on at the same time—the failures multiplied.

YEAR.	NO. OF FAILURES.	AMOUNT.
1863	405	$ 8,000,000
1864	520	8,000,000
1865	530	18,000,000
1866.	632	47,000,000
1867	2,386	86,000,000
1868	2,197	57,000,000
1869	2,411	65,000,000
1870	3,160	80,000,000
1871	2,915	87,000,000
1872	4,000	121,000,000
1873	5,181	228,000,000

Showing that in 1873, when we had the least currency in proportion to the population, the failures were seven times as large as they had been in 1865 and 1866, when we had the largest amount of currency.

Now, fellow-citizens, that strongly indicates the effect of contraction on the business of the country, and it is in accordance with reason. We all know perfectly well that business having adjusted itself to a given amount of currency in 1865–66, as the currency was reduced in amount the effect was to reduce all values of all property and labor; to compel people who were doing business to do it upon a falling market; to do it while the stocks they were working or holding in hand were depreciating in value. As this contraction went on, the pressure became more and more severe and the squeeze tighter, till, in 1873, the industries of the country broke down, the great Jay Cooke failure being the first.

The gentleman tells us that these failures are the result of what he elegantly terms a "national drunk." They are no such thing. I challenge any body to contradict the statement that not only were the industries of the people of Ohio more generally prosperous for ten years preceding the panic, taking that decade as a whole, than they had been during any other ten years of our history; but, also, I assert that for the five years before the panic, from 1868 to 1873, as the contraction was kept up, business men became more and more cautious. There was less of venture each year as we approached the panic. There was less of wild speculation each year. There was more of economy practiced each year, for people, during several years before the panic, felt severely the pressure of the hard times.

A national drunk! Was the Jay Cooke failure due to the expansion of the currency? No, gentlemen, it was due to the giving to Mr. Cooke of an area of the people's land as great as Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois combined. It was the result of giving to Fremont's road another area as big as two or three States. It was the result of the wanton policy of the Republican party in giving large bonuses of public lands to numerous railroads scattered over the uninhabited regions of the West, and, through those grants stimulating inordinately investments in Western railroads beyond the limits where the population and business would justify their construction. That was the trouble. It was not the currency at all. It was these land grants in large part, and in further large part the fact that the people, when the war ended, supposed the Southern States were going to be allowed to rise on their feet and prosper; and, therefore, they made investments in Southern railroads and plantations. They did not calculate on the fact that the Republican Administration intended to let loose a flight of vultures on the South to eat out its substance and bring the States to bankruptcy.

Those are the two causes that made all of the drunkenness there was that disturbed the business of the country in 1873.

My friend talks about the construction of railroads in the East. He alludes to one road, the Midland road in New York, constructed by county aid; but let him point to the road in Ohio constructed in all that time that was not needed. There was not one. You may take Ohio from the lake to the river, and from Pennsylvania to Indiana, go from county to county, and you can not point out any evidence of a drunk in the industries of the country during this time. The decade from 1863 to 1873 was, as a whole, a season of prosperity, when all industries flourished, when all labor was fully employed; a season of thrift, when men made homes and bettered their condition; when laborers secured provision for their families and a little competence against the day when they could not labor. Aside from the griefs and losses of the war, it was a blessed epoch, and one that I am sure every considerate man must long to see return.

It was contraction of the currency chiefly that brought disaster to the business of the country. The Democratic party say that it was, and they further say that the Republican party propose an additional contraction by their resumption law. I will ask you to consider the law, and see if what I say be not true. Here it is. The gentleman says it is not an issue in this canvass. Here it is—a law for the resumption of specie payment by the people of the United States, by a people owing eight thousand million dollars of currency debt; a law which will add to that currency debt seventeen per cent. in three years, which will pile on the shoulders of the towns, cities, townships, counties, States, railroads and private individuals all over the country who owe that vast volume of debt—seventeen per cent. more in order to make it equal to gold by 1879. It proposes to lay on the shoulders of the people $1,360,000,000 additional debt. It proposes to add to the interest-bearing debt of the General Government $375,000,000 of new five per cent. gold bonds in order to buy the gold to redeem and destroy the free money the people now have. It proposes to add $44,000,000 to the bonded debt to buy silver with which to take from your pockets the fractional currency. And yet the gentleman says it is not an issue in this canvass: it is too small a matter. I suppose the Geghan law is a much bigger affair. [A laugh.] Why, he is the first man who has come upon the stump in Ohio belonging to the Republican party, to my knowledge, who has mentioned the words "Resumption Law," and he didn't mention it until I commenced putting questions about it, and he will talk very little about

it now. He will have a large amount to say about Continental money, and Confederate scrip, and French *assignats*, and the coin of the Dutch Republic and the Fiji Islands [laughter]—every thing that is just as far as possible away from the issue of the campaign—the question whether the people of this country are going to add thus enormously to their present burdens or not.

This resumption law compels the Secretary of the Treasury to get forty-four million dollars of silver coin, and take up and destroy all the fractional currency. What for? Oh, they say, it will give the people a money that chinks, and it will be so far toward specie payments. They started toward specie payments a year ago, and proposed to redeem all the currency under five dollars. They kept it up—well, I forget whether it was from nine to twelve o'clock on the day they started, or from nine to eleven [laughter]—but they ran out in the first three hours, giving them the largest time.

Silver has never been less than five per cent. premium since that law was passed. It is now eight per cent. premium. The Secretary of the Treasury has already run out $2,600,000 of new silver money to take up the fractional currency with. He has bought $12,000,000 of silver, and he has issued and sold near $12,000,000 of new five per cent. gold bonds to get the silver with, and has so far, by pushing the mints night and day, got out $2,600,000 of this silver. Where is it? Can't one of you hand up a piece? There is some of it belongs to this county if it is distributed evenly. I have never yet found the man who has seen a coin of it except one gentleman who saw one at the seat of Government, and he got it at the Treasury Department as a curiosity, intending to frame it. [Laughter.] No; of that $2,600,000 that have been issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, not a dollar ever came into the Mississippi Valley; not a dollar ever went into circulation even in New York City or in Brooklyn. It was bagged by four or five pet brokers in Wall Street, who pocketed the five to eight per cent. premium and sent the silver off to California, or Oregon, or Nevada, or China, or Japan. That is what became of it, and that is what will become of every dollar of the forty-four millions.

We are to add $44,000,000 to our bonded debt for the sake of putting probably $2,000,000 or $3,000,000 in the hands of some pet brokers, to be selected by the Secretary of the Treasury. Thus, we will lose our fractional currency, and the only consolation we receive is the suggestion that the merchants will print fractional money and circulate it, and that will answer the purposes of a fractional cur-

rency. We are to lose our fractional currency and to get along with grocery men's shinplasters.

The greenback currency is to be allowed to live until the first of January, 1879, but on and after that date it is to be paid in gold. Where is the gold to come from? From Europe. How? By a sale of five per cent. bonds. There is no other way to get it. The expenses of the Government last year overran the receipts, and Congress added $35,000,000 more of taxes, and now the expenses are just a little short of the receipts. But there is no margin there with which to provide $375,000,000 of gold, nor the tenth of it, by the first of January, 1879. It must be provided in the way authorized by this law, by the sale of five per cent. gold bonds in Europe, adding to the servitude we are already under to Europe, adding to the drain of gold from our country every year, in order to have $375,000,000 of gold on that day, so that the Secretary of the Treasury may take up and destroy the only money you now have that costs you nothing. That is, we increase our national interest-bearing debt about one-fourth in this attempt to get back to specie payments. We destroy our greenback currency; we destroy our fractional currency; in other words, we destroy $419,000,000 out of the $750,000,000 of currency.

Who is there among the business men in this country now that can stand it?—a contraction of sixty per cent. in three years put on the contraction that we have already had? Values have fallen low enough, and property and products of labor, God knows. But we must be prepared for a contraction of one-half more. Who can stand it? What merchant can continue his business in the next three years unless he has a large accumulation of wealth already, and see his goods shrinking in value while in his store, to an extent larger than any ordinarily anticipated profit? What manufacturer can manufacture under such circumstances? What man will borrow money to carry on business when he knows that, in addition to the interest he pays, seventeen per cent. has to be added for the difference between greenbacks now and gold on the first of January, 1879? Who will borrow money to go into business with?—and business can not be conducted without borrowing. The business of the country generally, and especially the business of the West, is carried on, to a large extent, by borrowed capital. The men who have accumulated wealth are generally the elderly men, the men who, to a large extent, are done with the active business of life. It is the young, energetic men of the community, who combine their energies and their talent with

the money of non-producers to carry on the works of production and exchange—they are the men that do the business of the country in the main; and how can men go into business using borrowed capital when, in addition to the interest they pay, they must look at the fact that they pay seventeen per cent. additional for this money as it rises up to par with gold, pay it, too, in products constantly depreciating, depreciating far more, my fellow-citizens, than merely seventeen per cent.? That will not mark the measure of depreciation at all.

England attempted resumption in 1819, after her wars with Napoleon, when the difference between bank paper and gold was only three per cent. She fixed a day of resumption four years in advance; but in order to prepare for payment in gold, the banks had to reduce their currency forty-five per cent., and every thing in the island, whether land or labor or product, shrank to the full extent of the bank circulation. The result was that almost every man who was in debt was bankrupted—and almost every man who is in business is in debt. I mean that every man who is doing business borrows money, or buys on credit and sells on credit. He stands between his debtors on one side and his creditors on the other, and the fall of one knocks down another. Consequently it is that no considerable proportion of business men of any community can fail without involving the whole business of that community in ruin. And that is what we are approaching—approaching by reason of this immense contraction of the currency. The effect of this law is being already anticipated by the large holders of money securities and of money. They know perfectly well the effect of a reduction of the currency sixty per cent. in the next three years.

The gentleman talks about free banking under this law, and an increase of currency by means of it. It is a cheat and fraud. It was put there for the purpose of catching Morton and Logan and Ferry, and giving them a chance to go before their Republican constituents in the West, telling them that they were to have more bank money. Have they had it? So far from it, the bank currency has been reduced twenty-five million dollars under the operation of that law inside of eight months. It is true the law makes banking free, but it makes it free under such conditions that no new banks will be established. It makes it free under the condition that every bank must be prepared to pay gold for its notes, or legal tender, which is the same as gold, on the 1st of January, 1879; and if the new bank fails to pay, or any of the old banks fail to pay gold or legal tender (which, after the 1st of January, 1879, will be a mere

check on the Secretary of the Treasury for gold), under the banking laws, their bonds are to be confiscated with all the premium. The consequence is that old banks, under the operation of that law, seeing how unsafe business will be, how unsafe all loans, seeing the high price of bonds, have preferred to sell their bonds for a premium, and withdraw their circulation, rather than increase their circulation, although they are permitted to do it to any extent. And the result is that about twenty-five million dollars of old bank circulation has been withdrawn, and only about four or five million dollars of new bank currency issued; and for every dollar of the new bank currency issued, eighty cents of greenbacks are destroyed.

He says this law is a measure of inflation, because when a new bank is created and given new circulation, the Secretary only withdraws eighty per cent. of greenbacks; but the reason is that the new bank is pledged to keep twenty per cent. of reserve, and the effect of it is simply to make the volume of the currency the same after the increase of new bank currency. So it is not a law of inflation in that respect at all; and under the law, as I said before, there has been a contraction of greenbacks and of national bank notes amounting to twenty-nine million dollars up to the first day of this month, as appears by the Treasury statement. That is the contraction still going on referred to in the Democratic platform.

Gentlemen say money is plenty. Oh, yes, money is plenty. There is plenty in the hands of men who hold from a hundred thousand to a million dollars of it. There are $150,000,000 of money piled up now in Wall Street, in sight of the residence of the gentleman who will follow me—$150,000,000 that is not being used. Why is it not used? What is that money for? That money is for the business of the country. Money is the handmaid of business. Its place is out in business; and in ordinarily prosperous times, when men can have an assurance that business will be fairly prosperous, money is loaned out by the holders to business men. But this resumption law in effect says to all the holders of money, "Do n't you lend a dollar. You lend money to this man who is manufacturing, and you will lose it." Why? Because all his goods will be falling while he is manufacturing them; because when he goes out into the market he will find nobody who has any money to buy with. He will find that he can not sell except on long credit; and when he sells on credit, he can not collect.

That is what gentlemen call "over production." They mean by it that state of affairs when almost every body is out of every thing they want, and have not money to buy any thing. That is the sort

of over-production this law has made, and it is the sort that it inevitably must keep on making. The law says to every man who has money: "Gold is seventeen per cent. premium now. Just lay your money away in your safe and you will make seventeen per cent. by turning the key and putting it in your pocket." They go out and say, "Would you like money at two per cent. on United States bonds?" and any body that has something better than money to deposit can get the money at two per cent. Then gentlemen who come out to address you say, "See how cheap money is. It is only two per cent. It is not out because it is not needed. If it were needed people would put up satisfactory security and get it at two per cent." But the difficulty is that men who are in business generally can not put up United States bonds. They can only offer their business. They say: "I am doing a business of $100,000 a year. Lend me $20,000 to carry it on." But that security does n't go down any more, because the money holders see that under this contraction of the currency there will be a general massacre of business in the next three years, and they will not trust the money out in business. That is the whole of it.

Now, our Democratic platform says that this contraction of the currency under that law, with a view to the forced resumption of specie payment, shall stop, and that the business of the country shall have just so much money as it needs—no more, and no less. Gentlemen cry out, "That is unlimited inflation; that means a flood of money beyond all the wants of business." Well, the platform of the Democracy of Ohio was framed by pretty intelligent men, and adopted by an intelligent convention. It means just what it says. It means that the legitimate business of this country shall not suffer because of a too small volume of money. It does n't say that the greenback shall be increased or diminished arbitrarily. On the contrary, it says it shall not be. It in effect says, in respect to the volume of the currency: "Look at the business of the country. See what it needs. Don't fix your eye on specie payment, and say: 'We will resume in 1879, and let the business of this country go to the devil,' but look at the business of the country; give it all the currency it needs for healthy growth; let the industries rise to their feet again, and trust the restoration of specie payment to that time when, by the general growth of business, increase of wealth, payment of the national debt, ending of our servitude as borrowers to European money-lenders, it will become practicable, without great public injury, to resume specie payment." It is a sensible proposition, and it seems to

me that, fairly considered, it ought to commend itself to the good opinion of the people.

Our platform goes one step further on this money question. Here are a little over two thousand private corporations who have been allowed to usurp the sovereign power of furnishing the money of the people to the extent of $350,000,000, and they are being paid five per cent. per annum for the usurpation. It would be an outrage to put into the hands of private corporations the right to furnish money at all. The tendency is dangerous. But it is still worse to lay on the shoulders of the burdened industries of this country an additional tax of five per cent. as a bounty to these parasites, and that is what the Republican party does. The national banks pay a tax of one per cent. on circulation, and taking out that tax from the currency value of the interest on the bonds which that amount of greenbacks would buy, the saving to the people would be about $18,000,000 of currency each year by the mere issuing of legal tenders to the amount of $350,000,000 in place of that many national bank notes. Going into the market and buying that amount of bonds and stopping the interest, the people of this country would save $18,000,000. The national banks would pay the same tax that they now pay, State, county, city and national, except the single tax on circulation, and I defy anybody to show to the contrary.

That eighteen million dollars of saving, if applied now to the payment of the principal of the public debt, would extinguish every dollar of it within the next twenty-five years—not principal and interest, but principal alone. Every dollar would be paid off by that one single act of costless justice to the people, and the majority of the men who now hear me would live to see this vast burden rolled from the shoulders of the industries of the land. Why was it not done in 1865? If it had been done we would have saved up to this time between two and three hundred million dollars. Why was it not done? Because, with few exceptions, these banks were pillars and supports of the Republican party, and it therefore, in effect, robbed the American people of eighteen million dollars a year to distribute among party retainers and supporters. That is the effect of it.

Now the Democratic party say: "Stop that! Issue greenbacks in the place of those bank-notes, and put an end to that big drain at least." Between the policy of the Democratic party on the one hand of substituting greenbacks for national bank notes, and of the Republican party on the other of buying up and destroying the greenbacks and fractional currency, is a difference to the American people of be-

tween three and four hundred million dollars of debt reduced, and four hundred and nineteen million dollars of interest-bearing debt added—a difference of over $700,000,000. If you prefer to have over $400,000,000 added to the public debt, adopt the Republican policy and vote for their platform. If you want over $300,000,000 taken off, vote the Democratic ticket.

GOVERNOR WOODFORD'S REPLY.

Messrs. Chairmen and Ladies and Gentlemen:—

You look like earnest, practical men. Such a man am I; and so, without one word of introduction, let us to work.

The issue is in the eighth section of the Democratic platform: "That the contraction of the currency hitherto made by the Republican party"—that is statement number one.

The Republican party has made no contraction of the currency which is legal tender. Such contraction as has taken place in the notes that were circulated and used as money was the joint and equal work of both political parties. It took place between 1865 and the 4th of March, 1869. During that period the late Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, was President of the United States. Hugh McCulloch was Secretary of the Treasury. The notes withdrawn, and whose withdrawal my friend calls contraction, were mostly of two kinds. You remember the old compound interest notes. When any body holding one of those notes found that it had so much interest added to it that it was worth more to keep it than to pay it out, he put it into his pocket, and himself contracted the currency; or when he had a seven-thirty note, whose interest had grown to the extent that it was to his advantage to keep the note rather than to pay it out, he put it into his pocket, and so contracted the currency. You sinful men yourselves contracted the currency. Those were debts, and Mr. McCulloch proposed to fund them, and he sent a recommendation to Congress to that effect in December, 1865, and then the following resolution was adopted:

"*Resolved,* That this House cordially concurs with the views of the Secretary of the Treasury in relation to the necessity of a contraction of the currency, with a view to as early a resumption of specie payments as the business interests of the country will permit, and we hereby pledge co-operative action to this end as speedily as practicable."

This resolution was adopted without even a reference to a committee, by a vote of 144 in the affirmative to 6 in the negative. There were 32 Democrats present in the House that afternoon, and 31 of those Democrats voted for the resolution, and only one against it. [Applause.]

This resolution was followed by the passage of a law on the 12th of April, 1866, and on the passage of that bill, of all the Democrats in the House of Representatives, only one voted against the bill. Andrew Johnson had by that time become a pretty good Democrat, and contraction was a Democratic measure. In the Senate the negative vote, the vote against the bill, was cast entirely by Republicans. So the contraction of the currency, so far as it occurred, my brother [to Mr. Ewing], we shall have painfully to share between us. [Applause and laughter.]

Allow me again to read from the record: "That the contraction of the currency hitherto made by the Republican party, and the further contraction by it, with a view to the forced resumption of specie payments."

Now let us see what contraction we Republicans have proposed. Perhaps it will be as well to read this Resumption Law. Then we will understand its meaning better than by citing it from hearsay.

"An Act to provide for the resumption of specie payments. *Be it enacted*, etc., That the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized and required, as rapidly as practicable, to have coined at the mints of the United States, silver coins of the denominations of ten, twenty-five, and fifty cents of standard value, and to use them in redemption of an equal number and amount of fractional currency of similar denominations; or, at his discretion"—you are not to have any of them in the West; they are all to be given to us in the East, my friend thinks; but allow me to read the law—"or, at his discretion, he may issue such silver coins through the mints"—there are mints elsewhere than in New York—"the sub-treasuries"—there are sub-treasuries elsewhere than in New York—"the public depositories"—there are public depositories elsewhere than in New York—"the post-offices of the United States"—is there not one in every village in Ohio?—"and upon such issue he is hereby authorized and required to redeem an equal amount of such fractional currency, until the whole amount of such fractional currency outstanding shall be redeemed."

Then if you want silver for the fractional currency in your pockets, whenever the Secretary has gotten enough to begin resumption, you

can get it from your postmaster. If you waste it after you have gotten it, it will not be the fault of this wicked law.

Then the next clause is "that so much of Section 3524 of the Revised Statutes of the United States as provides for a charge of one-fifth of one per cent. for converting standard gold bullion into coin is hereby repealed, and hereafter no charge shall be made for such service." Heretofore the Government has always been in the habit of coining bullion into money whenever any body presented it, and charging one-fifth of one per cent. to cover the expense. Hereafter they will coin bullion into money whenever it is presented, and make no charge, thus taking away a very slight hinderance against the specie resumption. It of course is a very slight one.

My friend says that we have already bought eleven millions of silver, and have sent the bonds abroad to get the silver. My friend is mistaken. The great amounts of silver that are now being mined are from the hills of Nevada, and I think it is only to-day the telegraph brings the report that the Superintendent of the Mint finds the production of silver is so rapidly increasing that the Comstock lode alone is expected to supply about four millions of silver per month. The production of gold and silver in the mines of the West, now that gold and silver look like being of some use for purposes of money in this country, the Superintendent of the Mint says will increase between twenty and thirty million dollars this coming year. So that the supply naturally follows the demand.

My friend asks where the two millions of fractional currency have gone that he claims have been retired? Where does corn go when it is used? [Laughter.] Where does cloth go when it gets worn? Where are sheep raised? Where wool can be sold. Where does silver go? Where silver is used. Where did the two millions of silver go? It went to that part of the country where, to-day, they do not use the fractional currency, but only use dimes, quarters, half-dollars, and dollars of silver.

My friend says that silver will not float. I suppose every one of you knows that a silver dollar does not contain a dollar's worth of silver. The silver coin of our land is a debased silver. A silver dollar is worth to-day about a dollar and eight cents in greenbacks. A gold dollar is worth a dollar and seventeen cents in greenbacks. With gold at 108 the greenback is just as good as the silver dollar; and whenever gold falls to 108—and we have had it down to 110 once within the past twelve months—whenever gold falls to 108, nobody will care to hoard the silver, for he could get no more for the silver than he could

get for the greenback itself. The greenback and the silver are of equal value with gold at 108, so that whenever the gold falls to 108, silver will float of itself, because the silver dollar is to-day worth only 108 in greenbacks. The silver coin is depreciated, and for that reason it is only a legal tender to the amount of five dollars. You can't make a man take more than five dollars in silver in payment of a debt. You can make him take but twenty-five cents worth of nickels. Any debt beyond that must be paid either in gold or the greenback, and as the greenback is not worth as much as the gold, and the greenback is a legal tender, of course we use the greenback.

Let us go on. Section 3 repeals all restriction on the banking law, so that banking is to-day as free as the business of keeping a hotel, or the business of running a grocery store. But my friend says, No, it is not quite: you have got to put up security. Well, you can't successfully go into the hotel business unless you have got capital enough to run it. A man can't open a grocery store without capital enough to run it. You can't start any business without capital enough to run it, unless you work for somebody else, and are being hired. If you propose at any time to work for yourself in business, on your own account, you have got to have some capital on which to do the business.

Why is this banking capital required? You men in Ohio, look back but a very few years, and you recall the time when if your neighbor paid you in an Indiana State bank bill, you had to sell it at a discount of five cents on the dollar. If he paid you in a West Pennsylvania bank bill, you had to sell it at a discount of seven cents on the dollar. Paper money was always at a discount when far away from the bank that issued it. How is it to-day? Did you ever stop when any body paid you a national bank bill, to ask where the bill was issued? Is not a bill from a bank in Oregon, a bill from a bank in Texas, a bill from a bank in Maine, just as good as a bill from a bank in Wilmington? Is not the bank in Wilmington compelled to take, in payment of any debt that you owe it, the notes of every national bank all over the United States? Have not you got a bank currency to-day that is absolutely good? Did you ever hear of a man losing a dollar because he had the bill of a national bank when that bank broke? Never. Behind every dollar of bank money that you hold, there is lodged at Washington for every ninety cents of the bank money a gold dollar bond of the United States that is worth a dollar and twenty cents in national bank currency, if it were sold. So that there is that which will sell for one dollar and thirty cents in national bank currency as absolute security for every dollar of national bank bills. That gives you

an absolutely safe currency. The capital is required to be put up, simply that there may be an absolute security for the bill-holder.

Now, of all those banks—and it is always safer to test things by experience, rather than by prejudice, or possibly by passion—of all the national banks, take them all together, and the losses suffered by their depositors will not form the one hundred and eighty-sixth part of one per cent. of the amounts owing by the banks. Was ever such a banking system known in the world? But my friend says he proposes to tear it down, so as to get the free money of the people. Let us see what that would do.

Not a United States bond to-day is taxed, except the bonds held by the national banks. Remember that. Not a United States bond to-day, under the law, can be taxed, except the bonds held by the United States banks. Why is that? Chief Justice Marshall, of the Supreme Court, decided that no Government had a right to tax its interest-bearing debt. Why? Because it could thereby repudiate its interest. Don't you see? You lend the Government a thousand dollars on condition that the Government shall pay you six per cent. interest. If the Government can tax you one per cent., then it will pay you but five. If it can tax one, it can tax two, and then it will pay you but four. If it can tax two, it can tax three, and then it will pay you but three. If it can tax three, it may tax five, and then it will pay you but one; and if it can tax five, it may tax six, and then it will not pay you any thing. And that was the logic by which the Chief Justice of the United States demonstrated that United States bonds could not be taxed.

But my friend, and all my Democratic friends say States and counties should be allowed to tax them. Stop one moment. When the Rebellion broke out, the States of Kentucky, and Maryland, and Delaware remained in the Union, but had decided leanings at least toward the other side—suppose that men with large capital had been living in those States, and suppose they had been disposed to lend money to the Government, if one of those States could have taxed United States bonds, she could have prevented any citizen of hers from lending a dollar to the Government, by simply putting such a tax on United States bonds that the man who had the money could not lend it, for he would lose all his income. And so Chief Justice Marshall decided that neither State nor county could tax the United States bonds.

But the United States bonds of the national banks are taxed, and why? Because the Government says: "If you want to go into the banking business you must put up such security that every bill-holder

will be protected, so that the cashier and president can not steal every thing there is in the bank, and run off and leave the poor laborers to whistle for the money on their bills. You must put up security. You must put up such security that if you do n't pay the bill-holder we can, and protect ourselves. Therefore, you must buy our bonds, and lodge them with us, so that if you break and steal the money of the bank, and do n't pay the bill-holder, we can pay the bill-holder, and protect him without loss to ourselves, because we have got in our hands as security the debt that we owe you." And so the Government was absolutely protected.

And there was another reason. Our friends say these bonds are all held abroad. It is quite a staple argument among our Democratic friends that these United States bonds are held abroad, and that the gold interest goes there. Then here was a chance to have a certain amount of bonds held at home, so that we could keep the interest here.

But my friend says we are paying interest to the banks on the security for their bills. Suppose the banks did not hold those bonds, would not we have to pay interest to somebody? Until the bond is paid have not we got to pay interest to somebody? What difference is it whether we pay it to a bank or to somebody else? Is it not better to pay the interest where the bond will absolutely protect the bill, and where the bond will be held in this country, and is it not better to offer an inducement to bring our bonds, as far as possible, from abroad, so that when the Government comes to pay gold, the gold on the bond may stay here, and not be carried away across the ocean?

But my friend says right here—and pardon this digression from the direct run of my argument—"You are paying double interest. You pay interest to the bank on the bond." Certainly we pay interest to whoever holds the bond, whether bank or citizen, until the principal of the bond is paid. I give you my note. You pass it to your neighbor. That note bears interest. Until I pay that note I have got to pay the interest on the note, I do n't care who holds it. It is payment of principal that stops interest, and nothing else.

Then, to go back, my Democratic friends suggest that you are paying a double interest. You pay on the bond. Yes, we pay on the bond to whoever holds it. We get in return the privilege of taxing United States bonds that could not be taxed in any other way, and the State of Ohio collects to-day in money, legal tender money, nearly one million dollars of taxes out of these national banks that it could not get in any other way, because if the bank invested that money simply

in United States bonds and put those bonds in its vault, the Government could not compel the taxation of them.

But my friend says the banks make interest both ways. Let us see. You go to a bank to get your note discounted. Suppose that there was not a national bank in existence, and all the money that the bank had was legal tenders, do you think that they would lend you those legal tenders, and not charge you interest? [Laughter.] Suppose there was not a national bank in existence, and you wanted to borrow money, will the man that owns that money lend it to you without charging interest? Why, you know he will not. When you borrow money you have got to pay interest. Did you ever borrow any money, except from a dear friend, who lent it as an accommodation? Did you ever borrow any money that you did n't have to pay interest on? Do you expect that if we had Democratic State banks of deposit and discount, they would lend greenbacks over their counters to every body who wanted them, according to the demands of trade, and charge no interest? [Laughter.] Then I apprehend, my friends, when you borrow money, you have got to pay interest, and you have got to pay just as much whether you borrow the greenback or whether you borrow the national currency.

The present law will give you the greenbacks if you prefer them. For example, you give your note at thirty days to the bank, due in thirty days. The bank discounts it, and gives you national bank notes. You walk out of the bank and hand those bills to your neighbor, and say, "Won't you please go into the bank and get me greenbacks on these notes?" Your neighbor can take the notes, and go into the bank and ask for greenbacks, and if the bank don't give him greenbacks, it is wound up and put into bankruptcy. The bank is compelled to redeem every note of its own with greenbacks, whenever any such note is presented.

Now, more than that, suppose you have a thousand dollars in national bank notes, and they are on a thousand different banks; suppose you had Democratic State banks, you would have to send your notes a thousand different ways, and, if you sent them by mail, that would cost three cents postage on each bill to get them redeemed. If you have a thousand national bank notes for one dollar each, and each on a different bank, you can send them by express to the redemption agent at Washington, and the Government sends you back greenbacks for every one of them; so that your bank bills are, practically, redeemable in greenbacks whenever you want them redeemed.

Now, the idea that because the money is printed by the Govern-

ment, you and I are going to borrow it without paying interest, is, if my learned friend will excuse the expression, almost too absurd to be worthy of further discussion.

Gen. Ewing.—Who suggested it, allow me to inquire? You are fighting the air.

Gov. Woodford.—My friend says that I am fighting the air. I am. I am fighting inflation. [Applause and laughter.]

Now, as these additional bank notes are issued, here comes in the process of contraction. Eighty dollars in greenbacks may be retired for every $100 in bank notes that are issued, and the contraction puts out $20 more of paper money than was out before. You destroy $80 of greenbacks for every $100 of bank notes that are issued. Eighty dollars from $100 leaves $20 more in circulation. It is hardly necessary to discuss that any further.

But my friend either did argue or logically suggest that the effect of this bill has been to contract the currency since the 1st of January, 1875. So it has, and in this way. Banking is free. Now, if a man has a right to go into the grocery business, has he not got a right to go out of it? If he has got a right to go into the banking business, has he not got a right to go out of it? You all have heard of the great profits of the national banks. You are led to suppose that they are accumulating wealth so rapidly that their fortunes rise like Aladdin's palace in mid-air. Well, if they are making so much money how is it that they are going out of the business? [Laughter and applause.] Under the operation of this law it is an actual fact that more men have gone out of the banking business than have gone into it.

But it will be suggested, or has been, that it is the dread of specie resumption in January, 1879, that does this. Now, one would suppose that if there was so much money to be made in the banking business they would all stay in it until about three months before that time, and then go out. But because there is to be resumption in 1879 they all go out now. Don't you see it? When they might remain in business and go out ninety days before the 1st of January, 1879, and make all these enormous profits between now and then, why should they go out now? What regulates the price of corn? It is the amount there is raised and the demand there is for it, is it not? What regulates the price of labor? The amount of labor that is done and the number of men who are ready to do it. What regulates the profit on money? The amount of money that there is to be used and the demand there is for it.

But my friend may suggest it is the dread of this resumption in the

5

future that is paralyzing our industry. Has it paralyzed the farmers this last summer? Did n't they get all the crops they could raise, and if crops were poor it was because of the flood and the bad weather, and not because of their failure to work. The resumption law did n't scare a farmer from planting a hill of corn. It did n't keep a man from hoeing a hill. You thought there would be sale for all the corn you could raise; that it would pay to make pork, and the corn is bringing a fair price now, and the pork is bringing a good price. The specter of resumption in 1879 did n't turn a pig away from the swill—[laughter]—did n't stunt the growth of an ear of corn. Why, the very corn has been teaching you a lesson. It waved in luxuriant greenbacks all the summer, and it is being redeemed and turned into hard gold now in the autumn. [Applause.]

There will always be a sale for every thing for which there is a demand. There is a demand for corn and a sale for corn, a demand for pork and a sale for pork. There is no demand for those articles where the production has been over-stimulated. Let us look at this thing very fairly and frankly.

When we were in the war, a million of men here in the North were taken out of our industries, and while they were in the field they made nothing, but they used things up very fast. All the men from the South that were in the army produced nothing. They used things up very fast. When the war came to its close the soldiers came home. Very many of us had become tired of the quiet life that there is on a farm. The men here in this audience know that it was hard work and irksome to come back to a quiet farm after they had been on the march and in the battle, and they drifted, very many of them, into the cities and towns, and into the factories. There has not been labor enough on the farms of this country for the last seven or eight years, but there is now too much labor in the cities and the large towns. You can't help the thing by forcing an artificial growth of industry in the cities and towns. Labor must go where labor is needed. Money must go where money is needed. Supply and demand will regulate this thing better than conventions or politicians. If it would pay to have but a thousand coal mines in the State of Ohio, and there are a thousand and ten, then either those ten must stop working, or the whole thousand and ten will make but very little profit. If there is demand only for a certain amount of iron and more iron is made, then somebody in the iron business will break, or else all of the iron business will be depressed. I will take an illustration from my own calling. If there is room in this city of Wilmington for but five

lawyers, and eight come here, and there are three too many, by Saturday night some week three of these attorneys will be thinking that there are not so many greenbacks in circulation as the wants of trade require, and they will be applying to the Central Democratic Committee for some of those greenbacks that the wants of trade demand. [Applause and laughter.]

My friend will suggest that it is fear of resumption that crushes us down, and he cites the example of England. Now, English resumption was an entirely different thing from that proposed in our bill. English resumption worked from the top downward, and compelled the banker and trader to pay at a certain time in gold. We have passed no such law. There is no law that you shall pay your debts in gold on the 1st of January, 1879, except under one contingency. There is no law that any bank shall pay its debts in gold, except under one contingency. The Government does say this: "We will get ready if we can by the 1st of January, 1879, to make the greenbacks of the country equal to gold, and to pay gold for them." Where will the greenbacks be then located? The law requires every bank to hold fifteen per cent. of its deposits in those greenback notes, ten per cent. in the vault of the bank itself, and five per cent. in the redemption agency at Washington. When these greenbacks are gold you see that they will thus be distributed at once all over the country. They are already in the bank vaults, and will be there when the day of resumption arrives. The bank will not have to redeem its notes in gold until the Government has made the greenback gold.

Now I believe that this can be done. Let us see if it can not. Is not every national bank note redeemable in a greenback dollar to-day? Yes. There are about $350,000,000 of national bank notes. There are to-day $373,000,000 of greenbacks. Then there are enough of greenbacks to redeem the national bank notes now, and have $23,000,000 to spare. Now I want to ask you this question: If $373,000,000 of greenbacks will redeem and float $350,000,000 of national bank notes, will not $373,000,000 of gold redeem and float $350,000,000 of national bank notes?

I will state that again. Every bank note is to-day redeemable in a greenback. You can get a greenback under the law for every national bank note that you hold. There are $373,000,000 of greenbacks. There are $350,000,000 of national bank notes. There are $23,000,000 more of greenbacks than there are of national bank notes. Of course the present greenbacks will redeem the present national bank notes, and leave greenbacks to spare. Then will not the same amount of gold—

$373,000,000 of gold—float $350,000,000 of national bank paper, if $373,000,000 of greenbacks will do it? Now try to bear that in memory during the next year when people endeavor to stump you about this matter of redemption. If the greenbacks sustain the credit of the country, the gold certainly and inevitably will.

But, it will be suggested that the exchanges of the country are to-day thirty billions of dollars—thirty thousand million—or, to state it in the other form, thirty billions of dollars, nearly fifteen times the entire aggregate of the present national debt. All those exchanges are effected with what? With $373,000,000 of greenbacks and $350,000,000 of national bank notes. The bank notes are redeemable in the greenbacks. The $373,000,000 of the greenbacks support and sustain the enormous credit business of the country. Of that amount about $170,000,000 are held as the reserves in different banks, and that fund of reserves sustains the entire present credit business of the country. If paper will do this, will not gold, that is worth a great deal more, do it better?

But my friend says that the execution of this resumption law will add sixteen per cent. to your indebtedness. It does n't add a dollar. What do you owe to-day, if you owe any thing? Suppose you owe a hundred dollars. You owe a hundred dollar debt that you can pay with $100 in greenbacks, and you can't pay your neighbor with any thing but $100 in greenbacks, if he insists on having them. He will take bank notes, and why? Because the bank notes will always bring the greenbacks. Very well. If the Government make the greenback gold, it will be just as easy for you to transfer that greenback into gold as to handle the greenback. You have only got to go to your bank. Whenever the currency basis is gold, all the values of the country will have been lifted up, and that is the great feat of the resumption law.

The Government says: "We made you take that paper in the hour of our extremity and need. It was a forced loan. We compelled you to take it because our safety and our salvation demanded it. We will not put a burden upon you. We will not ask a man to pay a dollar in gold, or a bank to pay a dollar in gold, till we, the Government, that contracted the debt, put our broad shoulders under the wheel, and instead of depressing the industries of the country, lift the industries of the country up, so that every paper dollar shall be a gold dollar, buying what the gold dollar will, actually worth what it claims to be worth to-day, what it was worth yesterday, and what it will be worth to-morrow." [Applause.]

I proceed to the next point. Resumption of specie payment does

not involve a dollar of increase in the national debt, when you take the years together. Here we strike the error that lies at the bottom of this entire discussion. The greenback is just as much a debt of this country as is the bond. The difference between the greenback and the bond is simply this: the bond is the promise of the Government to pay gold twenty years from now, with gold interest in the meanwhile, and the bond is not a legal tender in the payment of debt. It does not have that element of value. The greenback, on the other hand, is the promise to pay a certain number of dollars, at no given date, and without interest. The greenback, in order to give it the quality of circulation, has upon its back the indorsed authority of the Government that it shall be a legal tender in the payment of debt. Do not forget this; because the subtle logic of my friend will naturally seek here to mislead you.

The greenback dollar is as much a debt of the Government as is the bonded dollar. Let us read the language of this greenback: "The United States will pay the bearer five dollars." It does not say, "This is five dollars," but "The United States will pay the bearer five dollars." What are the five dollars? Something behind that bill; not another bill like it; something back of it. You give me your note. When it becomes due I ask payment. I present it to you. You say: "Certainly, Mr. Woodford. I belong to the inflation party of Ohio, and I believe in paying my debts promptly at maturity." You open your desk, and you sit down, and with flowing ink and a round hand you write me a bigger note than I had before, and you give it to me, and you say: "There, Mr. Woodford, consider yourself paid." [Laughter.] After awhile I get a little weary, and I bring your note back to you, and you reach me a bigger and a handsomer note yet, and you say: "If you do not consider that payment of debt, then you have not faith enough to believe in a "Brindle" dollar, or to vote for his Excellency, Governor Allen, and there is no hope for you." [Laughter and applause.] The United States will pay five dollars. The greenback is the debt of the Government just as much as is the bond, only because it does not pay interest on the greenback —it gives you the privilege of paying your debts with it until the Government shall keep its promise. Do I err in my statement?

Now suppose that the Government had put out four hundred millions of coin, do you think that it would carry that coin as part of its debt? After you have paid a man a hundred silver dollars, do you still owe him the dollars? No. When the Government pays coin, it no longer owes a debt. The coin is the debt paid, and it

stands. It not only represents value, but *is* in and of itself actual value, irrespective of the decree of the Government. It will buy, though the Government did not make it a legal tender. The gold coin and the silver coin of foreign nations is not a legal tender in this Government under the law. The law of this Government says, "No foreign gold or silver coin shall be a legal tender in payment of debt," and yet the foreign gold and silver is worth more than our paper promise to pay because it has actual value in itself, as a bushel of corn has value, as a yard of cloth has value, as an acre of land has value. The value is in the thing.

Now, I might cut off, by accident, the top of that bill, and it would still be five dollars. It is the promise of the Government. That bill might be burned, and I could make the Government give me another, because it is a note. It is a promise to pay. But see how gold is made a legal tender: "The gold coins of the United States shall be a legal tender in all payments to their nominal value, when not below the standard weight provided by law: . . . and when reduced to weight below such standard, shall be a legal tender at valuation in proportion to their actual weight." So that if I take a ten-dollar gold piece and cut it in two, either half is only legal tender for the amount that is left.

I now turn to the statement of the debt of the United States. Here it is: "Debt bearing interest in coin," so much; "debt bearing interest in lawful money," so much; next is "debt bearing no interest," so much. Next are legal tender notes, $374,000,000. So the Government owes them. Then if the Government buys gold and pays them, all the difference will be that it has transferred a non-interest-bearing debt into an interest-bearing debt. Ought it not to do so? If I can not pay you what I owe, ought I not to pay you the interest on it? The bond-holder gets his interest. Ought not the bill-holder to get his principal? But my friend says that in doing this you add to the interest volume of the debt. You do not, however, add to the principal. You owe the four hundred millions of legal tenders now. You will only owe the bonds given for the four hundred millions of gold then. The volume of the principal of the debt will not have been changed.

But it may be said the legal tender is not to be paid in gold. Let us go, then, right back to the authority that my friend is fond of quoting—the Supreme Court of the United States. In the case of the Bank against the Supervisors, reported in 7 Wallace 29, the late Chief-Justice used these words, and this I believe to be the law of the land: "Under the exigencies of the times, it seems to have been thought in-

expedient to attempt any provision for the redemption of the United States notes in coin. The law, therefore, directed that they should be made payable to the bearer at the Treasury of the United States, but did not provide for payment on demand. The period of payment was left to be determined by the public exigency. Every one of these expresses upon its face an engagement of the nation to pay the bearer a certain sum. The dollar note of the Government is an engagement to pay a dollar, and the dollar intended is the coin dollar of the United States—a certain quantity in weight and fineness of gold or silver, authenticated as such by the stamp of the Government." No other dollars had before been recognized by the legislation of the United States as lawful money. So that same dollar, the greenback, is to be paid in gold.

But it is again suggested that by payment in gold we shall transfer a non-interest-bearing debt into an interest-bearing debt. This is so. To raise four hundred million dollars in gold, you must now sell five per cent. bonds at about par, so that the interest on four hundred millions will be twenty millions of coin per annum. Four hundred millions will not be required. There are to-day but three hundred and seventy-three millions of greenbacks. But let us make the figures on the basis of four hundred million dollars. We add nothing to the principal. The treasury makes no distinction between the gold and the paper dollar in keeping its accounts, because some day the paper dollar has to be paid in gold. We add twenty million dollars to the interest account of the country. Now, let us see how this will work. Having decided upon a plan of finance, the Government authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to issue fifteen hundred millions of five per cent. bonds, and if he can sell them at par, to fund an equal amount on which we are now paying six per cent. We have thus funded five hundred millions. The interest on that five hundred millions at six per cent. was just five million dollars more than it is at five per cent. So on that transaction we have saved five millions of interest. If we stand up steadily and say that we propose to keep the faith of the United States, and pay our debt to the bill-holder and the bond-holder, we shall fund the remaining thousand million at five per cent., and save one per cent. on that. That will be ten million dollars saved. We shall then have saved fifteen million dollars, and the new interest will be but twenty, so that we shall be out on the transaction but five million dollars. These figures I think even my friend will not venture to dispute.

Gen. Ewing.—I certainly shall.

Gov. Woodford.—I shall begin to think at last that my friend has thoroughly gone over. I shall stop talking to him, and talk entirely to you. That will increase the interest account just $5,000,000. Now, my friend said at Circleville, on Saturday, that all the bonds that have changed hands since the act of 1869, are to be paid in gold. I could not state his condemnation of the law in terms stronger than he does himself, so that I will leave him to do it for himself. He says it is the sad fact that all those bonds that have changed hands since 1869 are to be paid in gold, and only those in greenbacks that have not changed hands since 1869.

I asked my friend how he proposed to put out the $350,000,000 of new greenbacks, and he said that he would go into the open market, as I understood him, and buy the bonds at the best price he could. Bonds are now 120. To buy $300,000,000 of bonds it would take $360,000,000 of greenbacks. You would cancel $300,000,000 of the principal of the national debt. You would add $360,000,000 to the principal, and the net result would be an increase of the principal of the debt by just $60,000,000. That will pay the $20,000,000 interest for three years at the least.

But that amount of new greenbacks will not begin to do the work; and why? Because you want money for the demands of trade. You propose to go down to Wall Street and take those three hundred and sixty millions of new greenbacks that you have printed, and buy up three hundred millions of bonds, and cancel the bonds. Where does that leave the three hundred and sixty millions of greenbacks? Not here in the country to supply the wants of trade, but down in New York, where we have got more than we want now. That surely does not and will not help.

But our Democratic friends also propose to retire the circulation of the national banks. Now let us see how this can be done. I can not follow my friend into the far heights of metaphysics, for my head swims when it gets among the clouds. Well, they print three hundred and fifty millions of greenbacks. They call in the national bank notes. Are they going to make those greenbacks a present to the national banks in exchange for the national bank notes? That will not help trade or the people. That will only help the banks. They are going to compel the banks to retire their three hundred and fifty millions of bills now out. Is that inflation? That is contraction. Every bill that a national bank has got out it must hunt for. It can not lend a dime. It stops its discounts to-morrow. With one voice the banks will say: "We are compelled to retire our bills. We have

got to turn in our bills and take up our bonds. We can not and will not lend you a dime." The pall of death settles on your industries. A man wants money to pay his laborers, but he can get no discounts. The banks are hauling in their bills, and the Government is doing what? It does n't propose to *give* its greenbacks to the banks, does it? It can't steal the bonds that the banks have deposited with it as security, because, as my distinguished opponent admits, the banks have mainly bought them since 1869. They were shrewd enough to change them, so that the bonds the banks hold must be paid in gold, even according to the theory of my friend. The Government can not exchange its greenbacks for the bank bills. But suppose they even do that. Suppose the Government goes to the banks and says, "We want your bills, and we will give you the greenbacks for them." What will the Government then do with the bills? Is it going to lose that $350,000,000, and put it in the debt, as well as the $350,000,000 of greenbacks? Of course not.

Contraction! There never was a scheme at the root of which there lay such absurdity, and whose fruit can only be destructive to the industries of the country. Think of it! Every bank stops its discounts; every business man is compelled to pay at once without mercy; every body is brought up standing, and these bank bills raked in from all over the country. That $350,000,000 of greenbacks may be spent in the purchase of bonds and those bonds bought in Wall Street, and the result is this: Not a dollar of bank currency in the country; your bank bills taken from you, and the $350,000,000 of greenbacks issued in their place all turned into Wall Street that men may accumulate there more and still more. It is as inevitable as that sunrise follows the sunset.

You will be told, or you may have been told already, that this is a struggle between the money of the people and the money of pet corporations. We have two kinds of money power down in New York. I can talk plainly about that, for I know that thing myself. We have men in Wall Street who gamble in stocks and in gold. Can you gamble in any thing that has a fixed value? Gambling is betting on the value that something will have to-morrow. You can gamble in pork, because pork may rise or fall in value; but you can not gamble in the number of pounds of pork. You can gamble in wheat, because wheat rises and falls; but you can not gamble in the number of bushels. You can gamble in wool, but you can not gamble in the number of pounds. You can not gamble in gold when gold has a fixed value, so that it measures value and is always the same. You

can only gamble in gold when there is a difference between gold and paper. You see that is as clear as sunlight. When gold has a fixed value, it is a measure; when it changes in value, it is a commodity. If you come back to specie payment, it is a measure. Until you do get back there, it is a commodity. You can gamble in gold to-day, when you are on a paper basis. Did you ever hear of any gambling in gold in the old time when we were on a specie basis? Yet they say that the gold gamblers of New York want resumption. I will tell you the men in New York who want resumption. The great bankers who discount the notes given by merchants all over the West to the merchants in New York—they want resumption. So also the great merchants of New York, who sell to the entire country, want resumption, and they seek it for your good as well as their own. How will it help Alexander T. Stewart, who sells his goods to merchants all over the country, to break down those merchants who trade with him? How will it help Horace B. Claflin, who sells his goods all over the country, to cut the throat of the credit of the country?

What is New York? She is not a power within herself. She is a representative to-day of the money that circulates all over the country, and what makes for your welfare makes for the welfare of New York. What helps the farmer of the Scioto, toiling in the Scioto Valley, what helps the miner in the Hocking Valley, what helps the iron man in the Youngstown country, what helps any man here, helps the honest industries and the honest business of New York. The only New Yorkers, with comparatively few exceptions, who are standing with the inflationists of Ohio in this mad crusade against the nation's credit, are the men who are gambling in gold; and I want them and the Ohio inflationists to go up in a balloon or down into the grave, one way or the other. [Applause.] Of course, I said that metaphorically, about the grave. [Laughter.]

My friend has some questions that he wants answered. He asks, first: "Is the Republican party of the United States in favor of the execution of the Specie Resumption Law?"

On the 10th of July, 1872, the National Democratic party, gathered in convention at Baltimore, resolved as follows: "That the public credit must be sacredly maintained; and we denounce repudiation in every form and guise, and a speedy return to specie payments is demanded alike by the highest considerations of commercial morality and honest government." I presume that the Republican party of to-day, like the National Democratic party of 1872, is in favor of an honest and earnest effort to execute the Specie Resumption Law.

My friend asks: "Was not every vote in favor of it cast by Republicans?"

I am pained to say that every vote in favor of it was so cast by Republicans. After the national record of the Democratic party in 1872, I had trusted that the parties would have shaken hands, and would have stamped out this repudiation idea forever; but if my Democratic brothers have gone back wandering after strange gods, I rejoice that the Republicans have not followed them. [Laughter.]

Third: "Is the Republican party in favor of continuing in the national banks the power to issue paper currency?"

The Republican party is in favor of a volume of currency that shall equal the demands of trade, and be regulated by the demands of trade. It wants trade and the people to regulate that volume themselves, and does not want Congress to do it. It is in favor of having the Government make but one kind of money—gold and silver—the money of the Constitution. It is in favor of holding the national banks to a strict accountability; of compelling them to redeem their issues, and of allowing the paper currency, which is not money, and never can be money, until it has been paid in coin—it is in favor of having that currency issued by business corporations, and is opposed to the Government going into the banking or baking or farming or manufacturing business. [Applause.]

Fourth: "Was the power of the General Government to issue legal tender paper money derived from the Constitution? If not, whence was it derived? If it was derived from the Constitution, what provision of that instrument limits the exercise of the power to time of war?"

I am, unfortunately, unable to use words which my friend comprehends. That is my fault, and not his. Let me repeat what I have said on another occasion. I do not believe that in the Constitution of my country there is the slightest warrant for making any thing except gold and silver—the old hard money of Andrew Jackson and Thomas H. Benton—a legal tender under the Federal Constitution for the payment of debts within this land. And yet I admit that the greenback is, to-night, a legal tender in the payment of debts.

How and why? Let me take a very simple illustration. The Constitution gave no right in its terms to make any money out of paper. It did authorize Congress to coin money. You don't coin paper. You print paper. You coin money. But though there was not that authority, still the greenback is legal, and for this reason: I have no right to kill you. If I killed you this moment without cause, I should be arrested, tried, convicted, hung. But if, as I was leaving this hall to-

night, you sprang at my throat and tried to take my life, though I have no right to kill you, yet, in the exercise of the right to save the life that God has given me, I would be justified in taking your life, and should not break the written law in so doing, because I have a right to live. Precisely so when we were in the throes of the Rebellion. There was no authority in the written letter of the law to make the greenback money and stamp it with a legal tender quality; but when rebellion had sprung at the nation's life, when credit was impaired, when money could not be obtained, then in that hour, because our nation had a right to live, we violated the written letter of the Constitution and issued the greenback, and saved the life of the nation.

That issue was constitutional, because necessary to save the life of the nation; but now in peace, when that life is no longer in danger, let us cling to the old Constitution as it was interpreted by Daniel Webster for the Whigs, and Andrew Jackson, Thomas H. Benton, George H. Pendleton, and Wm. Allen, for the Democrats, and let us declare that gold and silver is the money of the Constitution. [Applause.]

GENERAL EWING'S REJOINDER.

For the first time in this debate we have had upon the other side something approaching a square discussion of the actual issues. In the first place, the gentleman says that the Secretary of the Treasury is bound to redeem this fractional currency, but that he may redeem it through postmasters and agencies of the Government scattered over the country, and if you want any silver for your fractional currency, when he is ready to redeem, go to your postmasters. Aye, he *may* redeem it through postmasters, but the law does n't *require* him to redeem it through them. The law allows him to select any one of a large number of enumerated agencies. Among the rest are the brokers, who are appointed, like Henry Clews & Co., special agents of the Government. You may have seen in the papers recently that Henry Clews & Co. got their appointment by employing a couple of men who were supposed to have special influence with the Administration, and agreeing to pay them twenty per cent. of the profits they would make as special agents. Such are the agencies that the Treasury Department have in these corrupt times employed. Such are the agencies through which they will take up and destroy your fractional money.

Such are the agencies through which they have taken up that $2,600,000. Why should you not have had your share of that $2,600,000 if the fractional currency was to be redeemed through postmasters? That provision of the law is a mere blind.

My opponent in this discussion says that the $2,600,000 has gone to California and China, where it is money. Yes, and there the balance of the $44,000,000 will go, and where will your fractional currency be? He says that when gold gets down to eight per cent. then silver will be at par. But when will it get down to eight per cent.? Immediately upon the passage of this specie resumption law it ran up—before there was one word of agitation against this law—before a dozen men west of the Alleghenies understood its effect at all. It ran up from ten per cent. premium to seventeen, because the eastern dealers in gold knew perfectly well that the necessity for the purchase of $375,000,000 of gold, the necessity to wrest that vast amount of treasure from the money markets of Europe, would keep gold up at a high premium; and it has been higher every day since that law passed than it was on the day it passed. Consequently silver has never been below five per cent. premium, and it is now up to eight, and, according to the gentleman's own admission, if issued now will not remain in circulation among the people.

You will have $44,000,000 of contraction of the currency in that one item, and of that part of the currency you are least able to spare—the fractional money, so indispensable to the ordinary business of the people. So much for the gentleman's statement. It is a full admission of all I have claimed. He says that the Secretary of the Treasury states that the Comstock lode will produce $4,000,000 of silver, with which to take up this fractional currency, and he endeavors to convey the impression that the $12,000,000 already bought was American silver. It was not; it was made up of old coins bought in Germany, as stated in the public press and never denied by any body. It was Germany's cast-off silver. We gave our five-per-cent. gold bonds for it, and brought it over here to the amount of $12,000,000, for the purpose of coinage.

"Whenever gold falls to 108, silver will float," he says. What is the value of that statement in the light of the fact that gold steadily keeps up to 116 @ 117 during the very time that the Secretary is executing that provision of the law to take up and destroy your fractional currency? He must do it as speedily as practicable. He is allowed no discretion. He must go right on buying up the fractional currency and issuing the silver as fast as it can be done. He has already done

it to the extent of $2,600,000, and it will all be done before gold approaches 108 or silver comes down to anywhere near par—and as long as it is one per cent. above par you may be perfectly certain that not one dollar of it will be left afloat in the community, but it will all be bought up and shipped off.

The gentleman comes now to the national banks. He says they pay interest on their bonds, and that they are the only holders of bonds who do pay interest upon them, and he quotes the authority of Judge Marshall (which, of course, I do not dispute) for the proposition that the bonds of the United States are not taxable (unless the authority be given by the United States) by any local authority. As they are not taxable, how does the Government tax the bonds in the hands of the national banks? It does n't tax them. It is an utter misstatement of fact. Suppose you have a bank here with a hundred thousand dollars of stock and ninety thousand dollars of circulation. That stock has been put into United States bonds. Those bonds are not taxable. The *stock* is taxable. So is the stock in a manufacturing company; so is the stock in any company. It is the stock that is the capital, and the credit on which the depositors rely. That hundred thousand dollars is taxed, although the bank does n't take any circulation or does n't have a United States bond at all. So the purchase of bonds of the United States with that capital does n't make the capital itself any more or any less taxable than it otherwise would be.

The gentleman talks as if the retirement of the bank circulation would be the instant destruction of all banking business. He says that the banks will all be compelled to instantly call in their loans, and to say to persons wanting to borrow: "We can't lend you a dime, because the Government is going to take up our circulation." It is an utter delusion. Take those banks that have already retired $25,000,000 of their circulation. How did they retire it? You have two banks here with a capital of $100,000 and $90,000 of circulation each. What is the mode of retirement? Why, the bank gets together say $30,000 of greenbacks, and sends them to the Treasury. It does n't necessarily take up its own notes. It takes greenbacks or its own notes, either one that may be convenient, and sends say $30,000 to the Treasury. In return for that the Secretary of the Treasury sends to the bank $33,000 in bonds. It sells those bonds in the New York market at 120. To replace the $30,000 taken out of its vault, it brings back $39,600 and puts in its vault to loan to the people.

The Government holds that $30,000 as security for the ultimate

redemption of an equal amount of national bank circulation, and if these two banks in Wilmington should choose to retire their circulation, they could do it without any man in town knowing that they had done it—without stopping their discounts an hour. The only evidence that they had retired their circulation would be the fact that they had nearly one-third more money to loan out to the community.

That is being done all around. It is not because the banking business is not profitable. Not at all. You take one of your banks with $90,000 of bonds in the Treasury drawing five per cent. interest. These bonds are worth $1.20 in greenbacks. When resumption is reached our bonds will only command about $100 of greenbacks for every $100 of bonds, because then the greenbacks will be at par with gold. The banks say, "Let us take our $120 of greenbacks now. We must be mighty careful whom we loan it to. We must not take the ordinary security from business men in this community that we formerly did, but let every man give two or three times the ordinary security, and then let the crash come, and still we will have our $120 of greenbacks that in 1879 will be on a par with gold, instead of having our one hundred dollars in bonds, which will be only worth about par in gold."

Thus the resumption law gives the banks a speculation for contraction of the currency. Although heretofore, before this law was passed, there was a speculation in the banks keeping afloat their currency, there is now a speculation offered them to take their currency in. The object is to reduce the national bank currency in order that after the $419,000,000 of greenbacks and fractional currency have been destroyed, there will be left only about $250,000,000 of bank money, and they have the hope that possibly they may be able to hold enough of the gold that the Secretary brings into the country to enable the banks to resume specie payment on this diminished volume of currency.

The gentleman persists in the statement that this law is an inflation measure, because it allows one hundred dollars of bank paper to be put out, and only requires eighty dollars of greenbacks to be retired. I explained to you that that difference arises from the fact that the banks are compelled to keep twenty per cent. of reserve, and that reserve is no circulation. Therefore, so far as the new bank issues are made, the retirement of eighty dollars of greenbacks for every hundred dollars of new bank issue leaves, deducting the reserve, exactly the same circulation that there would have been if there had been no increase of bank paper. He says the retirement of bank circulation will

destroy all business, as if the existence of the national banks depended on their circulation. It does n't at all. All these banks that have returned their circulation to the amount of $25,000,000 are still national banks. They are still doing business as they always did. If they should all retire their circulation and get greenbacks in place of it, the banks would still exist, doing the same business as now, and the depositors and men dealing with them would probably never know, by any action of the banks, that the circulation had been retired. It would not disturb the business of any man in the community in the slightest possible degree.

Now I pass from this national bank matter. The gentleman admits that he is in favor of continuing this bounty to the banks. He admits it is the policy of the Republican party that there should be no paper money issued by the General Government. I smoked him out on that point. He has never come out on it before. He says no paper money should be issued by the General Government, and there should be none issued except through private corporations. The whole control of the volume of paper money is to be placed in the hands of private corporations who will expand and contract it as their interest demands, and not as the interests of the people demand. So that is his position, and the position of the party which puts him on the stump to represent it, respecting these vital issues before the people of Ohio.

The gentleman says the English resumption law was not like ours. He says we propose to commence at the foundation—make the greenbacks equal to gold, and then every thing else will become as good as gold. The English resumption law is like ours—exactly. Our law is copied slavishly from that infamous act that threw the industries of Great Britain into bankruptcy, and the laboring classes into pauperism, and swept off the ownerships of mortgaged farms in the islands until, whereas there were 300,000 owners of lands before the resumption law was passed, under its operation they were cut down to 30,000, and the chief part of the soil was wrested from its owners by the holders of money securities. The author of that British resumption law, Sir Robert Peel, eleven years after its passage, was compelled to rise in the House of Commons and admit that it had worked ruin to the people, claiming only that it was then too late to retrace the step.

Oh, you say that you only make the greenback as good as gold. You don't make the national bank note as good as gold, I suppose? You don't require every man who owes a debt to make that as good as gold? It is the same as if the law declared that every debt in the United States now existing should, on and after the first of January,

1879, be paid in gold instead of that money which we understood the debts were to be paid in when they were made. We have all been contracting debts in this greenback currency. All this accumulation of debt has been made for which greenbacks only have been received, and with the full understanding that greenbacks only were to be paid. Now, by this adroit manipulation on the part of the holders of this vast volume of debt they undertake to turn it from a greenback debt into a gold debt, adding seventeen per cent. to the eight billion dollars of currency indebtedness now outstanding.

My friend says you can pay it in greenbacks. Aye, but getting the greenbacks on par with gold involves this contraction of the currency, and the contraction of the currency involves a fall in all the values of labor and property and with which only the greenbacks can then be got. If you shrink every thing that can buy a greenback on the first of January, 1879; if you shrink all labor and property seventeen per cent., is it not an addition of seventeen per cent. to the difficulty of paying the debt? The shrinkage will be vastly more than seventeen per cent. The shrinkage will equal the amount of contraction of the currency, as it did in England. To reach specie payment when the British notes were only three per cent. discount, they shrank the currency forty-five per cent. To reach specie payment now, when our currency is seventeen per cent. discount, we must shrink our currency at least sixty per cent., and all the means by which debts can alone be paid will be shrunk in the same ratio, and, practically, every man that is at all considerably in debt—I don't care whether other people owe him or not—may prepare for bankruptcy if this devilish scheme for destroying the business of the country, for piling up the burden of debt, of salaries, of taxes—if this devilish scheme is executed under the ingenious but spurious morality of returning to what the gentleman calls honest money. The greenback currency is the money that we got when we contracted these debts, and that we understood we were to pay. Dishonest money and dishonest legislation inhere in this resumption law that compels us to pay this vast volume of debt in some other currency higher in value than that we got for the debts, and that the creditors perfectly well understood they were to receive for them.

The gentleman admits that we will increase our bonded debt $400,000,000 by this resumption law. Four hundred million dollars of five per cent. gold bonds must be issued and sold to execute it. But he says, on the other side, we will fund our debt into bonds bearing a lower rate of interest. We were doing it before the resumption law passed. We did four times as much before the resumption law passed

as we have done since, and we can do it without the resumption law just as well as with it. That reduction of interest on the public debt is a right that the people should enjoy. It is not a right the Republican party may justly appropriate and use as a pretext, for enormously increasing the burden of the debt of the United States, and of the persons, communities and corporations now owing debts.

I am glad my friend has been so frank in his admissions. He says greenbacks were constitutional and valid, although the constitution did not give any power to issue them. The Supreme Court says that the Constitution does give the power to issue them, and the Court does not confine its reasoning or its statement to issues in time of war. Under the reasoning of that Court the issue is just as good in time of peace as in time of war. Therefore, the people may strike down this parasite system by which the national banks are fattening on their energies to the extent of $18,000,000 per annum by furnishing them a currency inferior to the greenback, a currency redeemable in the people's money, and to supplant which we should issue the people's money itself. Gentlemen, my time is up. I am much obliged to you for your attention.

DEBATE AT TIFFIN,

Friday Afternoon, Oct. 9, 1875.

GOV. WOODFORD'S OPENING SPEECH.

Messrs. Chairmen and Citizens of Tiffin:—

We are met to discuss the financial questions of this canvass. If possible let us get at the root of the matter in the beginning. The first thing that suggests itself to our thought, in considering this subject, is the very simple and natural question, What is money?

What is money? It is usually defined by writers and thinkers on Political Economy, as being the measure of value, the instrument or medium of exchange. You work for your neighbor. By agreement with him, you determine on the value of your service, and that value is measured by the article we call money. Your labor is worth so many dollars a day; your corn so many cents a bushel; your land so many dollars an acre. Men can not conveniently carry around that which they desire to exchange or barter. Nor can they, as a general thing, actually swap it off for the article which they want in return. It is not possible for a man to carry 300 bushels of corn with him, but he can carry the money that represents the value of the corn. He can not always drive his herd of cattle about with him, but he can carry the money that represents their value. Money serves the same use in measuring value, that a yardstick does in measuring cloth; that a bushel does in measuring quantity; that a pound does in measuring weight. Money, then, is the measure of value, the instrument of exchange.

We have in use at the present time two kinds of money, both of which are recognized by the Federal law. One consists of gold and silver. It is the money of the old Constitution, the money that we knew, and recognized, and understood in the old time before the Rebellion.

It is the money that Daniel Webster, speaking on behalf of the Whigs, said was the "only legal tender in payment of debt under the Constitution." It is the money that Andrew Jackson and Thomas H. Benton, speaking for the Democrats of the olden time, declared to be the only legal tender under the Constitution. It is the money that a distinguished son of Ohio, one William Allen—possibly you may recognize the name—once declared to be the only money that the law of the nation knew. This was many years ago when he was a senator of the United States. It is the money that one George H. Pendleton—you may also know him—declared to be the only money known and recognized by the Constitution. This was when the legal tenders were first suggested in Congress in 1862, and when Mr. Pendleton was a member of that body. It is the money that, until the year 1862, was recognized and admitted by the thinkers, by the orators, by the statesmen of all parties, to be the money of the Constitution of the nation.

We now have still another kind. We have the greenback, which, by authority of the Federal law, is declared to be a legal tender in the payment of debt. It has no value in and of itself, beyond the paper on which it is printed. The article of which it is composed is worth seven or eight cents a pound. The article of which the gold money of the Constitution is composed, is worth all for which it is coined by the Government of the United States. The gold money has value in and of itself. The greenback paper has no value in and of itself. The stamp on the gold money only declares its worth. That worth or value is there without the stamp. The promise on the greenback dollar pledges the future payment of a dollar, and declares that it—that is, such printed promise—is meanwhile a legal tender. The value is not in the paper; the value is in that which is printed upon it. Just as the value is not in the promissory note that you gave for the article that you have bought; the value is in the words that are written on the promissory note. The value, then, of the gold dollar is in the gold itself. The value of the greenback dollar is in the promise that is printed on it.

How came this greenback dollar into circulation?

You all remember that in 1862 we had borrowed much money. The military chest was empty. There lay on the table of the Secretary of the Treasury almost $20,000,000 of warrants for the payment of the soldiers and sailors that had not been honored, and could not be honored, because there was no gold and silver with which to pay them. There lay requisitions for nearly $50,000,000 for the payment

of supplies for the troops, and for all the enormous expenses of the war.

We were then called to face the question as to how we should meet these obligations. The Government had no money. It was then proposed by leaders of the administration party that we should print Government notes. They should be promises to pay dollars. We would issue them as money. We would pay them to our soldiers. With them we would discharge the many and great obligations of the Government.

But while the Government could force its soldiers, its sailors, and its creditors to accept those printed promises, still such promises had no value in their hands, except as these soldiers, sailors, and creditors had confidence in the intention and good faith of the Government. So the Government turned its printed promise over, and wrote upon the back an assurance that the greenback dollar should be legal tender in the payment of debt. Thus the soldier in the field, who took it in payment of his services, was able to send it home, that with it his wife might purchase clothing, food, and shelter; that with it he might pay his creditor; that in the extremity of the war it might serve as the circulating medium, and enable the business of the country to be transacted.

There was not in the written letter of the Constitution authority to do this. The Constitution had given to Congress power to do what? I quote, in answer, the words of the instrument itself:—power "to coin money." You *coin metal,* you can not coin paper. *You print paper.* You do not print gold and silver money. But there *was* power or authority to do this thing. How, and why? Let me use the simple illustration that I employed in our opening discussion at Shawnee.

I have no right to kill you. If I should do it this moment, I should violate the written law. I could be arrested, tried, and hung. But if, as I was leaving this hall this afternoon, you sprang at my throat and tried to take my life, though I have no right under the written letter of the law to kill you, I have a higher right to save my life by every power that God and nature have put into my hands. [Applause.]

So, in the hour of the nation's extremity, when gold and silver were gone from the Treasury chest, when it was hard to borrow coin, when the future was dark, the war prolonged, and its issue doubtful, the Government had the right to live. It printed the greenback, and made that greenback money, so that thereby it might crush rebellion, and save the nation alive. [Applause.] Thus was the greenback born.

Neither here nor elsewhere has the Republican party one sneer against the loyal greenback of the war. We recall the important part it bore in the struggle. We honor it so much and love it so well that we intend to keep its good faith free from all stain and to fulfill its pledge and promise to the very letter.

These are our two kinds of money, coin and the greenback. Now we have a third kind of currency that is in circulation. We have the national bank note. This national bank note is not money. It is not a legal tender in payment of debt between individual citizens. The national bank note is, however, just as good for practical use as the greenback. Why as good? Because you can get a greenback for a national bank note whenever you want. The bank is compelled to redeem its notes in greenbacks whenever presented. More than this, if you held a thousand one dollar notes on a thousand different national banks, you could send them in one parcel by express to the Treasurer at Washington and he would return to you a thousand dollars in greenbacks.

The national bank currency practically answers nearly all the ordinary business uses that the greenbacks will answer. This is so simply because such currency is redeemable in the greenback.

Right here pause and thoughtfully ask yourselves this one question:—Will not the greenback practically answer all the purposes that the gold dollar can answer, whenever the greenback is redeemable in the gold dollar, just as the bank note answers the purpose of the greenback because the bank note is redeemable in the greenback? Let me ask you to keep this question in view during the discussion of this afternoon.

We thus have two legal measures of value in our country. The law makes our gold money a measure of value. It also makes the greenback a measure of value. Now are these two measures of equal value, the one with the other? We have two of them, both known to the law—two kinds of dollars—gold dollars and paper dollars. Are these two kinds of dollars equal measures of value?

My friend says that I sometimes indulge in what he pleasantly calls "object teaching." He adds to this the sneer, the courteous sneer, "the retort courteous," that I came from far New York to talk to the men of Ohio as, were I a teacher, I should talk to the children in a primary school. But I trust this is not so. I have met one distinguished gentleman in Ohio to whom I have thought it quite necessary to show the gold dollar quite frequently in order to keep his mind fixed on the point of discussion. [Laughter and applause.] So that it will

be rather to my distinguished friend and for his benefit than for yours that I shall give this lesson of "object teaching" this afternoon.

I said that we had two kinds of dollars known to the law. Here they are. Here is the greenback dollar [showing a five dollar U. S. note], and it bears what words on its face? "The United States will pay the bearer five dollars." What are the five dollars that this bill promises to pay? There they are [exhibiting a five dollar gold piece]. Take a good look at it. You may not have seen one for long years. [Laughter.] If the policy advocated by my friend shall succeed, you will not see one for many long years to come. [Applause.] This greenback reads: "The United States will pay the bearer five dollars." That gold piece is one of the first gold coins ever issued from the United States Mint. Its date is 1795. The only words printed on it are, on one side, "Liberty," on the other, "United States of America." There are no words upon it saying, "This is five dollars." Yet it is gold, pure gold, coined 80 years ago, and yet worth as much to-day as the day when it was stamped. It is five dollars; the five dollars of the Constitution; the five dollars which the greenback promises to pay.

Am I right in this? Some gentlemen may say it is the stamp of the Government which makes that gold coin worth five dollars. He may say that if the words "This is five dollars" had been on the greenback, then the greenback would have been in fact as well as name five dollars. In other words, some claim that the value is in the *stamp*. The value of that gold piece is, however, in the gold itself. It is worth its real intrinsic value here. It is worth that value in London. It is worth it in China. It is worth it in Japan. But this greenback, if you should go to the Hottentot, who could not read and did not know who printed it, would not get you even a night's shelter. He would understand the yellow glitter and the meaning of that five dollar gold piece. That gold is money. It is bread. It is shelter. It is life, wherever the sun goes in his journey round the world. But this greenback is the promise of five dollars, good where men can read, and where men trust the Government that puts it forth. Such is the difference between the two.

Not only is there this great difference in the value of these two kinds of money in foreign lands, but there is marked and great difference right here at home. The two yardsticks are not of the same length. The two bushels do not hold the same amount of corn. The two pounds do not weigh the same. That (the gold) is like a yardstick that is always thirty-six inches. This (the greenback) is like a

yardstick that is thirty-four inches one day, thirty-three the next, and thirty-two and a fourth the third. That is a bushel that always holds a bushel. This is a bushel which changes in quantity with every month, with every week, with every day. That is a pound of always the same number of ounces. This is a pound of eleven ounces one day, and nine ounces the next, and eleven and a half the third. Such is the difference between the two right here in Ohio.

Do I err, my Democratic friend? Money, for practical use, is worth what it will buy. Will this [the greenback] buy as much as that [the gold piece] here in Tiffin? Is there an inflationist here who will venture to tell me that this five dollar greenback will buy as much as that five dollar gold piece here in Tiffin? No. I can go to your bank and I can sell that gold piece for seventeen cents premium on each dollar. Five times seventeen are eighty-five. I can get for that gold piece another five dollar bill just like this and eighty-five cents in fractional money also. Will not $5.85 in paper money buy just 85 cents worth more than $5 in paper money? Then this pound is more of a pound than that. This bushel is more of a bushel than that. This yardstick is more of a yardstick than that. That [showing the gold piece] was five dollars yesterday; that was five dollars when the war broke out; that will be five dollars to-morrow.

During one dark hour in the war it took $2.80 in this greenback money to buy a dollar in gold. It takes $1.17 of it to buy a dollar in gold to-day. When the Democratic party made their platform in Ohio it took $1.14 of it to buy a dollar in gold. Now that this inflation discussion has gone on, and that Pennsylvania has followed the mad will-o'-the-wisp that leads into the bogs of your financial mire, and is stuck there alongside of the Ohio Democracy, it takes $1.17 of paper to buy a dollar in gold. That gold, which you hear tauntingly spoken of as the money of the bond-holder, is worth to-day three cents on the dollar, fifteen cents on the five dollars, *more* than it was when Ohio began her crusade against hard money. The greenback is worth three cents on the dollar, fifteen cents on the five dollars, *less* than it was when the Ohio Democrats began their crusade. So the discussion through this State has put three cents on the dollar into the pocket of every gold-holder; and it has taken three cents on the dollar out of the pocket of every bill-holder, of every poor man who gets only paper money. [Applause.]

The Government, under the pressure and necessity of the war, lawfully made that paper money legal tender. But it never did, it never could, and it never can, regulate or compel the price at which men

shall sell their property. If you had a farm that in 1863—(I think it was in 1863 or '4, when gold was worth 280)—was worth $2,800, I could then have bought that farm, if you wished to sell, for $1,000 in gold. I could have taken my $1,000 in gold, gone to a bank, and exchanged it for $2,800 in greenbacks, and they would have paid the price of your farm. The Government may make paper a legal tender, but it can not regulate prices. If your wages are two dollars a day on a gold standard, and paper is so depreciated that gold is worth 150 in greenbacks, your wages will be either two dollars in gold or three dollars in greenbacks. You will require three dollars in paper money to buy the coffee, or potatoes, or cloth, that the two gold dollars would have bought.

Government may make paper legal tender, but it can not regulate price. It can not tell you for what you shall labor, nor at what figure you shall sell your corn, or your cloth, or the products of your farm.

Now it is suggested that the changing value is in the gold. My friend seriously argued the other night before an audience that, charmed by his logic and his eloquence, sat open-mouthed and open-eared, drinking in the wisdom of his utterance—he actually argued that the paper money of the Government was stable, and that the gold was what kept bobbing up and down like the mercury in the thermometer. [Laughter.]

Let us bring this to a very simple test, and see whether it is the gold or the paper that changes in value. When a man wants to speculate, he can speculate in corn, because its value changes. But you can not speculate in weight, because true weight does not change. You can speculate in corn, because corn goes up or down. But whoever heard of a man speculating in the number of bushels of corn? You can speculate in wheat because wheat goes up or down. Whoever heard of a man speculating in the number of bushels of wheat? You can speculate in wool, because wool varies in value. Whoever dreamed of speculating in the weight of the pound of wool? You can speculate in cloth, because cloth changes in value. Whoever heard of speculating in the length of the yard? You can speculate in land, because land changes in value. Whoever heard of speculating in the size of the acre?

Now, do not men speculate in gold? Will not my friend tell you about this? He may not, for I think after to-day he will probably let this alone. [Laughter.] But he has with seriousness argued elsewhere that gold changed, while the paper money of the Government did not. At the same time, with courtesy but with incisive directness,

he has indicated that I was representing the spirit of the gold gamblers of Wall Street. Whoever gambled in gold before the war, when gold had a fixed value, and was a measure of value? Men could gamble in gold when gold ceased to be money and became a commodity. That is, so long as it was money they could not gamble in it. They did not gamble in it. But when it became demonetized and was an article of traffic, they gambled in it. When it becomes money again, they can not gamble in it, because it will then always have the same value.

If you wish to stop gold gambling in Wall Street, make gold again to be money. Take this money power, of which my friend speaks so eloquently, the power of the gambler, right by the throat, and say: "We want money as the pay for our labor; we want money as the pay for our products; we want money to be an absolute measure of all that we raise and sell." Thus and thus only can we stop gold gambling. Make gold again to be money, and no man will dare to gamble in it. [Applause.]

Now to learn that the inherent value of gold and silver changes very little, go back with me over the records of history. By common consent, gold and silver have been selected from the earliest time as the measure of value and the instrument of exchange. When the old patriarch, with pious care, sought a burial spot where his dear ones might rest, he printed no greenbacks, but he paid for the field with shekels of silver. Through all the ages, civilized nations have used gold and silver as the ultimate measure of value. Whenever, under the stress of temporary necessity they have wandered off and have sought to bridge over a temporary evil by using paper money, one of two results has always followed. When the necessity passed and the danger was over, they either set themselves resolutely to redeem their paper promise, or they inevitably drifted into bankruptcy. There has always been either specie resumption or repudiation. There is not an instance —(I speak seriously, and I ask this point to be borne in your memory) —there is not an instance recorded in the history of the civilized world where a government ever put out irredeemable and unsecured paper in time of peace, and stamped it with the quality of money, that the government did not ultimately repudiate that paper, and the nation land in inextricable bankruptcy.

Do we hope to reverse the history of the world? Do we hope to turn back all the ages that are gone? From every land under the sun, from every page of written history, from every people that have lived on earth, comes back this one lesson: if you print paper money

in time of peace, without providing, when you print, for its redemption in coin, you will inevitably at last repudiate that paper money.

Repudiation always falls on the laboring and the suffering poor. Why? The rich man lives from the accumulations of past toil. The poor man from the earnings of to-day. The poor man has nothing but his labor to sell. As the paper money goes down and down in value, he who must work to live, is paid in it. The man who has other property gets rid of his paper money. When the inevitable crash comes at the last, the rich have taken care of themselves because they could, while the poor men have got only the worthless paper currency of the country. [Applause.]

Now, although we have two legal measures of value, we use but one of them when we deal with foreign lands. If you want to buy in Canada you must pay in gold. If you want to buy in Europe, you must pay in gold. Whatever you buy outside the limit of this country you pay for in gold. You can only use your paper money here within our own land, where it is protected by the authority of our local law.

Nay, more than this: although the law makes greenbacks a legal tender all over the United States, you can not use your paper money to-day if you wish to buy cattle in Texas, or wheat in California. If you deal in California, you must pay in gold or in greenbacks at their gold price.

If you have stopped at a hotel in the mining country for two days, and go down to the clerk's desk in the morning, and say, "I am going away; what is my bill?" He replies: "Ten dollars." You take out your pocket-book and hand him a ten-dollar greenback. He says, "I meant ten dollars in gold; the premium on gold is seventeen cents; if you are going to pay me in greenbacks, your bill is $11.78." You answer: "I thought you said ten dollars; this money is legal tender." He replies: "It is legal tender, but when you pay in paper we charge paper prices, and when you pay in gold we charge gold prices."

A Voice.—"Prosecute him for being disloyal."

Gov. Woodford.—Why? Because he would n't take the greenback?

The same Voice.—"Yes, sir, that is what was done during the war."

Gov. Woodford.—My friend says prosecute him for being disloyal. Then the Government is going to do three things. It is not only going to print paper and make it money; it is not only going to make the paper a legal tender; but it is going to tell you what you shall charge for your corn, and what you shall charge for your labor. When it

does that, you have got an absolute despotism that even Russia does not begin to equal. [Loud cheers.]

We try by stamp and authority to make this paper actually money. Its value is in what? It is in the promise that is printed upon it.

Now the business disadvantages of using such a currency lie first in this: We are at the mercy of every foreign nation whenever we deal with them. We must pay the foreigner in gold. We have our paper currency only for use at home. That is disadvantage number one.

The second disadvantage is this: We do inevitably introduce the element of gambling into all subsequent business transactions. For a man not only does business on the expectation of a rise or fall in the article that he buys or sells, but he must also take into account the shrinkage or the enlargement of that which he uses as the measure of value in conducting his business. Surely I need not pause to argue that again at length. I suppose that every thoughtful man appreciates the element of uncertainty that enters into business, at once.

It is an additional evil, that capital becomes timorous, and is scared away from business. It dares not expose itself in active trade, because it knows not at what hour nor how it may be affected by constant changes in greenback values.

Let me pass on, trusting that my friend will give you, with the same frankness and directness that I have sought to employ, his views as to the use, the value, and the need of this money, which is the root of the question we would discuss.

But here our ways divide. The Republican party say frankly that the greenback was the money of the war. We love it for all that it did for us. We love it so well that we would fully keep its promise. While we love it so well, still we would not recklessly shock or needlessly disturb the industries of the country in order to make its promise at once as good as gold. But we do steadily press on toward resumption. The path we would walk lies from the midnight of war to the sunrise of peace; from the paper money that we used as the instrument of crushing rebellion to the gold and silver money of the Constitution, with only such paper money as is redeemable in coin. So soon as we can, without unjust shock to business and industry, we propose to keep the pledge of our paper money and make it actually the gold that it represents. [Applause.]

We have passed the specie resumption law. It may not be all that it should be. The time of resumption may be too late; it may be too early. There may be doubt with regard to the feasibility of the execution of its provisions. But whatever its defects may be.

with the same purpose that guided us all through the war, we will amend and adapt the measure to secure the end of actual resumption. We will do what is right and wise and expedient to secure this result, pledging you as we pledged you in the days gone by, that we will never crush the industries of the country, but will rather help to build them up. This Republican party has always been the party that has taken care of the wool-growers on the farms [applause]; that has taken care of the coal-miners in the Hocking Valley; that has taken care of the iron-workers in the district of Youngstown; that has taken care of the spindles of Massachusetts; that proposes to take care of American industry, always and every-where. Ours is the party of labor, the party of honest money, and the party of loyalty to the issues of the war. [Applause.]

This law may not be the best possible, but we have embarked in this matter of resumption as men embark on a ship. You do not propose, when you go on shipboard, to toss and travel, to turn and tack forever, and never to go ashore. When a ship leaves New York, she sails out on the ocean. Her destination may be Liverpool. She may not always sail directly thither. When winds are fair, sky clear, and sea smooth, her prow and course are toward her haven; but when driven aside in the storm, she tacks and veers, and makes first toward one point and then toward another; but the purpose of her voyage is to reach Liverpool.

So it may be with the nation. We mean and intend resumption of specie payment at the earliest practicable moment, consistent with the industries and business of the country. We may not be able to sail directly thither; we may have to tack; we may have to alter our course; but with the compass of absolute honesty to guide our voyage, with the prow of the vessel always toward specie resumption, over the storm and over the wave will we go, until at last we reach the sure, firm land of absolute specie resumption.

We intend to have money that is money; a dollar that means to-day just what it meant yesterday, that will mean to-morrow only what it means to-day. [Applause.]

[*Time expired.*]

GENERAL EWING'S REPLY.

Mr. Chairman and Fellow-citizens:—

The great question to be discussed here to-day is not whether we shall have paper money or gold money for the business of this country, but whether we shall have greenbacks or blackbacks. [Applause.] It is an old fight in the United States. In 1813, when the country was groaning under the burden of the debt of the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, Thomas Jefferson, the father of the Democratic party, the noblest statesman that has lived in the tide of American history, seeing that the seven hundred banks of that day were usurping the currency, and believing that the people had a right to be relieved of that portion of the interest-bearing debt which an adequate circulation would amount to, demanded that "bank paper should be suppressed, and the currency restored to the nation, to whom it belongs." He proposed the issue of Treasury bills by the United States, receivable for all public dues, to relieve the industries of the country of a large part of the interest-bearing debt, and to put an end to the undemocratic and unrepublican practice of giving control of the currency to private corporations. My friend has had a good deal to say in these debates about the abandonment of Democratic principles by the party in Ohio in this canvass. Let him look to that historic instance and see what the father of the party advised and did then.

He talks about the examples of other statesmen. See what John C. Calhoun, of the strictest sect of strict constructionists, said in 1837, when the banks were swarming over the country and furnishing all the money. That, recollect, was at a day when the Government was out of debt, and when the question was not how the people should be relieved of public burden, but how they could dispose of the surplus revenue which a light tariff brought in. He said: "No one can doubt but that the Government credit is better than that of any bank,—more stable and more safe. Bank paper is cheap to those who make it, but dear, very dear to those who use it. On the other hand, the credit of the Government, while it would greatly facilitate its financial operations, would cost nothing, or next to nothing, both to it and the people, and would, of course, add nothing to the cost of the operation. It would give every branch of our industries, agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing, as far as its circulation might extend, great advantages both at home and abroad. And I now undertake to affirm,

and without the least fear that I can be answered, that the paper issued by the Government, if you simply promise to receive it for all its dues, would, to the extent it would circulate, make a perfect paper circulation which would not be abused by the Government; that it would be uniform in value as the metals themselves. And I shall be able to prove that it is within the Constitutional powers of Congress to issue that paper in the management of its finances according to the most rigid rule of construing the Constitution."

Andrew Jackson is referred to; and the gentleman in his former speeches wondered that his ghost did n't rise to denounce the Democratic party of to-day, fighting for money issued by the General Government against bank money. What does he say? "The corporations which create paper money can not be relied upon to keep the circulating medium uniform in amount. The paper money such banks issue, and its natural associates — monopoly and class privileges — have already struck their roots deep in the soil, and it will require all your efforts to choke its further growth and to eradicate the evil."

When Jefferson, Calhoun, and Jackson talked thus, they were engaged in the fight the Democracy of Ohio are to-day engaged in —a fight to wrest from private corporations the power to furnish the money of domestic business. The money power was too strong before the war for either Jefferson, or Jackson, or Calhoun, to wrest the control of the circulating medium from it. But when the war came on, when the Government had no gold or silver to pay its troops, it was forced by dire necessity to itself issue legal tender paper money—to take into the hands of the people, as Jefferson, Calhoun, and Jackson, claimed they should, the power to furnish all the money, whether it were gold, silver, or paper. This was done under the exigencies of war. But two years after the first issue of legal tenders, the money power got back the privilege of furnishing about one-half the paper money. And the war had hardly ended before it set its appliances and all the acuteness of its high intelligence at work to wrest from the people's Government the power to furnish any share of the paper money, and put the whole privilege back where it was before the war—in the hands of private corporations.

Look at the successive steps toward this end. From 1865 till the passage of the resumption law in 1875, every measure of the general Government affecting the money question has looked to that one end of the destruction of the money furnished by the Government. The power then exerted was vastly greater than that which thwarted Thomas Jefferson in 1813, and the Democratic party in the decade

from 1830 to 1840. We had before the war a money power that was comparatively insignificant. The old United States Bank, which the Democrats fought so vehemently, had a capital of about $30,000,000, while our national banks have a capital in the aggregate of about $500,000,000. The vast expenditures of the war, and the creation of public and private debts resulted in accumulating in a few hands in the North a wealth twice as great as the whole value of all the slaves in the Southern States. Its holders are a money aristocracy, living chiefly in that little section along the Atlantic sea-board, of which New York City is the center—and their time has been largely given to contriving, dictating, and carrying out through their instruments, the leaders of the Republican party, measures for increasing as far as possible the public and private burdens, and doubling the power that holds these debts.

They started first, having in view the ultimate destruction of the greenbacks, by sweeping out $1,200,000,000 of the public debt in the form of interest-bearing Treasury notes, the interest and the principal of which were payable in greenbacks. They wanted no use for the greenbacks. Two-thirds or three-fourths of our debt was then in the form of interest-bearing Treasury notes. They were held among the people. They were here in your county, circulating in business, and all over the States, wherever a soldier came back with money in his pocket; wherever produce or horses were sold to carry on the war; wherever supplies were bought or volunteers raised. That paper money bearing interest was, you may say, the public debt in 1866—easily borne, for it was a currency debt held by the people, who paid taxes to the General Government and received back as interest the money they paid. My friend, last evening, said this debt all bore interest at seven and three-tenths per cent. per annum. He is mistaken; a large part of it bore seven and three-tenths, but another large part bore but three per cent. interest in currency. I can tell the gentleman further that that part bearing only three per cent. interest was the last of this debt that the people surrendered. It staid out and was never voluntarily presented for redemption, although payable on demand—the people were satisfied with the three per cent. interest—until in 1872, when his party wanted to increase the national bank circulation, they peremptorily called in those Treasury notes, bearing this merely nominal rate of interest payable in currency, and funded them in five per cent. gold bonds.

Well, with a view to the ultimate destruction of the greenback, and the ultimate restoration of the power to issue all the paper money to

private corporations, this money power, through the Republican party, funded that $1,200,000,000 of interest-bearing Treasury notes in six per cent. gold bonds—the five-twenties. Those bonds, although they bore gold interest, were by the terms of the contract redeemable after five years in greenbacks. But while this right of redemption in greenbacks existed, there would remain a reason for keeping the greenbacks in existence: therefore the next step was to make them payable, not in greenbacks worth but seventy-one cents in gold, but in gold itself—in violation of the contract, and to the robbery of the people to the extent of thirty per cent. on $1,600,000,000 of the debt. [Applause.]

Did they tell you they were going to do that? Not a bit of it. They came before you in 1868, after the greenback canvass made by George Pendleton in 1867, and said in the Ohio Republican State Platform, which I hold now in my hand, that those bonds should be paid in legal tenders. So in Indiana they went before the people with the declaration of their Republican State Platform that they should be paid in legal tenders. John Sherman, the representative of the Republican party on this question, issued a campaign letter frankly saying that those bonds were by the terms of the contract—and he made the contract—payable in greenbacks; and that any bond-holder who demanded gold for his bonds was "a repudiator and an extortioner." [Cheers.] Mr. Morton, in a speech which I have here, declared it would be robbery of the people to pay those bonds in gold. And Thad Stevens, trembling on the verge of the grave, in 1868, when the suggestion was made in the House of Representatives that those bonds might be paid in gold, marched up to the Clerk's desk, and facing his Republican associates, said: "If you dare to violate the contract by which the people of this country have the right to discharge those bonds in greenbacks, I will vote for Seymour and Blair for President and Vice-President." [Applause.]

But no sooner had the Republican party elected General Grant on these declarations, than, for the purpose of accomplishing the ultimate destruction of the greenback, and turning over to these pet corporations the whole control of the money of commerce, Mr. Sherman himself reported from the Senate Finance Committee, a resolution entitled "An Act to strengthen the public credit," declaring that those bonds should be payable in gold; and Grant signed it, in violation of the plighted faith of his party to the Western people. Greenbacks at that time were worth about seventy-one cents on the dollar in gold. The day was within a month or two of arriving when the great bulk of those five-twenty bonds might have been paid in greenbacks—when

7

the General Government might have done as my noble father proposed to the Senate Finance Committee, in a letter extensively published at that time—might have said to the bond-holders: "Gentlemen, these bonds are payable in greenbacks. You may take greenbacks now for them, or four per cent. gold bonds, just which you please." *There* was the opportunity to fund the public debt in four per cent. gold bonds, or to pay a large part of it in the greenback money. But the Republican party did not want the greenback money afloat, and did want that this vast public debt, held by that money power which was its main stay, should be increased in value as far as possible, regardless of faith to the people and the interests of the people. [Applause.] So the $1,200,000,000 of interest-bearing Treasury notes payable in currency, the $1,600,000,000 of five-twenty bonds payable in currency, were wiped out; and there was no longer, on account of them, a reason for continuing the greenback in existence.

What was the next step? It was the enactment of this specie resumption law, which the gentleman who preceded me has touched so daintily—a law that involves the immediate destruction of all the fractional money, and within two months after the first of January, 1879, the utter wiping out of the whole of the greenback money—a law which accomplishes the final step toward wresting from the Government the power to furnish any paper money—a law that accomplishes that deep-laid policy of the money power, to take back into their hands the control of the money of business, which the emergencies of war alone were potent to wrest from them.

The gentleman says that good faith requires the restoration of specie payment as quick as it can be done without a shock to business, and therefore requires the execution of this specie resumption law, *if it is a good law;* if it is not a good law, they will have it fixed so it will be good. He slightly crawfishes from the position he took in reply to my interrogatories at Wilmington. I put the question to him there: "Who passed this resumption law?" He answered, "The Republican party." "Is the Republican party of the United States in favor of its execution?" He answered, "They are;" and in the same debate he admitted that the object of the specie resumption law and the purpose of the party was to wrest from the Government the power to issue paper money and turn it over to the national banks. He need not go back on that now. His views were well defined, and I expect to hold him to them, and to discuss those propositions here to-day. [Applause.]

I have no doubt, since the debate at Wilmington, there have been

warning voices to the gentleman, that it will not do to talk out plainly on this law. The Republican leaders know it perfectly well. Not a man who has appeared on the stump in this canvass, on the Republican side, except the gentleman from New York, and he only when pinned down to it by direct interrogatories, has dared to discuss this law before the people. It was gotten up in a secret congressional caucus. The wrangles between the men who professed to represent the Republican party—of Morton, Ferry, Logan and others, on the one side, and the specie resumptionists, regardless of the interests of the people, on the other—were all enacted in a midnight caucus in Washington; and not one word respecting those differences was ever suffered to go out to the people. It was reported in effect from that caucus to the Senate—going as a matter of mere form through the Finance Committee. This law, affecting as it does more than any act ever passed by Congress the interests and business of the American people, was reported by Senator Sherman; and when asked as to the effect of its several provisions, he stood as dumb as an oyster. He did n't dare to tell what its effect would be. The Democratic Senators said to him, "Does this involve the destruction of all the greenback money?" Said he, "Look at the law and judge for yourself." He who represents your business—for you are the principals, he is the agent—when asked whether he intended by that bill to destroy the free money that you now have, declined to tell. So did Morton. So did Ferry. They never intended that a word of debate as to the meaning of this law should go before the people, for then the people's attention would be directed to it, and they would begin to discuss it themselves. They put it through the Senate, without explanation, by a strict party vote, every Democrat voting against it; and when it went to the House they clapped on the gag of the previous question, and choked it through without a word of debate. And now Messrs. Sherman and Morton and other Republican leaders come before the people of Ohio, and when challenged, as they have been in the beginning of this canvass, to discuss the effect of this law before the people, not one of them dares say a word on the subject. They know that the American people, if they understood the effect and purpose of that law, would hurl the Republican party from power and bury it beyond resurrection. [Applause.] But, like the cuttle-fish which, when pursued, emits a milky fluid that discolors the water and thereby facilitates its escape, they get up a contemptible and false clamor about the public schools and the old spirit of rebellion, and thus blind their

constituents, instead of coming before them and manfully discussing this most important measure.

In the first place, this law involves the destruction of the whole fractional money. The Secretary of the Treasury is required, as soon as practicable, to raise money and buy up all the fractional currency now held by the people. Forty-four million dollars were outstanding when the law was passed. He has already bought $12,000,000 of silver. He is running the mints night and day coining silver to substitute for fractional money. How does he get the silver? He has no surplus revenue. He had last year nothing; this year but a few millions of dollars extra, not exceeding thirteen or fourteen millions. He is compelled, as soon as practicable, to buy and coin the silver with which to buy and destroy the fractional currency. That he does not rely upon revenue is perfectly plain. He has taken already $12,000,000 of new five per cent. bonds, which the law authorizes him to issue, and sold them in Europe, and with the proceeds bought the cast-off silver of the German nation—the sweaty old coin, as I described it yesterday. The gentleman, in reply, burst out in an eloquent speech to the effect that that sweaty old coin could be put through the fire and would come out bright and pure; whereas the sweaty greenback might be put in the fire and would be entirely consumed. True—but if the sweaty greenback were put into the fire and consumed, you could get another from the treasury in its place. Besides, what under heavens should the people want to put their money in the fire for? [Laughter and applause.]

What is to become of this silver money with which your fractional currency is to be taken up? Will *you* get any of it? Not a dime. Why? Because silver is to-day at eight per cent. premium over legal tender notes, national bank notes, and fractional currency. There has not been an hour since the resumption law passed when silver did not command five per cent. premium. The gentleman says when gold is ten per cent. premium, silver will be par. He is mistaken. Gold was ten per cent. when this resumption law passed; and silver was then but little under five per cent. premium. Gold then rose almost immediately to seventeen per cent. What put it up? He says the Ohio platform and this discussion. You unruly people of Ohio *will* talk about currency, and when you do, the bond-holders and gold-holders get mad and run up the gold. [Applause.] You ought to shut up and take what is proposed by the Republican party; because if you don't, these gold-holders will put up the premium and you will suffer for it. Therefore, the best way

is just to bow your neck and take the yoke. [Laughter.] Don't go to questioning about it, or saying what you think, because you are wholly unfit to determine these questions. He says if the people determine the question of the volume of currency, there is bound to be repudiation. In other words, you are fit to make laws respecting all questions of persons and property; you are fit to make laws regulating the relation of husband to wife, parent to child, and guardian to ward —laws determining all questions of commerce between man and man, and of descent of property—in short, all questions of interest to mankind which lie within the scope of civil government—except, *only, this money question.* But if you undertake to determine that question; if you undertake to keep the control of the paper money, which is the only money used by the people in the hands of your own government, you are bound to rush on to repudiation. That is the idea of the gentleman, if I understand it.

He says, no nation ever issued legal tender paper money in time of peace without repudiation. Well, I do not think his reading of history has gone back far. In the 13th century Venice was mistress of the seas—the queen of commerce. Her business men were annoyed by the miserable coins of the nations they dealt with and of their own republic; and for the purpose of relieving them, the Venetian Government established the bank of Venice and issued through it irredeemable legal tender notes, on which *the Venetian Republic* paid a small interest, and those notes were above the par of this wonderful product—gold—for centuries. These irredeemable notes of Venice remained a legal tender for over five hundred years and until Napoleon invaded the Republic and overthrew it. It was a Government legal tender paper money not redeemable in gold—the first issue of paper money known in the commerce of the world—a monument to the wisdom of retaining in the control of government the money of the people. Russia issued *assignats* in time of peace—irredeemable legal tender paper money—which were at a premium over gold for forty or fifty years. And now, at this very hour, when he talks so glibly about the absurdity of legal tender paper money issued by the Government, the foremost statesmen of England are proposing to relieve the people of Great Britain of the burden of their national debt to the extent of the volume of currency needed, by the Government assuming to itself the exclusive privilege of issuing paper money, and that, too, never redeemable. I have in my hand a debate in the House of Commons, taken from the London *Times* of a recent date, which I will read:

DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, MARCH 17, 1875, ON SECOND READING OF MR. GOSHEN'S BANKERS' ACT AMENDMENT BILL.

Mr. Goshen, in his remarks on his motion for the second reading of the bill, said: Scotch bankers said let us have free trade in banking in Scotland, and let English bankers come and issue notes. But it was for the Government to decide, as a question of policy, whether such a course would be advisable, and he thought that if that question was raised it would be decided in the negative, and that no body of monopolists or bankers should issue notes without the State claiming its portion of the profits.

Mr. Cave, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, said he could easily understand free trade in *banking*, but free trade in *issue* was quite a different thing. [Hear, hear.] And no one could doubt that the paper issue of a country, like its currency, ought to be in the hands of the Government. No one could read the debates on the act of 1844, and doubt that that was the opinion of Sir Robert Peel, and that if he had been able he would have caused effect to be given to it.

In conclusion, the Right Honorable gentleman moved the following amendment: "That a select committee be appointed to consider and report upon the restriction imposed and privilege conferred by law on bankers authorized to make and issue notes in England, Scotland, and Ireland respectively."

Mr. Gladstone.—"My Right Honorable friend, Mr. Playfair, has referred with perfect accuracy to the declarations of Sir Robert Peel that he was in favor of entire freedom of trade in banking. I have the melancholy privilege of being the only person now in the House who belonged to the Cabinet of 1844, and who was, therefore, cognizant of the policy, and pretty accurately acquainted with the views of Sir Robert Peel in framing the act of 1844. * * * But Sir R. Peel was not also of opinion that if it were the pleasure of Parliament to combine the business of banking, *which is essentially and properly a free business, with the factitious and artificial privilege of issue, which has nothing whatever to do with banking,* and which rests on grounds of its own, such continuation of privileges might not materially modify the principle of freedom in banking. Sir Robert Peel proceeded steadily upon the principle that where the law imposed restrictions upon banks in their business of banking, these restrictions should be maintained *with reference to another principle, that the State was entitled to resume ultimately into its own hands the entire business of issue, and that that course should be taken upon the first favorable opportunity.* This is a true statement of the case as regards the views of Sir Robert Peel, and I need not say that these views upon a question of currency must always have great weight and authority in this House. [Hear, hear.] The issues of the Bank of England and the issues of the private bankers are so closely related, that to inquire into the one is quite impossible without virtually—even if not nominally—extending the inquiries to the other.

I think the bill, after this debate, must suggest to the mind of the House, whether it is not desirable, supposing a favorable opportunity to have arrived, that we should now at length, after a lapse of thirty or thirty-one years since the last legislation on this subject, endeavor to deal with the question of issues. [Cheers.] *I am one of those who firmly adhere to the policy of the act of 1844, and to the principle that the issue is the privilege and prerogative of the State. Nothing could be more strictly accurate, and at the same time more felicitous, than the expression of my Right Honorable friend* [Mr. Goshen] *when he spoke of the issue banks as being subsidized by the State. They are so in the strictest sense, because they have in their own hands a power which, if exercised by the State, would be directly productive of considerable funds, available for the relief of the Exchequer.* [Hear.] *It would be exactly the same thing, so far as the money is concerned, to grant a legislative privilege to a person to pay over to him a considerable sum from the Consolidated Fund.*" [Hear, hear.]

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said:

"The Government accepts in the fullest manner the principles of the legislation of 1844 and 1845, and it is with great satisfaction that I heard from the Right Honorable gentleman [Mr. Gladstone]—who speaks by additional authority on this subject as having known the mind of Sir Robert Peel, who was the author of that legislation—the most complete confirmation of what I have always understood to be the intention and meaning of that act, namely, to make a clear distinction between the two great principles of currency and issue on the one hand, and banking on the other. [Hear! hear!] *The design was to put currency and issue on their proper basis, and to do so on the theory that the privilege of issue belongs to the State, and that the State exercises that right of issue in such a manner as may promote the convenience and interest of the public.* With regard to banking, on the other hand, there ought to be no unnecessary restrictions; and the principle laid down was that the freer competition of the bankers among themselves was desirable in the interests of the public. But I also understand these were the principles that Sir Robert Peel laid down as the basis of his legislation; but he found himself unable to carry them to their proper results. Being, therefore, unable to give entire and absolute effect to the principle that the right of issue belonged to the State, and being obliged to leave a portion of the privileges in the hands of the bankers, he placed certain restrictions upon the banking system."

In reply to Dr. Playfair's [member for Edinburgh] objection to the amendment proposed by the Government:

"The words of my reference are that the Select Committee shall consider and report upon "the restrictions imposed and privileges conferred by law on bankers authorized to make and issue notes in England, Scotland, and Ireland respectively." That is as wide a term as could be used, and it is as applicable to the Bank of England as to other banks."

Mr. Lowe [a leader of the Liberals and currency reformers] followed:

"I am bound to say also that I think he [the Chancellor of the Ex-

chequer] deserves our thanks for the very distinct and explicit manner in which he has delivered his opinion on the merits of the question. He has left us in no doubt either as to his own opinion or as to that of Her Majesty's Government. *They are of opinion, as I understand, that the issue of notes is a matter which belongs properly to the sovereign power, the State, and that it ought to be placed exclusively in the hands of the State, which means, as I take it, depriving, in some way or other, all bankers in England, Scotland, and Ireland of the power of issuing notes, and vesting that power solely in the supreme authority."* [Hear! hear!]

Mr. Gladstone says that nothing could be more accurate and at the same time more felicitous than the expression that the issues of the English and Scotch banks are "subsidized by the State." Americans can with greater cause complain that the national banks are subsidized by the General Government by being allowed to usurp the power of furnishing the whole paper money of the country (under the policy of the Republican party and of this resumption law), while the people pay them for the usurpation a sum equal to five per cent. interest in currency over and above the tax which they pay for the issue. These national banks are now paid $18,000,000 as an annual subsidy for issuing of $350,000,000 of paper money. [Applause.] We say, stop this wicked and wasteful subsidy, by issuing greenbacks in place of national bank notes. Go into the market and buy up the amount of bonds that the $350,000,000 of new greenbacks will purchase—reduce the interest bearing debt that far, and save to the people this $18,000,000 annually. If the Republican party had done that in 1865, as it would have done if it had not been as putty in the hands of the money power, it would have already saved to the people of this country, principal and interest, in the neighborhood of $300,000,000. If we were to do it to-day, that saving of $18,000,000, would pay off the whole of the principal of our public debt within twenty-five years—within the life-time of a majority of the men and women now hearing me. The English and Scotch banks (except the Bank of England) do not issue paper money on Government bonds—yet Gladstone says they are subsidized by the Government. Why? Because the Government might just as well issue the legal tender paper money, and with that money reduce their interest-bearing debt; and the failure to do this is properly declared by him in this debate to be in effect a subsidizing of the banks to the extent of the interest on the bank paper currency. Mr. Lowe, the leader of the Liberal party, and Mr. Playfair, concurred with Mr. Gladstone in that debate—representing as they all do, a Government built upon a great public debt. Do they understand it to be repudiation for the Government to

take into its own hands the issuing of the paper currency of Great Britain? Not at all. And why will it be repudiation here? Why is it, unless it be that the people of this country are not fit for self-government? That assumption is at the bottom of the argument of these men who are carrying on this war for the destruction of the greenback, and for putting the whole paper currency of this country into the hands of the national banks.

This specie resumption law further provides that the Secretary of the Treasury may issue five per cent. gold bonds for the purchase of gold, with which to redeem the $375,000,000 of greenbacks now outstanding. He is required by this law to be ready to redeem and pay off every greenback after the first of January, 1879. He can't trust any chances; he must have the gold there in the Treasury on the first of January; and his only way to get it is to issue $375,000,000 of five per cent. gold bonds; and with them buy the gold and bring it from Europe, so that every body who wants gold on and after that day has only to send greenbacks to the Treasury and get it. Every greenback after that day is an order on the Treasury Department for so much gold; and when a greenback has once been paid in gold, it never can be re-issued, for the law provides for only one redemption. It is a plan under which every dollar of this money that now costs the people nothing, whether it be fractional money or greenbacks, is to be utterly destroyed.

What will become of the gold? The gentleman talks as if it were better for the people to have the gold than the greenback, and as if the people will get it. They will get no such thing. There will not be a dollar in ordinary business in the country. All that can be kept in this country at all, will be kept by the national banks as security for their circulation. The gentleman says that you can go to the national banks with national bank money after the first of January, 1879, and get the gold for it, and use the gold in your business. Well, now, let us see about that. The law regulating national banks provides that the banks after the first of January, 1879, must keep five per cent. of their bank notes in the United States Treasury in greenbacks or gold for redemption of the notes outstanding. That is the only redemption agency, except the bank itself, wherever it may be located. You have a bank in this town—several of them. You want gold after the first of January, 1879. You go to the bank and present a note of *some other* bank. You can't get the gold on it. You send it on to the Treasury, and may possibly get the gold there. But there is to be only one-twentieth part of the notes of each bank represented by gold or greenbacks in the hands of

the Secretary of the Treasury to redeem with; and if you send the note to Washington after the first of January, 1879, you doubtless will find that the five per cent. deposited by the bank has already been drawn by some gentleman in Wall Street. [Applause.] But the gentleman will say, the Treasury Department can take the banks in hand and treat them severely for failing to keep up their five per cent. fund. Well, how do they take the banks in hand now? This national bank law that I have here, forbids any bank to loan money at a greater rate of interest than is authorized in the State where the bank is located. Who is there in this town of Tiffin, who gets money from any national bank at the rate of interest authorized in Ohio? Nobody. Nor any body in any other town in Ohio. That provision of the law is every-where and utterly disregarded, and although it enjoins every bank officer loaning money, under the solemnity of his oath as director or officer, not to exceed eight per cent. interest; yet as a matter of practice and common consent all the bank officers every-where utterly disregard the law. But if a man sells liquor against the law, he is jerked up mighty quick. Has any body ever jerked up a national bank officer for violating the law about interest? Oh! no. This money power that owns the Republican party, controls also the administration of the law that relates to national banks. On and after the first of January, 1879, if you want this gold that the gentleman tells about, you will probably find that the bank whose bill you have is located in Arizona; because banking is free and all the banking in this country may be done in Arizona or Alaska. All the banks of issue may move their head-quarters there, and it would be inconvenient for the people to go to them to get gold for their bank notes.

It is utter nonsense to talk about gold and silver as the common currency of this country. We did n't have it before the war, when we had twice the volume of gold and silver in the country that we have to-day, and when we had not half the business we have to-day. The difference between the amount of gold and silver in this country in 1860 compared with the amount to-day, taking business into view, is as about four dollars in 1860 to one dollar to-day. And why? It is because we are a debtor nation. We owe $150,000,000 every year to Europe as interest on Government, State, and railroad bonds. We do n't pay it all in gold, it is true. We pay it to some extent in products, and to a still larger extent in making new debts. Every time a railroad company negotiates its bonds abroad the proceeds practically go toward paying the interest we owe that year to Europe on the bonds they already hold. But after deducting the payment by other products, and

by making new debts, we still ship abroad every year on an average $50,000,000 of gold. Our product of gold last year was about $36,000,000, and the year before, the same. It was greater in former years; but for the past two years the whole product of gold has fallen $14,000,000 short of the actual amount sent abroad. And since the passage of the resumption law our condition is growing worse—for in the first six months of this year we have shipped more gold to Europe than we did the whole of last year.

Now there is the established drain, arising from the fact that we owe Europe $150,000,000 of gold annually. My friend Woodford says that we drain the gold out of the country by using paper money. Not exactly. We owe it abroad, and must send it. Hence I assert we can not maintain one-fourth of our present volume of paper currency actually redeemable in gold, after the first of January, 1879. If the banks maintain a bigger circulation than that, they will do it by such fraudulent subterfuges as I have described—by locating their banks at remote and inaccessible points where the people can not get at them to present the notes, or by the Treasury Department simply saying, when notes are presented, that the banks have not got the five per cent. deposit. Certain it is that under this resumption law all of our fractional currency, all of our greenback currency, every dollar of them, are to be wiped out, and the banks understand that whether they can maintain all their own circulation or not, they can't substitute bank money in the place of the greenbacks and fractional currency to be destroyed. In fact, the banks have already taken the warning that the first day of January, 1879 is the day for resumption, and have retired their circulation to the extent of $25,000,000 since that law was passed. And I now warn you, fellow-citizens, that if we are to have an honest redemption of bank paper money after the first of January, 1879, you will see the currency of this country brought down from $750,000,000 to certainly not exceeding $250,000,000.

Can the business of this country stand it? I ask you how we have stood the contraction of the currency heretofore made? The gentleman endeavored to create the impression yesterday that there had been no contraction of legal tender money and bank money combined. I have here a table taken from the report of the Treasurer of the United States for the year 1874, page 45, in which he gives the amount of currency outstanding at the close of each fiscal year, showing that while we had $699,000,000 of United States legal tender money, non-interest-bearing, on the thirtieth of June, 1865, we had but $390,000,000 on the thirtieth of June, 1874. And adding the bank money

to the greenback, on the thirtieth of June, 1865, we had $910,000,000, and in 1874 but $740,000,000. In that nine years our population had grown, counting the Southern States, twenty-two per cent., while the currency had decreased eighteen per cent.—making an aggregate contraction of about forty per cent. counting the business and volume of currency together in nine years. That contraction was a chief cause of the panic.

The gentleman says the panic was brought on by a grand "national drunk;" that we went wild about speculation because there was an exorbitant amount of paper money. Well, one would suppose we would have been wildest when we had most paper money; and the crash would have come right then. If we had a grand national drunk we would have had the attack of delirium tremens when we had the most whisky in us. [Applause.] It was not so; there was less personal indebtedness in 1865, '66, and '67 than there was after the currency had been contracted in 1871, '72, and '73. But as the currency contracted, personal indebtedness gradually increased, and a vast mountain of credit was built up to carry on the business of the country, and take the place of the currency withdrawn. He talks about railroads—the Northern Pacific, and so on. Well, we had a good deal of wild railroad investment, it is true, but what caused it? The large amount of paper money? Not at all. The big grants of land made to private corporations by the General Government caused the building of these railroads. [Applause.] The granting to Jay Cooke of an area of territory as large as Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois combined—the home and heritage of our children—given free to a railroad corporation as a stimulus to build a road in a region where it was not possible that it should have business within the generation of men who built it; grants of large amounts of the public lands to railroad corporations in Kansas and Nebraska, and to the Texas Pacific—that is what caused the investment of capital wildly in the construction of railroads in the West. This unwise investment of money in railroads was not confined to the West, but extended also to the South, where, after the war, people had a right to suppose that the party which had conducted the war for the restoration of the Union would say to the South, when it was ended and they accepted the situation, "Arise, and govern yourselves as free States of this Republic." But the administration did not do that; it had other business in hand; it wanted to throttle the South and republicanize it through the influence of a horde of Northern scoundrels who bore down on the Southern people in their hour of prostration, to devour them as the jackal

does the dead lion. And so the Southern States were kept prostrate, Southern industries repressed, business stopped and paralyzed, and the Northern capitalists who sent money down to rebuild Southern railroads, found they could do no business, for industry was destroyed. It was those railroad investments that were the most immediate cause of the panic of 1873. The failure, first, of Jay Cooke & Co., then of Henry Clews & Co., alarmed money lenders, and broke down and overthrew that credit system with which the business of the country was being done, after the reduction of the currency.

Now, fellow-citizens, I ask you how the business of the country is going to stand the addition of $419,000,000 to the bonded debt, which means an addition of $22,000,000 to the annual taxes borne by the people? The business has got to suffer this vast additional taxation, and at the same time suffer a contraction of the currency, equal to about sixty per cent. of the present volume. It can not stand it. The mere threat of this large further contraction of the currency has already, in the language of the Democratic platform, brought disaster to the business of the country, and threatens it with general bankruptcy and ruin. All over this land we see the effects of it—failures on every side, business stopped, all kinds of productive industries paralyzed; a million of men already wholly out of employment, and two or three millions more having only half work, and that in many instances only on half pay. If this is done in the green tree, what may you expect in the dry? If this is done in anticipation, what may you expect when the law has borne its fruit?

The gentleman talks about the superior character of gold money; and says the holders will get seventeen per cent. more after the first of January, 1879, on this volume of paper money. Yes—but the people don't hold it. It is being hoarded by capitalists already, until now there is locked up from circulation more than half of the greenbacks—held to pocket the rise of seventeen per cent.; held too, because they know that business can not survive the contraction of the currency involved in the execution of that law; because they know that nine business men out of ten will go down to ruin and bankruptcy, and therefore they fear to trust the manufacturer, the merchant, and the ordinary business man, because with this contraction of the currency, and with all values shrinking, with all men who do business doing it on a fallen market; with men failing here and there, and by their failures dragging down others, until the ruin spreads to all classes and conditions of business men; they know that no money is safe lent out to take the chances which money takes in ordinarily

prosperous times. They, therefore hold it—hold it while lands go down in value, while labor goes down in price, while every product of labor falls, because while every thing else falls, the purchasing power of this hoarded money increases. Therefore they hoard it, and wait to take advantage, not of the business of ordinarily prosperous times, but of forced sales when the flag of the sheriff shall wave over the wrecked fortunes of the business men of the land. Then the money will come out, and these now hoarded dollars will not only be worth seventeen per cent. more than now, but every one of them will buy twice or three times the property it would have bought but for the enormous reduction of the currency involved in the execution of this law. [Applause.]

We have an illustration in the history of England of the effect of the contraction involved in the forced resumption of specie payment. England resumed in 1819 when bank paper was at but three per cent. discount, and when Ricardo, who led the bullionists, said to the people of the country, "Why, it only adds three per cent. to the debts of the debtors; that is all, it adds just the premium on gold." But what was the effect of it? The effect was to compel the banks to take in forty-five per cent. of their paper currency to get ready for resumption; and to shrink all lands and labor, and products of labor, to the full ratio of the shrinkage of the paper currency. You can see the account of it in Alison's *History of Europe*, second series, in which, aristocrat as he was, he denounces, with philanthropic indignation, that infamous law that broke down all the industries and pauperized the labor of Great Britain. Under the execution of that law, every man almost, who was in debt, was beggared. Farmers who had owed little debts on their farms, regarded in ordinary times as petty incumbrances, saw their lands swept off to pay them. We will see the same thing here. You *have* seen it to a large extent. What will ordinary real estate sell for to-day, in this State? Not two-thirds of its value two years ago. I would rather, to-day, take the chance of the pea-nut peddler on the streets of this town, who is out of debt, than of the holder of a twenty thousand dollar farm who owes five thousand dollars on it. [Applause.]

It only adds seventeen per cent., says Mr. Sherman, to the burden of the debtors. What is the aggregate of the currency debts of this country? Take the currency debts of States, counties, townships, cities, towns, and individuals, and the aggregate is at least, $8,000,000,000. Add seventeen per cent. to that and you require the debtors to pay, in three years, $1,360,000,000 more than they contracted to pay. When

they made their contracts they made them in currency; they got legal tenders, or their equivalent, and they expected to pay legal tenders or their equivalent; but this devilish device of the money power, under the form of law, and sugar-coated with specious talk of a return to honest money, adds $1,360,000,000 to this present currency debt besides adding $419,000,000 to the public debt of the United States. I say it is an act of wanton, flagrant, gigantic robbery of the people. [Applause.]

The gentleman has a great deal to say about the gold dollar and the greenback dollar, and he seemed disposed to turn our political meetings into a sort of kindergarten, where the children are taught by showing up the thing talked of so they can understand it. Now, people here understand what a gold five-dollar piece is and what a greenback five dollar bill is. He says that the gold is steady, always the same, never changes; it is the greenback that is changing. That is wholly erroneous. Gold fell from 227 to 141 in the first months of 1865. Now, if gold was the measure of your values, your property fell thirty-five per cent. in that three months. If your property had fallen that amount, it would have ruined many of you. Did it fall? No, it did not; there is not one man in fifty that knows what the price of gold is to-day, or what it was yesterday, or the day before, or cares. There is not one value in fifty that is affected by the price of gold to-day and its fluctuations. It does affect imports and exports, which comprise about one-thirtieth part of the exchanges of the country; but the general business is unaffected, for the standard of value is the greenback and not the gold, that being the money of business. Gold is now merely a commodity, which rises and falls with the demand for it at home or abroad. Europe carried off $55,000,000 of our gold in the first six months of this year, and that in part put up the price from 110 to 117. Just at the time that these Republicans were promising gold payment, the greenback was falling, according to the idea of the gentleman! Your values did not shrink thirty-five per cent. in the first three months of 1865, by reason of the fall in the value of gold. In August, 1869, and again in February, 1870, there was a change of twelve per cent. in the price of gold, which did not affect the general business of the country; there was not any change in values generally. Gold is not the measure of our values; and it is not the same in value to-day as it was yesterday, or a year ago. The gentleman has exhibited, in some of these debates, a coin of the Dutch Republic of three hundred years ago, and says it is of the same value now that it was at the time it was issued. Well, now, some years before that was issued the price of labor

in England was fixed by act of Parliament at a penny a day, and his dollar would have then bought the labor of fifty men for a day. To-day it buys the labor of one man for one day. Has it not changed in purchasing power—in value? It is constantly changing, and is in actual exchangeable value one of the most fluctuating products of the earth. When it is the only legal tender there is nothing to measure its changes by, but when we have the other legal tender—which I maintain is the more stable currency, if not arbitrarily changed in volume—it marks the changes of that product, gold, which is now a mere commodity, just as it marks the fluctuations of wheat, corn, and rye. [Applause.]

This tinsel talk of my friend from New York is effective only to hide from the people the flagrant robbery that is involved in the execution of the resumption law. An eminent British dissenter was once called before a council of Bishops of the Church of England. They said to him: "Why do you fight the established church? Why are you going about among the people preaching heresy and schism?" He walked up to their table in his homely garb, and, with a voice hoarse from out-door preaching, asked if they had a sovereign in their pockets. One of them handed him a sovereign. He asked for a Bible; they handed him one. He took the sovereign and put it over the name of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ. "Do you see the words under that?" No, they didn't see them. He took away the gold, and then they saw the name of Jesus. [Applause.] The reason my friend from New York can not see the perishing industries of this country, nor sympathize with the masses on whose shoulders rests this mountain of currency debt, nor see the ruin awaiting all men who are in debt, and nearly all who are in business, under this policy of contraction, is the over-mastering influence of that money power which is symbolized by his glittering piece of gold. [Applause.]

[*Time expired.*]

GOVERNOR WOODFORD'S REJOINDER.

Now, gentlemen, I have but thirty minutes, so I must talk rapidly, and I want you to follow very closely.

My friend began with Thomas Jefferson, and quoted his utterances

in favor of a national issue of paper money. The date of the letter, from which he quoted, was the 11th of September, 1813. At that hour we were in the midst of war with England. The Treaty of Ghent was not made until December 14th, of that year, and was not proclaimed in the United States until 15th February, 1814. Jefferson then, in time of war, asked that the Government should have the right to issue paper money, precisely as the Republican party in time of war issued the greenback. No more, no less. [Applause.]

A few weeks before that, on the 13th of June, the same Thomas Jefferson, writing to the same person, used these words: "It is a wise rule, and should be fundamental in a government disposed to cherish its credit, and desiring to restrain the use of it within the limits of its faculties, never to borrow a dollar without levying a tax the same instant for paying the interest annually, and the principal within a given term, and to consider that tax as pledged to the creditors of the public faith." [Applause.]

And on the 6th of November, 1813, two months later than the letter from which the gentleman quotes, Thomas Jefferson writes to the same person: "The sum of what has been said is that, pretermitting the constitutional question of the authority of Congress to consider this obligation, on the grounds of reason alone it would be best that our medium should be so proportioned to our purchases as to be on a par with that of the governments with which we trade, and whose medium is in a sound state; that specie is the most perfect medium, because it will preserve its own level, because, having an intrinsic and universal value, it can never die in our hands, and it is the surest resource and reliance in time of war." [Applause.]

Hold on. We have some more of Thomas Jefferson, the founder of the Democracy [Applause.]: "That the trifling economy of paper as a cheaper medium, or its convenience for transmission, weighs nothing in opposition to the advantages of the precious metals; that it is liable to be abused, has been and forever will be abused in every country in which it is permitted."

Some more of Thomas Jefferson: "Instead, then, of listening to the scarcity of medium set up by speculators, projectors, and commercial gamblers"—was n't the recent convention at Columbus well described? [Laughter and cheers]—"no endeavor should be spared to begin the work of reducing it by such gradual means as may give time to private fortunes to preserve their poise and to settle down with the subsiding medium."

Why actually Thomas Jefferson advised you Democrats to unite

with us Republicans in a specie resumption law that shall work slowly and give time to settle surely.

Mr. Jefferson may now step down from the witness-stand. [Laughter and cheers.]

My friend next speaks of John C. Calhoun, and he quotes him correctly. The words were uttered by Calhoun in a debate on the specie circular in 1836. In that debate another statesman also spoke, and his name was Daniel Webster. And these were the words of Webster in that debate: "Most unquestionably there is no legal tender, and there can be no legal tender in this country under the authority of this Government or any other, but gold and silver."

I think Mr. Calhoun may step down also. [Applause.] If you want to measure the value of their opposing constitutional interpretations, please remember that Mr. Calhoun also believed that this Government was a Confederacy, a rope of sand; that any State might dissolve it at will. Please remember that the fruit of the argument which John C. Calhoun made upon secession was fully ripened in the bloody war that made this greenback. [Cheers.] Remember that the logic and the constitutional authority of Daniel Webster was the logic and the authority that held the Union together. It was the logic by which our armies fought, by which our cannon thundered, and by which our Union stands to-day one and inseparable. [Cheers.]

My friend calls to the stand as witness number three, Andrew Jackson. [Laughter.] Now I leave it to my Democratic friends—and there are some sincere and honest ones here to-day—is it not the first time in all your lives that you ever heard Andrew Jackson called to the stand to demonstrate the constitutionality or advisability of paper money? [Applause.]

Then my friend said—and I think that the Philistine has been delivered into my hand, [laughter]—my friend said, and you remember the echo of his eloquent words, that gold fluctuated where it was measured by a greenback currency that *did not change in volume.*

But by the eighth section of the Democratic platform of Ohio they want a greenback currency that shall be made and kept equal to the demands of trade. It must then change in volume, shrinking in when there is too much, and expanding when there is too little, and yet your only possible measure of gold, according to the exact language of your champion, is a greenback currency that does not change in its volume. I leave him and the Democratic platform to settle their disputes between them. [Laughter and applause.]

We can not issue more greenbacks without violating our pledged

faith. In 1864 we passed a law right in the midst of the Rebellion that gave value to our paper circulation. That law is on the statute book to-day. That law pledges the faith of this nation that we never will print more than $400,000,000 of greenbacks. You can not print another dollar without tearing that law from the statute book. You must begin your issue by being guilty of breaking the faith on which the issue obtained its valuable circulation.

He says that all our debts in 1875 amount to more than nine billions. How much is this? Nine thousand millions of dollars. More than three times the amount of our federal debt. Why are these debts so enormous?

After the Government had set the fashion of dealing in paper promises, instead of money, every body who wanted to do business gave notes—gave promises. We rushed into the mad speculation that was engendered and born of irredeemable paper currency. It bore the fruit that it always bears, and here we are owing that debt to-day. And now we are asked to inaugurate a policy of inflation that, if carried out, would swell our debt into millions and billions.

Do not forget this, it is easy to run into debt, it is hard, very hard, to pay your way out of it. A man may gamble and speculate into indebtedness, but with sweating brow, and aching back, and straining eye, he must dig out of debt. And who at the last bears the burden? Not the men with large fortunes, not the men with great accumulations; but always and inevitably the laboring poor.

If the debt be increased, one of two things must ultimately happen. Either you repudiate that debt, and so never pay it, or you pay it, and so have to work it out. If it is hard now, where is the reason, where the logic, of piling that debt three times higher, so that your burdened children may have the added agony of paying and working it out. [Applause.]

The Government, from about 1865 to 1869, retired $1,200,000,000 of debt and funded it. The gentleman talks as though greenbacks were not a debt, although he claims that the bond is a debt. He talks as if when you issue a greenback you have paid so much debt. What is the difference between these two? Let me explain it again. The bond is a debt that bears interest in gold. The greenback is a debt without interest. That is all. Some day the greenback must be paid or repudiated. Look at the greenback itself. [Showing one.] Let us have another short lesson in object teaching. You seem to take to it very kindly, and I am very much obliged. The bill reads: "The United States will pay five dollars." Thus it is the pledge or

promise of the United States to pay a debt. Is it simply a promise to pay another bill just like this one? Let me repeat my old illustration. I owe you a note for $100. You come to me for payment. I sit down and write you another note for the same amount, and give it to you and add: "I am a member of the inflation party in the State of Ohio, and I want you to consider yourself paid." [Laughter and applause.] When that second note falls due you come and say: "Now, friend Woodford, I wish to be paid." "Oh, certainly, sir; I have listened to the eloquent addresses of Democratic speakers, and I have this thing thoroughly in my head. I understand financial matters entirely." I sit right down and get pen and paper, and with a flowing hand write you still another note, and hand it to you with these convincing words: "This is my private greenback. Paper is better than gold. The Ohio statesmen have demonstrated that to promise is to pay."

The greenback note is simply a promise to pay the gold. Do I err? When the Government pays its debt with coin, does it still carry that coin, which it has paid out, as a part of its debt? No. It has paid its debt, and the coin which is in circulation is no longer a part of the debt of the Government.

Let us see how these greenbacks are carried on the books of the Treasury. Here is the debt statement for the month of last August. [Showing it.] The first heading is "debt bearing interest in coin;" the next is, "debt on which interest has ceased since maturity;" the next is, "debt bearing no interest;" and then comes "legal tender notes," so much. After the Government has paid them out it still carries them as debt, because they are the unpaid notes of the Government. Some day they must be paid. The Government does not pay the debt when it gives them out. Do I err in this claim? Here is the very greenback itself; that sustains me. Here is the debt statement; that sustains me.

Let me go one step further. This question has been before the United States Supreme Court. Hear what the late chief justice, ex-Governor Chase, of Ohio, said in rendering the decision in the case of the Bank *vs.* the Supervisors, in 7 Wallace, page 29:

"Every one of them [referring to these Treasury notes] expresses upon its face an engagement of the nation to pay the bearer a certain sum. The dollar note is an engagement to pay a dollar, and the dollar intended is the coined dollar of the United States, a certain quantity in weight and fineness of gold or silver, authenticated as such by the stamp of the Government."

Then some day these greenbacks must be paid in coined gold or silver dollars.

When we funded $1,200,000,000 we simply did what? We simply put so much of the debt in the way of payment. We took up so many notes, the great majority of them bearing seven and three-tenths per cent. interest in currency. If gold was then worth $1.20, and we had funded these seven-thirties in gold six per cents, we should have saved one-tenth of one per cent. on every dollar. For $6 in gold, at that rate, equalled $7.20 in currency, and the seven-thirties bore seven and three-tenths per cent., or $7.30 in currency interest, on each one hundred dollars. So we would have saved one-tenth of one per cent. in the interest on the transaction if we had funded them in six per cents. But these seven-thirties were mostly funded in ten-forties at five per cent. in gold. With gold at $1.20, $5 in gold represents $6 in currency. As the seven-thirties bore seven and three-tenths per cent. in currency, and five dollars in gold just equalled six dollars in currency, we saved, by the funding, $1.30 of currency interest on every hundred dollars. And that, my friend thinks, was bad financiering. [Applause.]

Then my friend attacks the law for redemption of United States bonds, passed in March, 1869. Suppose we read this law of 1869, on which so much unkind comment has been made during this debate. Now listen and see whom this redemption law was intended to protect. I want every man, I care not what his party, to listen to this law as I read it:

ACT OF 1869, CHAPTER I.

AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE PUBLIC CREDIT.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in order to remove any doubt as to the purpose of the Government to discharge all just obligations to the public creditors, and to settle conflicting questions and interpretations of the laws by virtue of which such obligations have been contracted, it is hereby provided and declared that the faith of the United States is solemnly pledged to the payment in coin or its equivalent of all the obligations of the United States not bearing interest, known as United States notes, and of all the interest-bearing obligations of the United States, except in cases where the law authorizing the issue of any such obligation has expressly provided that the same may be paid in lawful money or other currency than gold and silver. But none of said interest-bearing obligations not already due shall be redeemed or paid before maturity unless at such time

United States notes shall be convertible into coin at the option of the holder, or unless at such time bonds of the United States bearing a lower rate of interest than the bonds to be redeemed can be sold at par in coin.

And the United States also solemnly pledges its faith to make provision at the earliest practicable period for the redemption of the United States notes in coin.

J. G. BLAINE,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SCHUYLER COLFAX,
Vice-President of the United States and President of the Senate.

Approved March 18, 1869.
U. S. GRANT.

And then my friend told you what I said about this law in the Wilmington Debate. My friend's memory is good; the accuracy of the stenographer is better. Let me read just what I said, and then let me stand or fall by the record. The first question the gentleman asked me was: "Is the Republican party of the United States in favor of the execution of the specie resumption law?" On the 10th of July, 1872, the National Democratic party, gathered in convention at Baltimore, resolved as follows: "That the public credit must be sacredly maintained, and we denounce repudiation in every form and guise, and a speedy return to specie payments is demanded alike by the highest considerations of commercial morality and honest government. I presume that the Republican party of to-day, like the National Democratic party of 1872, is in favor of an honest and earnest effort to execute the specie resumption law."

Is it my fault that the Democratic party have changed since 1872? My dear Democratic brother, if there is any thing that I pity, it is the weariness with which you try to keep your seat in the Democratic saddle. In 1864 you resolved the war a failure, and in 1868 you congratulated the nation that it had proved a success. [Applause.] In 1868 you demanded the payment of the bonded debt in greenbacks, and in 1872 you demanded a return to specie payment at the earliest practicable moment. [Applause and laughter.] Now in 1875 you have gone back to the platform of 1868. I would not call hard names for the world [laughter,] but what a difficult time you must have in changing your convictions every year to meet the changing requirements of the gospel in the Democratic platform. [Laughter and cheers.]

And then my friend blames Senator Sherman because, when asked with regard to the meaning of the resumption law of 1875, Sherman simply replied: "Look at the law and judge for yourself." I hardly think the answer either evasive or unwise. But if I did think it evasive or unwise, what should I, in order to be consistent, think of the answer that my friend gave me the other day at Circleville. I put to him this question: "Do you intend ever to redeem your new greenbacks in coin?" And like Senator Sherman, quick and pat, clear and distinct, fell the ringing words: "I refer you to the Democratic platform." [Laughter and cheers.] So my brother in this debate sees that it is peculiar to Ohio men to answer in that peculiar style. [Laughter and applause.]

My friend has said that when the fractional currency is redeemed in coin, you will never get them. He has said that there have been $2,600,000 of this fractional currency redeemed in silver coin; and, to every audience until to-day, he has pointed with eloquent and forcible gesture and said: "How many of those silver coins have you got? Not a dime."

It occurred to me that possibly none of the fractional currency had been actually redeemed. So I telegraphed to the Secretary of the Treasury, and asked him how much of the fractional currency has been redeemed in silver coin since the passage of the resumption law. Now, to save my friend from the mortification of repeating the question to the assemblage here, with the telegram in my hand, I showed him the telegram before he made his speech. [Laughter.] I was kind to my brother, so that he might not be delivered twice into my hands. [Laughter and applause.] And now let me read the telegram: "No fractional currency has been redeemed in silver under the specie resumption law." So, of course, you have not got it. [Laughter.] My brother, how could they get it? [Laughter.]

But I will tell you, my friends, how you can get it. When specie resumption comes, the Secretary of the Treasury is ordered to get the silver, and coin it and distribute it. How? So that the brokers down on Wall Street, those sinful brokers, may not get it. "He may issue such silver coins through the mints"—there are mints elsewhere than in New York—"the subtreasuries"—there are subtreasuries elsewhere than in New York.—"the public depositories"—nearly every national bank is a public depository, and there are some here in Tiffin,—"and through the post-offices of the United States." So, my brother, let me give you a bit of advice, and unlike most New York lawyers I will charge you nothing for it: if you want the silver for your fractional

currency, you just hold on to your fractional currency, and when the silver comes after resumption has begun, you just go to the postmaster and pass the fractional currency through the window, and he will pass back the silver. Then, if you do not take care of it, it will be your fault and not mine.

Then my friend talks about the paper money of Venice and Russia. Now I frankly confess that I seldom talk about that of which I know nothing. I shall seek to know, before the close of our debate to-morrow night, all the facts with regard to the paper money of Venice, and will then be enabled to discuss this Venetian question with my friend.

If my friend is right, then Thomas Jefferson was wrong in the extract that I read; and it is now a question of his true knowledge between Thomas Jefferson on the one side and Thomas Ewing on the other. [Laughter and applause.] I will leave the Venetian question until we meet to-morrow night for the close of the debate. Let me here to-day simply say this: That bank of Venice stood, my friend tells you, for 300 years. That is, I suppose that its bullion was in its vaults, and that the people had the paper until Napoleon came and broke the bank. The probability is that the Venetians still hold their valuable paper, and that Napoleon carried back what of the worthless gold and silver he could find, and put it in the military chest of France. [Cheers.]

My friend says that the stamp on the paper of the Government makes paper money; that it is the best money the world knows. There [showing an old Continental note] is some of the paper that your Government and mine has made. It is a Continental note, which was issued in 1778. It promises to pay eight Spanish milled dollars. It is stamped by the best Government that the world knows. It is the best paper that the world knows. All of the Democratic Convention at Columbus, if concentrated into one body of wisdom, could not surpass that. And there is the best paper money that the world knows, issued by the United States. A bushel of it would not buy your breakfast to-morrow morning, simply because they put out too much, and then they repudiated all. Now do not you again put out too much. [Applause.] I have finished. Thank you for your patient listening. [Cheers.]

[*Time expired.*]

DEBATE AT COLUMBUS,

Saturday Evening, Oct. 9, 1875.

GENERAL EWING'S OPENING SPEECH.

Mr. Chairmen, Ladies and Gentlemen:—

The finance question to be discussed here to-night is not whether we shall have, as a people, gold money or paper money. It is a fight merely between the greenback and the blackback. Gold is impossible as the money of ordinary business in this country. We never had enough before the war when the amount of gold and silver in the country was $285,000,000 as against $160,000,000 to-day, and when the business to be transacted was not half the business of to-day. We therefore can not rely on gold only, or mainly, or at all, as the common currency of the people.

The issue is, whether that large sum of the public debt which an adequate currency would amount to, shall be in the form of non-interest-bearing legal tender notes, or of bank notes costing the people five per cent. interest: whether we shall add $419,000,000 to our interest-bearing bonded debt in order to take up and destroy the costless money of the people, or, on the other hand, retire the bank money, issue legal tenders to an equal amount in its place, and with those legal tenders purchase and cancel over $300,000,000 of the interest-bearing debt. [Applause.] In short, whether we shall add $419,000,000 to our burden, or take $300,000,000 off. [Applause.] It also involves the question whether the Government of the United States shall control, by methods of its own appropriate to that end, the question of the proper volume of the currency, which is the life-blood of business; or whether the whole control shall be committed to two or three thousand pet corporations. [Applause.] Nor is that all. It involves, too, the

question whether the now prostrate business of this country shall rise again, or whether this reconstruction law shall be driven, like the car of Juggernaut, over its bruised and crippled body. [Applause.]

This is no new fight. It is one we have had in the United States, off and on, from 1813 till now. Toward the close of the war of 1812, Thomas Jefferson, the father of Democracy, the noblest name in the annals of our political history, [cheers] cried out, in behalf of the debt-burdened people of that day, for the suppression of bank paper and restoring the currency of the country to the nation, to whom it belongs. [Applause.] He said bank paper must be suppressed, and Treasury notes issued in its place, and thus, to the extent of the needs of circulation, lift from the shoulders of the people the burden of the debt of two wars. The gentleman came back at me yesterday with a quotation from Jefferson, to the effect that he believed gold and silver were better than a paper currency. No doubt he believed it; just as Jackson, Benton, and most of the public men of the last generation did. But when Jefferson demanded the suppression of bank paper there was then, as now, not a question between gold and paper money, for in the condition of the country then, as now, a gold currency was impracticable. It was the question whether, as we had to have paper money, that money should be issued by the General Government or by private corporations. [Applause.]

What was the condition of the country when Jackson and Benton made their war against bank paper money? Not only out of debt, but the little tariff imposed brought into the public treasury a fund so large that, with the economical administration of the Government of that day, there remained a large surplus. And one of the perplexing questions of the time when they were fighting paper money—that is, bank money—and clamoring for specie—that is, money issued by the Government of the United States—was, "What shall we do with this surplus?" and the Whigs and Democrats fought each other desperately over the question whether it should be distributed among the States or not. But the two war debts that were oppressing the energies of the people, when Thomas Jefferson wrote his letters to Eppes, in 1813, had built up a petty aristocracy which had the political parties of that day as completely in their fist as the moneyed aristocracy now has the Republican party. [Cheers.] It was a comparatively small power, but the population was small, and that little concentrated money power mastered the statesmen of that day, and prevented the wise advice of Jefferson being followed, of issuing paper money by the General Government exclusively. And so on down until our war, the concentrated wealth—that is, the wealth

expressed in money and money securities—has always succeeded in defeating every effort to put or keep in the hands of the General Government the sole power of making the money of the people.

When our war came on, when our Treasury was empty, when capital shrank and fled, while the "boys in blue" were rising all over the land and marching down to give their lives for their country, when the holders of money bags tied them up and hid them away in vaults and closets, then the General Government was compelled to issue a legal tender paper money that filled all the channels of commerce, lifted the Government from despair to hopefulness, paid off our armies, sent beef and horses and every necessary of war to the field, and, with the blessing of God, brought us the grand triumph which keeps us one nation to-day. [Cheers.] But the bank power, however suppressed for awhile, only waited its time until, in 1864, they forced the enactment of the national bank law by which corporations were created to divide with the Government the power of issuing the money of the people, and in time to wrest it wholly away. Every step of the Republican party from that day, at all affecting the question, has been directed to the destruction of the greenback so as to leave the people again, where they were before the war, dependent wholly on private corporations for the volume and character of their money.

Consider the successive steps. The five-twenty bonds were issued. What did the people get for them? Greenbacks. At what price? At par. They were a six per cent. bond, the Government having the privilege at the end of five years of redeeming them in the same money it received for them. In 1869, these $1,600,000,000 of five-twenty bonds, it was apparent, would be a permanent obstacle in the way of destroying the greenback, and therefore the act of the 18th of March, 1869, was passed, violating the contract on which those bonds were issued, and making them payable in gold. Did they say in advance they were going to do it? What did the Republican party in its platform of 1868 tell the people of Ohio? I have the platform here. It told the people that by the contract under which those bonds were issued, the principal was payable in legal tenders, and should be so paid. [Applause.] What did the Republican party of Indiana in its platform of that year tell the people? That the principal of those five-twenty bonds, which comprised almost the whole bonded debt of the United States, should be paid in the money the people got for them. What did Mr. Morton tell, who is now going about Ohio lecturing on good faith. He said it would be a gigantic swindle to pay the principal of those bonds in gold. What did John Sherman say? He told

the people that any bond-holder who demanded gold for the principal of his bonds, was a "repudiator and an extortioner." [Applause.] They came before the people of the Western States with these solemn declarations of party conventions and eminent statesmen, and thus won the election. They went back to Washington, and before Gen. Grant was warm in his seat, passed the infamous law falsely entitled "An act to strengthen the public credit," but which in fact was an act of repudiation and extortion, by which they prevented the people paying those bonds according to the contract. Greenbacks were then worth but seventy cents on the dollar. It made a difference to the people of this country of about thirty per cent. on $1,600,000,000 whether those bonds were to be paid according to the contract or in gold. By that act they robbed the people of a right worth at that time $500,000,000. But it would not do to let the five-twenty bonds stand out payable in the money of the people, because their existence furnished a reason for continuing the greenback money as the currency of the country. Therefore for the double purpose of still more enriching that money power which is the vital force of the Republican party, and of ultimately wiping out the greenback money and leaving the field open solely to the national banks, they destroyed this right of redemption of those bonds in greenbacks.

The gentleman rather exults in this discussion that I say that the act of 1869 practically fastened the fraud on the people. Why do I say so? Because the bonds have changed hands on the faith of the act, and because they have to a large extent been funded in new bonds. He comes before the people not denying one word I have said as to the character of the contract, and the infamous conduct of the leaders of the Republican party in violating their pledged faith, and he exults that the fraud and swindle has been fully accomplished, and that, therefore there is no reason for keeping the greenbacks in existence. [Applause.]

Another step toward the destruction of the greenback—one which in fact preceded that which I have just explained. In 1866, after the troops had been paid off, almost the whole interest-bearing debt of the United States was in five-twenty bonds, or interest-bearing Treasury notes. Twelve hundred millions was in Treasury notes, bearing currency interest. These notes were held among the people. They answered the double purpose of currency and investment. After any installment of interest had been paid on these notes, they would come out and circulate as currency; and as the time approached for another payment of interest, they would be withdrawn by the banks and

brokers, or held by the people themselves in order to get the next installment of interest. It was a form of debt easily borne, because it was owed by the Government to the very people who paid the taxes which paid the interest upon it. The interest flowed from the Treasury to the people, and flowed back from the people to the Treasury; and during that period when our debt was largest, held as it was at home, we bore more taxes, paid off a greater volume of the debt, and felt the public burdens less than ever we have done since. But that large body of Treasury notes, bearing interest in greenbacks, and payable in greenbacks, if permitted to exist would have made the greenback currency permanent. Hence, without consulting the people, the Republican party swept them out of existence by funding in six per cent. gold bonds.

The third step toward the destruction of the greenback was the passage of the resumption law on the 14th of January last. It provides that the Secretary of the Treasury shall, as rapidly as practicable, buy silver, coin it, and redeem and destroy our fractional currency, thus adding to the interest-bearing debt of the people $44,000,000 for the difference between a silver currency and a paper fractional currency—the difference being in effect between a currency that chinks in the pocket and one that does n't. [Applause.] We must pay every year $2,200,000 more taxes for that purpose. When this new silver is issued, where will it go? Will you have it? Not at all. Silver has never been below five per cent. premium since the resumption law was passed. It is now at about eight per cent. premium. Do you suppose that silver money will remain in circulation when it bears a premium of even one per cent.? It will be bought up by the brokers, presented at the Treasury in packages sent from Wall Street, the silver received for them, and sold at a premium, and the premium pocketed by such pet agents of the administration as Henry Clewes & Co., or their successors. [Applause.] You are, in short, as rapidly as practicable, to be stripped of all fractional currency. I made this point in a speech at Findlay, and a few days afterward, being in Chicago, I saw a copy of the *Times*, in which it reviewed my Findlay speech and said—violent bullionist organ as it is—Ewing is right about the fractional money; this silver can not remain in circulation; it will be sent off to California, Oregon, Nevada, China, and Japan. But then, the *Times* said, after all, that is not a very serious matter, because grocers, saloon keepers, and merchants will all issue shinplasters to take the place of the fractional currency. The *Times* was very frank

as far as it went, but it failed to add that the people must pay $44,000,000 for the difference. Hardly worth it! [Applause.]

Now there is no discretion with the Secretary about this. He is compelled to take up the fractional currency with silver as rapidly as practicable. The mints are now running night and day coining silver for that purpose; and I predict that under that law, if executed, the people of this country will be left, within a year from this time, without one dollar of fractional money, whether paper or silver. [Applause.]

The law then requires him to buy gold and have $375,000,000 of it in the Treasury on the first of January, 1879, with which to redeem and destroy every dollar of greenback money now afloat. He will not get any part of that $375,000,000 in gold from revenues. Our revenues last year were a little short of our expenditures, and this year, a little in excess—the small surplus arising from the fact that Congress last winter added $35,000,000 to our taxes. The gentleman says that this increased taxation is all right, as the taxes were added on tobacco, whisky, and beer. He thinks it is no burden at all if you will collect it off of these articles—it is only rather a more effective mode of the crusade. [Applause.] His party slightly broke down at the old method of crusade last year. [Cheers.] They are trying it on in another form. Why, said my friend, you people have no right to complain of the $35,000,000 of extra tax, because you can avoid it all by giving up the use of tobacco, beer, and whisky! When they came to put on this additional tax, the Democrats tried to have it put on incomes, and the Republicans voted it down. [Applause.] Oh, no, these wealthy gentlemen experienced an income tax once and found it disagreeable to have every year, in some method, either by equivocation or false swearing, to dodge the tax, and therefore they made the Republican party repeal it. It is an unpleasant sort of a tax, and so they put the added burden of last winter, not on incomes, but on articles of common consumption, so that the day laborer shall pay as much of the tax as the rich man. [Applause.] It is simply the old and approved British method which puts more tax on the laborer's pipe than it does on the lord's land. [Laughter and applause.] I have read somewhere of a tavern in Shropshire called the "Four Alls." At the top of the sign in front of the tavern are the letters, A L L. On one side of the sign stands a soldier, representing the army and navy, pointing up to the letters and saying, "I fight for all." On the other side stands a clergyman of the established church, pointing up to the letters and saying, "I pray for all." In the middle sits the

Sovereign Majesty of England pointing up and saying, "I rule all." Below, entirely outside of the sign, and bearing the whole on his stooped shoulders, is the laborer pointing up and saying, "I *pay* for all." [Cheers.]

The Secretary can not get from revenues the money to buy $375,000,000 of gold with which to redeem and destroy the greenback. What, then, is his method of getting it? He may issue five per cent. gold bonds to the necessary amount. He has already sold $12,000,000 of bonds in Europe and bought up a lot of Germany's demonetized silver, and is now putting it through the mints. He must go on selling bonds, buying silver, taking up the fractional currency; selling bonds, buying gold, piling it up in the Treasury to be ready for that day of resumption when every greenback may be looked for to be presented at the Treasury with a demand for payment in gold. The Government can take no risk on that subject. It can not, like these associated banks during the panic, say, "We decline to pay, and what will you do about it?" Having pledged its word to pay, and people having bought the greenbacks with the expectation of payment, that good faith which the gentleman lectures about so strongly, compels it to be ready to pay every greenback on that day of resumption, and to do that it must add $375,000,000 more to the bonded debt of the United States. [Applause.]

But the greenback will not be presented, they say. Can the Government take the risk of its not being presented? and does it make any difference whether it is to be presented or not, if we must add $375,000,000 to our bonded debt in order to be ready to pay it if it shall be presented? But it will be presented. We have a constantly diminishing supply of gold in this country, arising from the fact that for the last two years our production of gold has fallen from an aggregate of $65,000,000 some few years ago, to an aggregate last year and this year of but $36,000,000; and from the further fact that we owe in Europe $150,000,000 of gold every year as interest on bonds of the Government, of railroads, of the States, and of cities. It is true we do not pay it all in gold; we pay part in products when the balance of trade happens to be in our favor, and part in making new debts, and the remainder by actual shipment of the treasure itself, which has gone on since the war at the rate of over $50,000,000 annually—an amount of shipment greater by $12,000,000 or $15,000,000 than the whole product of gold in the United States. The gentleman talks about the balance of trade being now settled in our favor. Well, I don't know about that. That depends on how the books are footed up.

It is notorious that no statement of the balance of trade is or can be accurate. It depends on the valuation, and the valuation depends like Sam Weller's method of spelling—"on the taste and fancy of the speller." [Laughter.] But we ship every year more gold than we produce, and vastly more than goes into coinage. The drain is constant and increasing. We have in all the United States but $160,000,000 of the precious metals now against $285,000,000 in 1860. Every year is lessening it; every year increasing the demand for gold interest. This resumption law itself will add $20,000,000 to the annual interest drain. Now, will any sane man pretend that, even if we could bring the gold over here with which to redeem and destroy our greenbacks, we can hold it here, with the banks and the governments of all nations struggling to obtain it as the foundation for their currency and their debt? Why, of course we can't keep it. It will be shipped abroad just as our gold now goes abroad; and the sum total of it will be that we will add this $419,000,000 to our bonded debt; will destroy our greenbacks and fractional currency, and will be thrown on the mercies of the banks for our paper money; and then within a year or two after resumption, if not immediately, the banks will do just as they did after the panic—agree among themselves, and say: "Yes, gentlemen, you are entitled to gold, but you can't have it." [Applause.]

And what will the Republican party do about it? Why, look at the way they treat the banks now. This banking act, which I have here, imposes on every bank officer an obligation, under the solemnity of his oath, to loan money only at the rate of interest authorized in the State in which the bank is. Do they do it? Has there been a loan made in Columbus for years past at eight per cent. interest? I venture to say not. Ten, twelve, fifteen, twenty—any thing they can get—without regard to the usury law of the State. They are sworn to obey that law. They are required to obey it by the law itself, but not by the administration which executes it. [Applause.] No official ever calls a bank officer in question about violating that law. No official called the banks in question when, after the panic, they agreed among themselves that the people should not have their own money out of the banks. The money was on deposit, the bank might be able to pay, yet it was understood and agreed among the largest national banks over the country that they simply would not pay. And so after 1879 they will have an understanding and agreement that they won't pay in gold, and you will have just about as much enforcement of the law requiring specie payment as

you now have of the act of Congress requiring obedience to the usury laws of the State. It is a trick to wrest from the people of the country the power to issue paper currency, which is the only currency that the business of this country can get, and to add to the burden of the people $419,000,000, under the plea that honesty and honor and public faith demand that they shall turn over this power to these national banks. [Applause.]

Now when the Republican party determined to rob the people of the right of paying the five-twenty bonds according to the contract, they did not tell you they were going to do it. They solemnly assured you they would not do it. And when they determined to rob you of the right of issuing paper money by the General Government, and to turn over the whole power to their pet corporations, did they advise you of the fact? Was this resumption law considered in open session and discussed? Not at all. That's not their style. It was concocted in the secret recesses of a congressional caucus. Not one word of the debate upon it among the leaders of the Republican party was ever suffered to go out to the people. [Applause.] They brought into their caucus Logan, Ferry, Morton, and all the Republicans that pretended to represent the business interests of the West, and got them to agree to this resumption law framed by Sherman and the other bullionists, and the law was reported practically from that caucus to the Senate, and not a Republican in the Senate opened his mouth in explanation of its provisions. Mr. Sherman, the representative of the people of Ohio, the representative of Democrats and Republicans alike, in introducing this measure which affects most profoundly the interests of the people—a measure fraught with more woe to the American people than any act ever passed by Congress—Mr. Sherman, the author and reporter of the law, when he came to the Senate, was asked: "Does this mean the destruction of the greenback?" He declined to answer. "Will we get the gold to buy these greenbacks from revenues?" He had nothing to say in response. And he left the Democrats there to speak and fight against the bill, and neither he, nor Morton, nor Ferry, nor Logan, ever said one word in explanation of its provisions; and when it went to the House they put it through by a party vote, under the gag of the previous question, without any body having a chance to open his mouth about it. The gentleman admits that it is a Republican measure, that it was passed solely by Republican votes, and that the Republican party is pledged to its execution. He is a little more frank than any other Republican that comes on the stump this year. You do not hear Sherman, or Morton, or Hayes talking about the specie re-

sumption law. Oh, no; they are talking about the terrible dangers to the country from the designs of the Pope against our common schools, [cheers] and asserting that the war of the Rebellion has to be fought over again. They in effect say: "You should not talk about this money question; you should look to the public schools and to the South—there is the danger! No danger to your business at all from the resumption law! Just be easy now, and let us carry out our finance measures, and do n't bother our North-eastern friends with your crude notions about the currency." [Laughter and cheers.] The great body of the Republican party of the West and South has been since the war in the position of the automaton chess-player. It has been the figure, and its hand has moved the pawns—Logan, Morton, Ferry, and all the rest—but the unseen intelligence that played the game has been that money power in the East, in whose interest and for whose aggrandizement every measure affecting the debt or currency has been contrived and executed, from the national bank law in 1864 to the resumption act in 1875. [Applause.]

Now, fellow-citizens, my friend says this is an inflation measure. Well, what in the world is he fighting us Democrats about inflation for if this Republican law is a measure of inflation? He says it effects inflation because whenever $100 of the new bank circulation is issued only $80 of the greenback is to be retired, and that the increase will be twenty per cent. by reason of the new bank circulation. Well, the proof of the pudding is in chewing the bag. What has this resumption law resulted in so far? Has it been a measure of expansion? The currency has been contracted since the first of July, 1874, within a fraction of $30,000,000. The national banks know perfectly well that if this law is to be executed the present volume of national bank circulation can't remain honestly and squarely redeemable in gold even after the whole of the $419,000,000 of greenbacks and fractional money have been destroyed. They have consequently retired their bank currency to the aggregate of over $29,000,000. It is no expansion measure, but a measure that has produced the full effects of contraction, by cancellation and hoarding combined, to at least $200,000,000 up to this day. It is a measure that says to every man that has money: "Hold on to your greenback, it will be worth seventeen per cent. more three years from now than it is to-day. You may lock it up in the safe, but you get a fair return by just holding it; and, above all, do n't trust it out in ordinary business. Do n't you see business men failing every-where? Do n't you see every industry depressed and struggling; houses that have been monuments of commercial success for genera-

tions tumbling and covering whole communities with their ruins? This is no time for men to loan money."

Money is the handmaid of business. Its office is to be loaned and to exchange for commodities. Business in this country is conducted by the young, energetic, intelligent, ambitious men, who have not accumulated fortunes, but are seeking to make fortunes by uniting their energy with the idle capital of men who are already rich. [Applause.] It is the desire to accumulate a fortune that makes men go into and continue in business; and so when men have accumulated wealth, they usually retire and loan out their money to men in business. But men, warned by the resumption law, have quit loaning. They have hoarded their money until it rises now like "Pelion on Ossa, Ossa on Pelion piled." They dare not loan it. Of course they can't take the ordinary chances of trade, or loan on securities such as business can offer. They will lend on mortgages if you put the price of property down to one-third its usual value. They will lend on Government bonds or any thing else that is better than money, and at two or three per cent. They have in effect shrunk from the business of the country, and business is now tottering and falling for want of that money which is its life-blood.

It is the work of the resumption law. It is the work of the steady policy of contraction adopted by the Republican party since the war.

It is the result of that policy which, according to the figures I have here, taken from the official tables, gives us to-day in this country—wholly excluding the interest-bearing treasury notes to the amount of $1,200,000,000, of which I have spoken—forty per cent. less of legal tenders and of national bank notes combined, in proportion to population, than we had in 1866. Under the pressure of that contraction men were compelled to use credit in place of currency. When we had a full currency in 1866, we had less credits by half than we had in 1873. Then a few wild railroad schemes, like that of Jay Cooke & Co., fell—schemes which had their origin, not in a redundant currency, as the gentleman says, but in land grants made by the Republican party to useless enterprises—and when they fell, the credit system of the country, which had taken the place of a full currency, fell with them. [Applause.] Hence the panic.

Now, fellow-citizens, I ask you, how is the business of the country, already prostrated, to pass through the next three years of further contraction of the currency, continued shrinkage of values, and continued doubt and timidity of the holders of money? It will perish in the passage. Not one business man in ten can stand it. Mr. Sherman tell us that it is only the debtors that will suffer. Who are the debtors?

Almost all business men are both debtors and creditors, and the failure of one knocks down another. As failures multiply, doubt and distrust extend, and men who stand eminent in the confidence of the community become affected by the general distrust, and the calamities falling on the few extend over the many, and finally cover all. It is a policy of disaster and ruin to the business of the country. It is a policy that will rob laborers of employment; will add to the million of unemployed men now in the country another million next year, and cover this land with pauperism and suffering and despair. [Applause.] For this return to a nominal gold payment, this return to the cheat of a bank currency, nominally redeemable in gold, we add $419,000,000 more to our interest-bearing national debt; we add at least seventeen per cent. or $1,360,000,000 more to the eight billions of dollars of currency debt now owed in this country, by shrinking the currency, and shrinking all values of labor and its products with which debts are paid. And we add these vast sums to the general and individual burdens, not by the natural process of growth and increase of wealth and rise of the currency to par with gold, but by the cunning contrivance of that money power in whose hands is lodged the great bulk of those securities, and who are to receive without equivalent the enormous wealth thus wrested from the people by a forced, unnatural, rascally resumption. [Great and prolonged applause.]

GOV. WOODFORD'S REPLY.

To-night the debate which began eight days ago among the coal mines of Shawnee, comes to its close in the capital of your great State. Before entering on this evening's discussion, I desire to recognize the uniform courtesy with which your distinguished fellow-citizen has met me upon every platform. If it shall be the judgment of your people that I have lost the honors of the debate, I shall at least have the satisfaction of feeling that I have gained a life-long friend. [Applause.]

We were invited to discuss the financial issues. By some strange mischance the "crusade," and the "bloody shirt," and the school-house have crept into our debate, and have come upon the platform. [Laughter and applause.] I fondly hoped that in our discussion at

Galion I had opened the door of that school-house; that I had dressed my friend in that shirt; and left him in the school-house studying the A B C of the one question we had engaged to debate. [Applause.]

There are one or two other little matters that have thrust themselves into this evening's meeting which possibly had better be cleared away before we get at the heart of the discussion.

My friend has cited Thomas Jefferson as favoring a governmental note, to be issued by authority of the Federal Government, and designed to be used as money among the people.

Here I wish the earnest, thoughtful attention of every Democrat in this audience. My distinguished opponent has said that Jefferson was the father of Democracy. Now, children, listen to your father. [Gov. Woodford here quoted the correspondence by Jefferson with John W. Eppes, reading it in full as in the debate at Tiffin. As it has already been given verbatim in the report of that debate on page 113 of this volume, it has not been thought necessary to reproduce it here.]

One would think that Jefferson was not only a good Democrat but also something of a prophet. When he wrote those words, "Listen not to the plea of projectors, speculators, and commercial gamblers;" do you not think that he had the recent Columbus convention clearly in view? [Applause.]

There is also one other matter which has been thrust into this debate. My friend has seen fit, conscientiously no doubt, to speak of the enormous moneyed power that is centered on the Atlantic coast. That plea, if it can have any effect on a Western audience, is to excite the prejudice of the Western people against the men of the Atlantic coast. I am sorry whenever I hear even a suggestion, however slight, of North against South, or East against West. That suggestion of sectional strife has already piled this debt mountain high, about which we discuss to-night. [Cheers.] That suggestion of sectional strife has ridged the Southern land with graves; has made the many widows and orphans, who still go mourning among our homes, and will not be comforted, because their dear ones are not.

I make no apology for standing here, a New Yorker on the soil of Ohio. [Cheers.] I am here not simply as a New Yorker to speak to men of the Buckeye State; I am here by the higher and absolute right of an American citizen [cheers] to plead with my fellow-countrymen.

Let me make but one additional suggestion on this point of section-

alism before I pass to more congenial themes. Can you suffer and we not suffer? To whom do we sell? From whom do you buy? Can the banker of New York be prosperous, if the Western bills of exchange are protested?

A voice.—"Who fixes the price?"

Gov. Woodford.—If you will be patient, my friend, I will try to tell you. [Laughter and applause.] I am sure from your kind, candid face that we shall agree when I get through. [Laughter and cheers.]

You ask me: "Who fixes the prices?" The gold price of every bushel of corn grown in the Scioto and Muskingum valleys, is fixed by the price at Liverpool. Deduct from the gold price at Liverpool the cost of transportation from Ohio to Liverpool, and you have the gold price in Ohio. Reduce that gold to its currency value, and you have the greenback price here. So, too, the price of iron is determined largely by its relation to the price of the like article produced abroad. And if you Democrats succeed in paying half the tariff duties in greenbacks, as your platform demands, I fear that you will hurt Ohio iron more than you will English. Who fixes the price? [Cheers.]

Now we have come to the real questions to be debated to-night. The issues of this debate and canvass are determined for my friend and myself by the Columbus Democratic platform. If I am correctly informed, he was chairman of the committee that reported the platform. Am I correct? If he, as chairman, reported the platform, and I have been invited to discuss the financial issues of this Ohio canvass, then to avoid all mistakes we will go directly to the Democratic platform itself.

The first controverted points are in its eighth resolution. That resolution declares "That the contraction of the currency heretofore made by the Republican party, and the further contraction proposed by it, with a view to the forced resumption of specie payment, has already brought disaster to the business of this country and threatens it with general bankruptcy and ruin."

The first statement is "the contraction caused by the Republican party." There is a very serious doubt whether there has been any contraction of the legal tender currency. Statisticians, of at least equal eminence with my friend, say that the volume of legal tender and bank notes in circulation to-day is larger than at any previous time in our history. They make up the figures as follows:

YEARS.	National Bank Notes........	Greenbacks, Fract'l Currency, Dem'd Notes, Com. Int. Notes, 1 and 2 Year, and Coupon Notes of 1863........	Total Circulation.
1869........................	$295,312,160	$391,649,558	$636,961,718
1870........................	293,406,407	398,430,562	691,836,969
1871........................	309,761,938	397,699,652	707,461,590
1872........................	328,793,687	399,245,363	728,039,040
1873........................	340,012,574	401,527,267	741,640,241
1874........................	339,547,761	428,517,693	768,095,457
1875........................	351,869,008	421,237,050	773,106,058

But my friend takes 1865 as the date from which he computes his alleged contraction, and estimates all the seven-thirties as if they had been legal tender circulation. Whatever contraction occurred between 1865 and 1869, was the joint and equal work of both political parties, Democratic and Republican alike.

When Secretary McCulloch recommended the contraction of the currency, which he did in December, 1865, the following resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives: "That this House cordially concur in the views of the Treasury in relation to the necessity of a contraction of the currency, with a view to as early resumption of specie payments as the business interests of the country will permit. And we hereby pledge co-operative action to this end as speedily as possible." The resolution was adopted, without even reference to a committee, by a vote of 144 in the affirmative, against only 6 in the negative. There were in the House of Representatives that afternoon 32 Democrats, all told, and of them 31 voted for the resolution and only one against. [Cheers.]

On the 12th of April, 1866, a bill was passed to carry out the purpose of that resolution. By that time Andrew Johnson, although elected as a Republican, had become a reasonably good Democrat. And in April, 1866, on the passage of the bill to carry out the recommendation of that resolution, only one of all the Democrats in the House of Representatives voted "*nay.*" In the Senate the bill was passed, and all the negative votes were unfortunately cast by Republicans. So it was not Republican contraction. [Laughter.]

But my friend will tell you that the Republicans then had control of Congress, and that, therefore, they were responsible for its legislation.

Let me pause for one moment right here and speak one direct and earnest word in regard to this matter of partisan responsibility. No party justly carries the conscience and judgment of any representative or senator. Every man who, with his hand on the Bible, has sworn to uphold the Constitution and maintain the law, is bound to do it *as citizen, and not as partisan.* [Cheers.]

You and I were citizens before we became partisans. We shall be citizens after we have ceased to be partisans. No man's Democracy can shield him in the wrong. No man's Republicanism should shield him in the wrong. When my party errs, I should set it right; or, failing in that, should strike it down. When your party errs, you should set it right; or, failing in that, should strike it down.

Let me say frankly to-night, that I bear in this discussion no "*free lance*" that belongs to my party, right or wrong. [Cheers.] As a citizen I am pledged by the vow of knighthood to succor the distressed, to right the wrong, and help to do justice between the high and the low. As I said at Youngstown, when my canvass of your State began, so in closing at your capital, let me say to-night, whenever the Republican party swerves one hair from the royal road of financial integrity and strict preservation of the public faith, cast that Republican party out and bury it among the great achievements of its mighty past. With your faces toward the sunrise and your backs upon the past, do your duty by State and nation first and all the time, but never in the sole interest of politician or of party. [Applause.]

The next clause in this Democratic platform of Ohio, is "the further contraction," which my friend and the Democratic platform alike charge as the purpose of the Republican party. Let us frankly meet the issue; and instead of quoting from memory, permit me to read this much-abused resumption law:

"*An act for the resumption of specie payment. Be it enacted, etc.*, That the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized and required, as rapidly as practicable, to cause to be coined, at the mints of the United States, silver coins of the denominations of ten, twenty-five, and fifty cents, of standard value, and to use them in redemption of an equal number and amount of fractional currency of similar denominations; or at his discretion"—my friend says you never saw any of it out here in Ohio, you know—"he may issue such silver coins through the mints"—there are mints elsewhere than in New York—"through the sub-treasuries"—there are sub-treasuries elsewhere than in New

York—"the public depositories"—nearly every national bank is a public depository—"the post-offices of the United States"—and there is one in every village all over the land. So that when the silver coin shall have been provided it will be distributed all over the land, and the postmasters will be authorized, just as they receive and give money orders now, to redeem the fractional currency that any man may present at the post-offices.

My friend says that the silver, when issued, will not float. I suppose that you are all aware that the silver dollar does not contain a dollar's worth of silver. The gold dollar does contain a dollar's worth of gold. But the silver dollar is, to use the technical phrase, a debased coin; there is not a dollar's worth of silver in it. I have hitherto said that it will float whenever gold is at 108. On revising my figures I am justified in saying now that it will float whenever gold is at 110, with absolute certainty. That is, when it takes $1.10 in greenbacks and fractional currency to buy a dollar in gold, a dollar in silver will be worth just as much as the greenback dollar—no more, no less. So that with gold at or below 110, there will be no object in hoarding or retiring silver. Dr. Linderman, the superintendent of the mint, says silver will float with gold at 111; but at 110, the figures, when worked out or ciphered on the slate, demonstrate positively that it will float. Whenever, then, we get and keep gold down to 110, we shall be able to maintain silver in circulation.

But you say to me, at once, this is not honest specie resumption, if silver is debased coin. For that reason, silver is only a legal tender, under the law as it stands to-day, in amounts not exceeding five dollars. You never could make any body take more than five dollars of silver in payment of debt. So, too, you can only make him take twenty-five cents in coppers and nickels. But gold is legal tender in all amounts. So that long before gold has come down to an equality with greenbacks, silver money will be floating and circulating among the people.

My friend, until yesterday, figured from the monthly Treasury reports that $2,600,000 of fractional money had already been retired, and exchanged for silver. He used to say, with a good deal of very positive and effective eloquence, to all the audiences that we addressed: "Now there have been $2,600,000 of this fractional money retired, and silver coin issued in its place. Have you seen a dime of it? You are entitled to some out here. Have you got any of it?"

It occurred to me, after a time, that possibly he was mistaken, and that no fractional currency had been redeemed in silver. So I tele-

graphed to the Secretary of the Treasury, and asked him whether any of it had been redeemed; and yesterday I received this telegram which I will read to you: "No fractional currency has been redeemed in silver under the specie resumption law." [Applause.]

Then how comes it that the amount of fractional currency in circulation is less than it was say two months ago. The explanation is simply this. As that fractional currency comes in, being paid in to the Government at different places, a great deal of it is found to be almost worn out, so worn out that the Government does not reissue it. Then what does the Government do? All of this worn and defaced currency is taken and put together. Its amount is subtracted from the total of the debt that is due on one side of the balance sheet, and subtracted from the amount of the fractional currency that is reported as in the Treasury, on the other. So being taken off of both sides of the balance sheet, it does not affect the total result. This defaced currency is then taken to the canceling room, where the numbers are all taken, and it is then burnt up and destroyed. Then new fractional currency of the same kind and amounts is printed. This is brought into the Treasury room. Then it is again put upon the debt statement as so much fractional currency owing on one side, and so much in hand, on the other; and the entire result, as you see, is not changed. My friend was accidentally, as in the Jefferson matter, slightly mistaken. [Laughter.]

Then the next section of this resumption law reads as follows: "That so much of section 3524 of the Revised Statutes of the United States as provides for a charge of one-fifth of one per cent. for converting standard gold bullion into coin is hereby repealed, and hereafter no charge shall be made for such service." This hardly requires comment.

The next section makes banking absolutely free; so that if any body desires to go into the banking business, he can put up the capital and engage in it the same as in any other business. But my friend might suggest, that makes it a monopoly, because only rich men can go into it. Tell me what kind of business there is that you can go into without some amount of capital? [Applause.] Suppose you wanted to open a grocery store; you must have capital or credit. Do you know of any kind of business that a man can go into without capital? That which would require the least would be to get a patent and a franchise for making greenbacks, [laughter] for then you would only require a small printing press, and very little paper and ink, and you could literally *make* money. [Applause.]

But my friend argues that this law contracts the currency, and that greenbacks are steadily retired under this law. Yes; for every $100 in bank bills that are issued, $80 in greenbacks are retired. Where is the contraction in that? One hundred dollars go out and eighty come in. Are there not twenty dollars more out than there were when you started? After the amount of greenbacks is reduced to $300,000,000, there can be no further contraction of the greenbacks, no matter how much national bank currency is put out. Where is the contraction there?

But then my friend says that the process of getting ready for resumption is retiring the national bank notes. Do you think so? The proposed resumption is decreed for the first of January, 1879. No one will have to resume even on the 31st of December, 1878. Now, if there is so much profit in national banking, if there is so much money to be made out of this banking business, why do not these bankers keep on making money till the autumn of 1878, then go out of the business and pocket the profit from now till then, and then get the gold upon their greenbacks? [Applause.]

Ah! but my friend claims that the fear of resumption is paralyzing business. Did a farmer plant one hill less of corn this last summer because of the resumption law? [Laughter.] Will not corn bring gold to-day? Men must eat in spite of the resumption law. [Laughter.] Will not pork bring gold to-day? Men must eat in spite of the resumption law. Will not wool bring gold to-day? Men must have clothing in spite of the resumption law.

Wherever there is any thing made to-day that any body else needs, that thing can be sold, and it will pay to make or produce it. But it does not pay to make things of which there is already a surplus in the market, and for which there is no demand. Pile your greenbacks mountain high, you can not sell things that people do not want. [Applause.] So I doubt if the resumption law has frozen Ohio stiff this summer. [Applause.]

My friend then argued that men are hoarding the greenbacks down in Wall Street, waiting for the rise in their value; waiting to realize the seventeen per cent. premium on gold. Let us see how that works. Those New Yorkers are now getting about three per cent. per annum on their money. It is more than three years from now until resumption. Three times three are nine. They will then get seventeen per cent. premium on their greenbacks. Nine and seventeen are twenty-six. They make out of the entire transaction in three years twenty-six per cent. Suppose that they should lend their money on good secur-

ity in Ohio or elsewhere at eight per cent. per annum. They would then get twenty-four per cent. interest on their loan, and then when the greenbacks were paid in gold, they would realize the seventeen per cent. premium on the gold, and they would thus make fifteen per cent. more by lending it out and doing something with it than by hoarding it. [Applause.] Those Wall Street men, my friend thinks, are smart. [Laughter.] I can assure him now, and being a lawyer by profession I have had a good many New Yorkers for clients, I never had one so stupid that he would financier in that kind of a way. [Laughter and applause.]

Money is not being actively used. That is true. Let me illustrate by a case in point. A great mercantile house in New York had an opportunity last summer to use about half a million of dollars in the purchase of a leading staple article. They had notes from all over the West, given by Western merchants in payment of goods. That house went to a bank, with which I am acquainted, and the bank wanted legal interest on the discount of the paper. They then took the notes to a broker on Wall Street, and he sold them on the street at the rate of four and a half per cent. per annum, because the money could not find safe and, at the same time, profitable employment there or elsewhere at a higher rate.

But my friend asks: Why does the money stay there idle? Simply because since 1867 Ohio and the other great Western States, through Mr. Pendleton and other leading men, have been trying to establish the wonderful financial principle that you can pay one note by giving another. [Applause.]

My friend claims that resumption will add seventeen per cent. to the present enormous indebtedness of the country. That is, he argues that if you now paid your present debts in greenbacks you could pay them in something worth seventeen cents on the dollar less than the gold or gold-bearing greenbacks, which you will have to use in payment of your debts after resumption shall have taken place. He claims that this will be a wrong to the debtor class. Now follow his logic out. If you issue enough paper to advance gold one per cent., then you help the debtor class one per cent. Do you not? If you issue enough paper to put gold up ten per cent., then if his logic be correct, you help the debtor class ten per cent. If you issue enough of your paper to make it worth only one per cent. on the dollar, you will help the debtor class ninety-nine cents on the dollar, and enable them to pay off their debts with one cent on the dollar. Is not that literally true? If bringing gold down does the debtor class wrong,

then putting gold up does the debtor class good. If you only can get so much paper out that it will not be worth any thing, why then the debtor class will have their debts all paid. Where can you escape from the logic?

My friend keeps on suggesting that terrible wrong is done to the debtor class. It was to avoid all semblance of wrong that, when the resumption law was passed, four years were given to adjust the business of the country to its requirements. Even then that law says to no man, "You shall pay your debt in gold." It says to no bank, "You shall pay your debt in gold." It does say this: "As the Government was benefited by the forced loan of the greenback; as all this disturbance of values was thrown into your business by this abnormal kind of money, so the Government, that received the benefit, should bear the loss. Therefore this resumption law provides that the Government must get the necessary gold at its cost and charge, so that every body shall have the gold for his greenbacks.

This law puts the credit of the Government under the vast load of our indebtedness. It will not do what the old English scheme did—crush the debtor class down from above. But it will make the greenback gold, and so, just as you lift a house, when you raise it into the air a foot higher and put a strong foundation under it, this law seeks to put the credit of this great nation under the business of the country, and lift your paper money up, so that every man who now has a greenback dollar shall then have a gold dollar that the nation has given him. [Cheers.]

This resumption law may not be all that it should be. The time may have been fixed too far ahead; it may have been fixed too near. It may be that as we come to the appointed hour, it will not be possible for the Government to resume. The Republican party does not say that under any and all circumstances it will enforce this law as against the interests of the people. It does say this: "We will try honestly and resolutely, to enforce this law in the true interest of the people." If we find that in any respect it is either wrong or that it will not work, then we will do what the Republican party has always claimed the right and the privilege of doing; we will try to be honest, and at the same time to take care of the industries of the people. [Cheers.]

Do we not try faithfully to care for these industries now? Have we not cared for the farmer, so that it pays to raise wool in the State of Ohio? Have we not cared for the coal interests of the Hocking Valley? Have we not cared for the iron interests of the State of Ohio?

Where has labor raised its strong arm, where has the furnace flung out its fiery banner, where has industry called to the Government for help, that the Republican party has not, by prompt and responsive laws, sought to protect American interests and American labor? [Cheers.]

We propose to stand by American industry. We do not propose, until greenbacks become as good as gold, to put a premium on foreign importations by practically reducing the tariff through paying one-half of the duties in greenbacks. [Applause.]

Will not the payment of one-half duties in greenbacks, as required by this Democratic platform, reduce the duties very greatly? Let me prove this. An importer brings here $200,000 worth of foreign articles, the duty on which is $100,000. He now has to pay his duties in gold. If he has to buy the gold, he pays seventeen per cent. premium. Then his duties, at a greenback valuation, cost him $117,000. Do they not? But if he can pay one-half in greenbacks, he has only got to buy one-half in gold; and his duties will cost him, at a greenback valuation, but $108,500. Is not that so? Does not that $8,500 just so far protect the English and the foreign manufacturer against the American manufacturer? [Voices, "Yes," "yes," and applause.]

My friend wants to take care of American industry by practically striking down the tariff that protects American labor. [Cheers.]

I have said that the resumption law may not be all that we desire. If it is not we will try to make it right. We started for Richmond a good many times [cheers], and we tried it a good many ways. At last some Ohio soldiers taught us how to go. [Cheers.] So let Ohio now point the way towards specie resumption, and "we will fight it out on this line if it takes all summer."

But, for the sake of argument, I will grant my friend all that he desires. Suppose that the specie resumption law were repealed to-night. Suppose it were off the statute-book. He thinks it the only issue of the campaign. Would you, my Democratic friends, be satisfied?

A voice.—Yes.

Gov. Woodford.—Who was that kind friend that said yes? [Laughter.]

Then I have one more good Democrat three-fourths converted. My friend says that he will be contented with the specie resumption law repealed.

The same voice.—Certainly.

Gov. Woodford.—Now the platform of the Democratic party in Ohio not only demands that this policy of contraction be abandoned,

and this resumption law be repealed, but this platform goes on to say, "And that the volume of the currency be made and kept equal to the wants of trade."

The same voice.—I am in full accord, Governor, in full accord.

Gov. Woodford.—Then I have redeemed one greenback already.

Now, my Democratic brothers, when I was down at Shawnee, among those earnest and honest laboring men, the cry that met their gallant champion was, not for the repeal of the specie resumption law, but, "*more greenbacks.*" And when a party of the most stalwart and fine-looking fellows that I have seen for many a day, came down from Columbus to greet their champion at Lancaster, their ringing welcome uttered all through his eloquent speech, was, "*more greenbacks,*" "*more greenbacks.*" [Applause.]

The specie resumption law is only the fence that keeps the wild cattle in. Take down the specie resumption law, and the wild cattle will come out. They want to repeal the specie resumption law, in the language of their platform, so that the volume of the currency be made and kept equal to the demands of trade.

Their is no fair-minded man in this audience but knows that this is their purpose. If you have heard their candidate for Lieutenant-Governor speak, what word has he uttered except "more money for the people?" If you have heard the distinguished and aged gentleman, who is their candidate for Governor, speak, it has been "more money for the people." It has only been since we pinned this heresy of inflation with a "free lance," into the earth, that they have begun saying that "it is not inflation that they want," that they only seek to get rid of the odious specie resumption law. [Applause.]

My Democratic brother, give me candid hearing. If the volume of the currency is sufficient now, why did your platform say that it "*be made?*" Do you "make" what already is? If there is enough now, is there any thing to be made? You make what is not, so that it may thereafter have existence. It is to be "*kept.*" If what you make to-day is not sufficient, more is to be made to-morrow. The volume is to be *kept* equal to the demands of trade. The first step is, down with the resumption law. The second step is, to make the volume of currency and keep it equal to the demands of trade. That is in the Democratic platform so clear, so plain, that it can not be gainsaid.

Let us discuss this matter of inflation a little further. In the opening meeting at Shawnee, I ventured to say that I believed that the principal question demanding our attention was this: Shall the Government, of its own sovereign authority, print, and hereafter continue

to print irredeemable paper and stamp it with the alluring name of money, and make it a legal tender in the payment of debt? On that night, in that same debate, my distinguished friend used the following words. That I may do him no injustice, I quote from the stenographic report: "The gentleman states what he understands to be the issue that we are to discuss to-night. His blanket doesn't cover the horse. So far as he states it, I have no special reason to complain; but he states only a fragment of the issue. He says the question is whether this Government shall issue legal tender paper money—for that it is, stripped of its gloss. I am willing to accept that issue. We say it has the right to issue it, and it ought to issue it."

Thus we have the question squarely presented. For one, I do not believe that the Government ought to issue paper money.

In the first place, I don't believe that in time of peace it has the constitutional authority. I am not going to pause to argue that at length now. In time of war it may have had the right, but in time of peace it has not. So Daniel Webster declared. So said Andrew Jackson. So said Thomas H. Benton. Until the war of the rebellion we never heard the claim seriously urged that the Government could make, print, and circulate a legal tender paper money in time of peace.

But possibly the power may be constitutional. My friend may succeed in demonstrating to you that it is. But let me ask your attention to this very serious question. If possibly it be constitutional to print legal tender in time of peace, is it not a very dangerous power to exercise? Does it not tend inevitably to centralize all power in the Government at Washington?

You Democrats blamed us Republicans because in time of war we used the centralization of the sword. You then plead for the reserved rights of the State. You then plead against uniting and centralizing the military power of this great Government in the central authority at Washington. And yet, in this time of peace, when there is no rebellion to be overthrown, when there are no enemies to be put down, you would substitute for the centralization of the sword the centralization of the purse. This is the more dangerous power to-day. And why? You would give to that Government at Washington the right to regulate all your financial business. If, of its own sovereign will and in its own sovereign way, it may regulate the volume of money, it may also regulate the volume of business that you may do. It may regulate the price of your wages. It may regulate the price of your corn. You thus change our government into a parental government, a patriarchal government, like the old monarchies across the ocean.

This is a nation and yet it is a government of delegated powers. The central authority at Washington has just such powers as the people have given it to enable it to discharge its functions. No more; no less. That was the essence of the old democratic idea; but the Democrats carried this doctrine to such an extreme assertion of State rights that they practically destroyed the essential, central idea of our nationality.

In the time of the rebellion, in order that we might save our land—because the highest national right that a nation can have is the right to live—we exercised all necessary power. We fought the war. Where in the Constitution was there a line of authority to free a single slave? [Cheers.] But because slavery stood in the way of the life of the nation, because it was there barring the advance of your brave boys in blue, we slew slavery. [Cheers.] We smote it down without the authority of the Constitution, that we might save the nation alive.

And now, when the rebellion is ended, the party that stood by liberty and law and union, says: "In these happy hours let us come back to the old ways of peace, to the old interpretation of the Constitution of the fathers." [Applause.]

While we are seeking this, our Democratic opponents are trying to take the entire money power and concentrate it into the hands of Congress; that Congress may determine the value of every day's labor; *that* Congress may determine the price of every bushel of corn. We say no. In the language of the Democratic platform, the Republicans really want the volume of the currency to be regulated by the demands of trade. [Applause.] But we want trade to do it and not the politicians. [Prolonged cheers.]

What a happy time you would have on the currency question, with General Cary in Congress from the Cincinnati district, saying: "We need more greenbacks. Oh! print them, print them, print them." [Laughter and applause.] With Governor Allen there from the Chillicothe district, with one eye on the presidential chair and the other on a pile of crisp new legal tenders, saying: "Do whatever you like so long as you nominate me for the presidency." [Laughter and cheers.] With my friend, Gen. Ewing, there, from the Columbus district, saying, with his grave candor and wisdom: "I don't know whether we need more greenbacks or not." With my friend Vorhees, of Indiana, saying: "We want to print at least $1,500,000,000 more of them so that we may surely have enough all round." [Laughter and cheers.]

What business could you safely do? Before every presidential elec-

tion now your business is paralyzed, waiting to know what shall be the financial policy of the party that may come into power.

If Congress is to have the right of saying: "We will print $200,000,000 of greenbacks this next year," or, "We will call in $200,000,000," I am inclined to think that Congressmen could make new rings pretty rapidly—rings that would outstrip in corruption any thing that was ever done or dreamed before by either Republican or Democrat in the city of Washington. [Applause.]

You Democrats—because to you do I most love to address myself—must have a hard time keeping up with your party. [Laughter and applause.] In 1864 you resolved that the war for the Union was a failure. In 1868 you resolved that it was a success. [Laughter.] In 1868 you wanted to pay the bonds in greenbacks. By 1872—listen to the National Democratic Convention: "*The public credit must be sacredly maintained.*" This is not Mr. Woodford; this is the National Democratic Convention presided over by the spirit of Thomas Jefferson. [Laughter and applause.] "The public credit must be sacredly maintained, and we denounce repudiation in every form. A speedy return to specie payment is demanded alike by the highest considerations of commercial morality and honest government." [Applause.]

There is a slight discrepancy between that platform and the one that my friend is endeavoring to uphold before you to-night. [Laughter.] My Democratic brothers, if you were honest in 1872, and believed these utterances of yours then, please try and explain to yourselves how you can vote against the same principles now. The change of party name does not change the principle. Democracy, when it emerged from the fire of the Rebellion, had but one principle of old Democracy left in it, and that was "*hard money.*" Alas! the last rag is burnt off now. [Cheers.]

Not only does such proposed exercise of power centralize authority in the national Government, but it can not be exercised without the possibility—nay, without the certainty, of terrible governmental corruption. Let me tell you why. A number of different schemes are before Congress. One asks for money to tunnel the Rocky Mountains. Another asks for money to build some railroad. The third seeks to build a canal. All these interests log-roll together to pass their bills. Congress does not have to levy a tax if they can simply print new greenbacks. They are held to no accountability. They simply print what paper money is necessary. The last check of accountability is taken from your public servants. Remember this, and think of it seriously.

To-day if Congress proposes to vote money, it has to do one of two things. If the money is not in the Treasury, it either has to provide a tax in the form of tariff or internal revenue to raise the money; or it must go out and borrow it, and so directly add it to the national debt. If you adopt the principle of allowing Congress to print what greenbacks it pleases, do not you see, as clearly as the sunlight, that every kind of corruption and jobbery would run riot throughout the federal capital, and the people would be powerless to check their representatives, because the printing press *alone* would do the work? [Cheers.]

I agree with my friend that the Government should furnish the money of the people. But it should be the money that is recognized by the old Constitution—gold and silver. The Government can not coin money unless it has bullion; bullion that is money to-day, that was money yesterday, that will be money to-morrow; money that politicians can not unmake; the money of the common people. [Applause.]

My Democratic friends talk about the gold gamblers of Wall Street. Let me make one suggestion. Bear it in your thoughtful memory. Whoever heard of gambling in gold when gold was money? It was only when gold ceased to be money, and became an article of merchandise, that men gambled in it. Men gamble in corn. They do *not* gamble in the size of the bushel. They gamble in wheat. They do not gamble in the size of the bushel. They gamble in pork. They do not gamble in the weight of the pound. Money is to value what the bushel is to quantity, what the yardstick is to length, what the pound is to weight. When you have a stable money that will not change, men can not gamble in it. When you have made gold to be money once again, so that it shall be worth no more to-morrow than it is to-day, you will have forever crushed the gold gamblers of Wall Street. [Cheers.] But just so long as you leave a difference between paper and gold, you are encouraging gold gambling.

There are two kinds of capital in New York, as there are all over the land. There is the kind of capital that is withheld from active business and that simply fattens on interest; and there is the capital that is controlled by strong, brave men, that is used in business, in manufactures, and in trade. The capital that such men hold is in business to-day, or it will go there as soon as you make business stable and profitable. But the money that lies in the broker shops of Wall Street, that gambles in gold and that lives on the needs of industry, always thrives and grows fat and strong when the poor laboring man

gets a depreciated paper dollar, and the gold gambler alone holds the real measure of value. [Applause.]

But that is not all. This Democratic platform proposes "the prompt retirement of the national bank currency." My friend has admitted that the bonds must all be paid in gold. He says that I speak in tones of jubilee in regard to this. There is no jubilee ringing in my voice. I am simply stating the hard legal fact, that all the bonds are now practically payable in gold. This my friend is forced to admit. Under the terms of the law, as it now stands, all the bonds are, or can be made, payable in gold before their maturity. Then if the bond-holder is already secure, how is the bill-holder to be helped by issuing more greenbacks? How is my friend to get his new greenbacks out? I asked him at Circleville, and with direct, manly frankness, he said: "By going into the market and buying up bonds."

This new Democratic scheme of finance contemplates, then, retiring the bank currency on one side, and using the new greenbacks in buying up bonds on the other. Let us see how this is going to work. This bank currency belongs to the banks all over the land. All your business is done through the banks. Every trader, every merchant, every manufacturer, keeps his account in some bank. You trade with checks. You pay in checks, and you receive checks. You have a note of your neighbor's; you want to use the money on it; you go to a bank and you get it discounted. Your notes have been discounted by the banks all over the country. The bank circulation is to be retired promptly, is it? How will the banks get their bills? There are $350,000,000 of them out and in circulation now. They must either get those bills and carry them to Washington, to take up their bonds, or they must get greenbacks, take them to Washington, and deposit the greenbacks in the Treasury, there to remain until the national bank notes come in for redemption or exchange. So that whether the banks retire bank bills or greenbacks, $350,000,000, the amount of the present circulation, is to be taken out of the active business of the country.

How can you withdraw $350,000,000 without disturbing and breaking your business all over the land? The banks must stop discounting. You go to a bank and want money. The banker replies at once: "No, we can not give it to you. The banks are to be broken up. Our circulation is to be retired. We are forced to get in our bills and send them to Washington."

Three hundred and fifty millions of dollars in paper money, either bank bills or greenbacks, are to be taken out of the active circula-

tion of the country. That, you see, is inevitable. It goes, where? Out of the business of the country; out of the stores; out of the shops; out of the large farms; out of the pockets of the people, and goes to the Treasury at Washington.

Then how are the new greenbacks to be put in circulation. My friend will go to Wall Street and buy, in the open market there, the bonds of the people, and pay for them in his new greenbacks. Your complaint about this money matter now, is that there is already too much money there and too little here. Your remedy is to haul $350,000,000 out of the active business circulation of the entire land, and expend $350,000,000 with the gold gamblers and the bond-holders of Wall Street. [Applause.]

There is no thoughtful man but must see and realize what madness of finance, what mockery of statesmanship it is, to pull $350,000,000 out of the business circulation of the country and thrust $350,000,000 additional into Wall Street, where the money is not wanted to-day.

If you succeed in working this new miracle of finance, I fear you will have to print some more greenbacks, whether you believe in inflation or not. [Laughter.] You will then have to start your printing presses whether you will or no.

How are you to get your new greenbacks out? Are you going into reckless expenditure to get rid of them? Are you going to do as a Democrat, with very serious face, suggested to me at Tiffin, yesterday? "Why," said he, "it is not going to be difficult to distribute these greenbacks." "How, my friend," I asked him, "are you going to get them out?" "Why—why—why—send people through the country to give them to every body who wants them, and take their vouchers and file them at Washington." [Laughter and applause.]

The distinguished Mr. Samuel Cox, long time a member of Congress from Ohio, had even a better plan than that. He rose one day, after one of these Western gentlemen had been discussing inflation, and offered this resolution in the House: "*Resolved,* That from and after this date every greenback and bank note in the country shall be taken as a legal tender for twice its present face value." [Laughter and cheers.] That would have inflated the currency just double the amount at once, and there would have been no trouble about it. [Laughter.]

But, seriously, how are you going to get them out? Suppose that they were all here to-night, piled on this platform, how could you

get them out? If you buy more bonds in Wall Street, Wall Street gets them all. If you retire more bank notes in the country, the country loses the little that it has. This magnificent system of finance has this only to recommend it. It is Scriptural in its suggestion, for, when you have done, to him that hath would have been given, and from him that had not, would have been taken away, even the little that the poor fellow had. [Laughter and cheers.]

Let me repeat to-night the illustration I have elsewhere used. I know of but five ways to get money out. I can not pack it into shorter space, or give it to you in more homeopathic form than this. I do wish you to take it away with you and ponder seriously upon it. If you have any thing to sell, and some body else wants to buy, you can sell. He buys, and then you have more greenbacks. If you can do some kind of work better than he, you can work and he can hire. Then you have more greenbacks. If you want to borrow and your credit is good, you can borrow and he can lend, and then you have more greenbacks. Or, if you are "hard up," and he is generous, you can beg and he can give, and then you have more greenbacks. [Laughter.] Or, if you happen to have been thoroughly indoctrinated with the essence of the Columbus Inflation Convention, you can steal the greenbacks and then you have got them. [Laughter and cheers.] I do not mean to use these words discourteously.

Said Andrew Jackson: "No system has ever been devised for robbing the laborer of the fruits of his toil like an irredeemable paper currency. It makes the rich forever richer, and the poor forever poorer." [Cheers.]

When you have at last gotten this new paper money afloat, where will its ultimate loss always fall? Always on the laboring poor. The rich man, when panic and disaster come, may live on what he has gathered from the earnings of other days, or from what his ancestors have left him. But the poor man, with wife and children pleading for shelter, for clothing, and for bread, has nothing between him and them and actual want, but the strong arm and earnest will that God has given him. Then, in that hour he must work; he must take for pay whatever paper is circulating in the country; and at the end the rich man will have gotten rid of all of his worthless paper and the poor man—God help him—will stand with the paper rags griped in the fist of honest toil. [Cheers.]

I would not dare, in the solemnity of this parting hour, to appeal to your prejudice or your passion. I have naught to say about the whisky that you drink or the pipe that you smoke. I have naught

to say that shall make any man uneasy in the lot where he has been placed—naught that shall kindle communistic passion or inflame prejudice.

In this parting hour I would simply leave with you this last appeal. There is but one sure way to attain a competence. It is by industry, by economy, by integrity. Some men may gamble into fortunes; but of the hundred who thus reach after wealth, ninety-nine fall and die by the way. I leave with you to-night, men of Ohio, the old, hard lesson: "In the sweat of our brows we must eat our daily bread." We must work. We must save. I know myself what it is and what it means to have been poor. But energy, industry, and resolution will always conquer in the long run. Working men of Columbus, while I plead with you to-night, do not dream that by some gambling chicanery of finance, do not dream that by some mysterious legerdemain, do not dream that by some magic printer's ink and printing press, you can create money either for yourselves or for your nation. We must work for all that we have. We must save all that we keep. Let us go back to the old paths of industry and integrity. Let us make our nation absolutely honest, and thus protect the *bill-holder* as well as the bond-holder. [Prolonged cheering.]

[*Time expired.*]

GENERAL EWING'S REJOINDER.

Fellow-Citizens:—

I reciprocate very cordially the sentiment of personal kindness and regard with which my friend from New York closes on his part this series of debates.

I have felt throughout these discussions considerable embarrassment arising both from want of fitness, and want of preparation, for the peculiar character of controversy in which we have been engaged. I lack the faculty of imagination which so largely predominates in my friend from New York. [Cheers.] I have no store of sky rockets to send fizzing from the platform, [cheers] to burst in splendor in mid-air, dazzling and bewildering the audience. [Cheers.] I feel a difficulty in answering him because of his splendid rhetoric. His arguments are

———"Like poppies spread,
You seize the flower, the bloom is shed;
Or like the borealis' race,
That flit ere you can point their place;
Or like the snow falls in the river,
A moment white, then melt forever."

["Good," "good," and applause.]

I have been unable in these discussions to tell what in the world landing on Mt. Ararat had to do with specie payment [cheers]; or to get in my mind a proper conception of the figure by which he seems to present himself as Moses coming down from Mt. Sinai. [Applause.] According to my plain reading of the Scriptures, I supposed that Moses, when he descended the mount, found *Aaron* making, and persuading the people to worship, the golden calf. [Laughter and cheers.] His figure turns me about, and seems to represent the people of Ohio as the worshipers of the calf, and himself, fresh from Wall Street, as the outraged bearer of the tables of the law. [Cheers.]

I was not supplied either, as a fit preparation for these debates, with old coins and bills, with which to give "object lessons" at our kindergarten schools. [Laughter and cheers.] Now, I blame John Thompson for that. [Laughter.] He knew that a large part of the effectiveness of the discussion in which I was being engaged would depend on having the very coins to show to the people. Why, he knew all about that coin of the Dutch Republic that has been shown around the State by my friend. He ought to have obtained for me one of the coins dug by Schliemann and other antiquarians, from the ruins of the cities of Asia Minor—not only antedating the coin of the Dutch Republic, but going back to a civilization "ere Romulus and Remus had been suckled." [Applause.] If I had had one of those coins, I could have shown how it contains just as much copper now as it did then. [Laughter.] The chairman of the Democratic State Executive Committee ought to have endeavored to get for me, also, one of the notes of the Republic of Venice, issued by that Republic in the thirteenth century; never payable in coin; containing no promise, as this offensive greenback does, for payment in coin; and which was a legal tender between man and man, and between citizens and the State. That legal tender money, the first paper money probably ever issued in the world, did more than all else to establish the commercial power of Venice, and make her the peerless monarch of the seas [applause]; a currency that always stood above par in gold and silver; that was never repudiated, as the gentleman says all legal tender paper money

issued by a government in time of peace, must inevitably be; and which for 500 years discharged better than gold and silver all the offices of money in that wonderfully prosperous republic. The committee might also have supplied me with a coin of a date of about the fourteenth century in England, going back a hundred years or so earlier than his coin of the Dutch Republic; a dollar of which then bought the day labor of fifty men, while it will now only buy the day labor of one man; in order that by holding up the coin, I might, to untutored minds, make the statement intelligible that gold and silver, instead of being the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, have shrunk in value ninety-eight per cent. in the last 500 years. The committee might easily have got for me a bond of the Confederate Government to hold up, as the gentleman has held up to former audiences a Confederate note, so that the people, when looking at the bond, might appreciate my statement, that when the Confederate Government fell, and its credit was good for nothing, its bonds were worth no more than its graybacks [applause]; and as a sort of a warning to the Republican party, which is piling up debt on the nation, States, local governments, corporations, and individuals, that there *is* such a thing as heaping the interest-bearing debt of a community to such a height as to sink it in utter insolvency. [Applause.] They might perhaps have supplied me with a bond issued by one of the Middle States, and which the State repudiated; issued, too, when there was none of this vicious legal tender paper money in existence; so that the people might understand, by looking at the bond, that it is not necessarily the issue of paper money that leads to repudiation. Sydney Smith had a large number of those bonds, and when the State repudiated, he exclaimed to some of his friends, in the language of St. Paul, "Would that you were all like me, brethren — *except these bonds.*" [Laughter and applause.] The committee might have furnished me the same kind of currency, perhaps, which the gentleman has spoken of often in these debates, telling how Captain Cook established cowry shells as legal tenders in the Sandwich Islands; and how he exchanged the cowries with the natives as the established currency of the Islands, until finally it turned out that Captain Cook held all the gold and the natives held all the cowries. [Laughter.] My friend has not actually exhibited any cowry shells in this debate, and so far, only, he was incomplete in his object lessons. [Laughter.]

But the cowry-shell legal tender is a pretty strong illustration, as he presents it, of the way the greenback and the gold have been managed in this country. When the purchasers of the bonds came to buy them

they gave par for them in cowries—legal tender paper money; but when they got the bonds they made them payable in gold, although they had agreed to take cowries for them. [Cheers.] So, too, here are eight billions of debt for which the persons, corporations, and States making the debt received greenbacks—cowry shells—with the understanding that when they came to pay the debt they might pay in cowries. But this resumption law provides that when the time of payment comes round, instead of paying in the cowry-shell greenback, they have got to pay in gold, [cheers]—in order that the holders of this vast sum of debt, when the transaction comes to be closed, shall have all the gold and leave to the natives all the cowries. [Applause.]

The gentleman says that whenever gold comes down ten per cent., silver will float at par as a fractional currency. Well, gold was down for many months before the passage of the resumption law, to nine per cent. Did you then see any silver among the people? [*Voices*, "No," no."] Not a bit of it. An ounce of fact is worth a pound of theory. [Cheers.]

The gentleman says we are going to overthrow the business of this country, by substituting greenbacks for national bank notes; for it will involve the withdrawal of $350,000,000 of currency, all at once, from among the people. It will do no such thing. The national banks, many of them, have retired their circulation since the resumption law passed. How do they do it? The president of a bank in Columbus who wants to retire its circulation may pack up $90,000 of greenbacks, go to Washington, give the greenbacks to the Treasurer, get the $100,000 of bonds deposited there as security for his bank circulation, take the bonds to New York, sell them at twenty per cent. premium, and come back to Columbus—all within two days—with $120,000 of greenbacks to put in his bank in place of the $90,000 taken away, and then loan them out at twelve or fifteen per cent. to the people. [Cheers.] We shall have the privilege of being shaved at the national banks just the same during and after the retirement of this bank circulation as to-day. [Laughter.]

The gentleman is distressed about the unconstitutionality of issuing greenbacks in time of peace. He says it is certainly unconstitutional. But the Supreme Court of the United States holds otherwise. It has decided that the greenback is constitutional; and does n't restrict the reasoning of the decision at all to the issue in time of war. [Cheers.] There is not a word in the decision of the court indicating that the legal tender notes may not be issued in peace as well as in war—not a word.

He says there will be vast centralization, and numberless corrupt subsidies, if the General Government issues greenbacks. Well, our Columbus platform declares expressly against all Government subsidies; whether in the shape of land, bonds, or money. [Cheers.] He seems to be fond of holding us to the Columbus platform in his discussions; and I therefore hope he will take that plank of our platform as an answer to his charge.

The currency must be "equal to the wants of trade." That seems to be exceedingly ridiculous to the gentleman. But, as he is a great stickler for party consistency, let us see what the Republican party of Ohio said in 1868 on the subject. "*Resolved*, That we heartily approve of the policy of Congress in stopping the contraction of the currency; [laughter and cheers] and we believe that the issue of the currency should be commensurate with the individual and commercial interests of the country." [Cheers.] I think that means "equal to the wants of trade." I indorsed that proposition as very good then; as I indorsed also the proposition in the same platform to pay the five-twenty bonds in greenbacks. [Applause.] But I find the promise of the Republican party either to stop contraction, or to make the currency equal to the wants of trade, or to pay the public debt according to the contract, is not very reliable. [Applause.]

The gentleman pleads for "honest money"—for the preservation of the national faith—and exhorts you not to commit dishonor and turn swindlers. The first legal tenders contained the endorsement—I am sorry I have not one to show you so that you may be able to understand the statement—[laughter and applause]—that those notes shall be exchangeable for five-twenty bonds. But the Republican party, while those notes were outstanding, passed an act declaring they should *not* be exchangeable for five-twenties. [Applause.] Those five-twenties—issued in the battle summer of the war, when the sons of Ohio were giving not only their time but their blood for the preservation of the unity of the Republic [applause]—were bought at from forty to fifty cents on the dollar, and were by the contract payable in greenbacks at par. The men who fought the war had the right to pay them in greenbacks. The men who made the vast sacrifices of the war, while the holders of money securities were to a large extent shrinking from personal exposure and personal loss, had a right to pay those bonds according to the contract. [Applause.] But the Republican party, after having won the election in 1868 on the faith of that pledge, wantonly, dishonestly, like a scoundrel, tore the power to pay those bonds in greenbacks from the people. [Cheers.] And now while all this green-

back money is afloat among the people—taken by them solely because it is a legal tender—Gen. Grant and Mr. Bristow propose that a law shall be passed stripping the greenback in the hands of the people of the power of paying their debts. [Applause.] And, further, though all the vast sum of eight billions of dollars of existing currency debt was made with the understanding that the people should have the right to discharge those debts in the money that they got for them, this resumption law proposes to swindle them out of seventeen per cent. more than they contracted to pay. [Applause.] Honesty and honor in dealing with financial questions! I am astonished at the gentleman talking here in behalf of the Republican party about either. [Cheers.] In point of oratorical nerve—I will not say audacity, for my friendship for the gentleman will not allow it—I have never known its parallel, except in the instance of Reynard the fox, who, after he had been out all Saturday night robbing hen-roosts, came in on Sunday morning to a congregation of foxes, and stepping into the pulpit, with the feathers still sticking in his whiskers, lectured them on the damnable sin of hen-stealing. [Laughter and cheers.]

The gentleman is quite facetious over the cry he heard from those dusky miners in Shawnee, "More greenbacks," "more greenbacks." What did that mean? It meant more work for unemployed men! ["That's so," and cheers.] It meant more food for suffering children and women. [Cheers.] It meant shoes for their feet and clothes for their backs. [Cheers.] This is fine talk to come from the city where $200,000,000 of unemployed money lies hoarded. Look at the prostrate industries of this country. See the stalwart, industrious men having no work, even at half wages. Look back at last winter. Think of the thousands and tens of thousands of men who left their homes in manufacturing and mining points like Shawnee—left their wives and helpless children, giving them the pittance that remained from prosperous days—and marched, with heavy heart, from house to house and farm to farm over the length and breadth of our great State, seeking to sell their labor for bread.

> "Oh! for a rake, a spade, a hoe,
> A pick-axe, or a bill" —

The wail of the pauper laborer of Great Britain heard at our doors in this land of bounty and plenty! [Cheers.] In my little city of Lancaster the mayor told me that there were 600 different men, able-bodied, sober men, who were brought up to some special avocation, and therefore were unable to engage in other pursuits successfully—not a

man of them a resident of our county—who came there in the bitter days of last winter and begged him to let them be locked up in our little cold jail. [Applause.] Some nights he said they were there in such numbers that in that small room they could n't even lie down, but had to stand up all night. "More greenbacks!" [Applause.] Aye, "Stop offering a premium for the withdrawal of money from the productive industries of the country"—that is what it means. Aye, "Give to the business of this country just the amount of currency it needs for legitimate purposes." [Cheers.] If that is the cry of the commune, I read history wrong. It is the cry of the American citizen who has the right to demand that, as long as we must depend on paper money which the Government may issue, it shall issue it itself, instead of hiring private corporations to do it—and shall issue it, too, in just such amount as the legitimate business of the country may be found to require [applause]—no matter whether it be a hundred millions more or a hundred millions less than the present volume of currency. There is no other rule for the quantity of money, but the demand of that legitimate business which will reopen our mines and shops, and give to the now stricken laborer constant employment at fair wages. [Cheers.]

Gentleman, my time is up, and the curtain now falls on our joint debates.